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Abstract 
 
Understanding why some organizations are more effective in their service 
delivery than others is a central discourse in both public administration and political 
organization. Scholars and practitioners all agree that the defining factor is institutional 
(state) capacity.  
 
Since the mid-1980s, deforestation in Zambia has been on the rise, especially in 
Protected Forest Areas, suggesting poor management by the Forestry Department, an 
institution mandated to manage these public lands. Ironically, despite the strategic 
position that forests hold in sustaining both the daily subsistence needs of over 90% of 
the Zambian population as well as the as the numerous industries that depend on this 
resource, the Forestry Department has not developed any specific 
strategies/interventions to combat forest degradation arguing that this problem is beyond 
its control; the department is underfunded and has inadequate forestry personnel to 
oversee its estates. Yet, the data shows that prior to 1980s Forestry Department 
operated very effectively on a relatively small budget and a lean structure.  
 
Utilizing longitudinal and cross-sectional data, and based on a multi-method 
analysis, this study explores the nexus between public administration and program 
implementation on one hand and, the role of politics in policy implementation on the 
other. Contrary to the Forestry Department’s mantra that inadequate financial outlays 
and field personnel have been the major factors contributing to forest degradation, this 
study has found that the problem is managerial incompetence, manifested in lack of 
visionary leadership, the practice of cronyism and clientelism, the breakdown in social 
capital support, including support by local Chiefs, and the poor quality of political 
connection between department managers and the larger political system. Clearly, 
resource allocation is a necessary but insufficient condition for improving institutional 
capacity, which is intimately connected to larger processes of governance. And this 
include, but not limited to, the rules, relationships and partnerships created among 
different actors, as well as the resultant environment that links these actors to the larger 
social capital outside ones’ locale.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The economic importance of indigenous forests2 to the Zambian 
economy and Forestry Department‟s role in ensuring that these 
resources are sustainably available to support both the industrial and 
daily subsistence needs of the Zambian people is well documented.3 
These forests support not only the subsistence needs of over 90% of the 
Zambian population (in terms of food, medicines, building materials, 
ecological stability, etc.) but are also intricately connected to numerous 
industries such as copper mining, manufacturing, construction, 
transport (railways), energy, agriculture, tourism, and wood processing 
and allied companies.  
Unfortunately, for some time now, at least since the late 1980s, 
forest degradation4 (arising mainly from deforestation) has been chipping 
away at this natural gem, a situation that is not only creating far 
                                                 
2
  These are also called natural or native forests to differentiate them from man-made industrial plantations, 
where typically exotic fast growing tree species are the norm. In the case of Zambia these include 
Eucalyptus and Pine species.  
3
  Forest Department, National Forestry Policy of 1965; National Forestry Policy of 2000; FD, Annual 
Reports, from 1965 to 2005; Oscar S. Kalumiana, Study of the Demand and Supply of Firewood and 
Charcoal in Central Province. 1996; GRZ, Zambia Forest Action Plan (PFAP), 1998; Esa Puustjarvi; Guni 
Mickels-Kokwe and Moses Chakanga, The Contribution of the Forest Sector to the National Economy and 
Poverty Reduction in Zambia, September 2005; MENR, Zambia Forest Action Plan, 1996, Volumes I, II 
and III. 
4
  Forest degradation is defined here as the loss of forest cover arising from various activities such as over-
exploitation for timber and charcoal production, illegal human settlements or simply claiming parts of such 
lands for agricultural purposes – the result of which if exposed to severe weather conditions makes such 
areas vulnerable. Under these conditions degraded forests lose their ability to provide various products and 
services and this could lead to severe consequences that may affect the people miles away from where that 
forest is. For simplicity, deforestation and forest degradation are used interchangeably in this study.  
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reaching environmental problems such as floods or droughts5 that are 
exacerbating food insecurity, but is also raising concerns that the loss of 
natural forests could soon affect the industries that have close 
connections to this resource. Ultimately, this may cause further 
unintended consequences on job security, incomes and in the national 
economy. Yet despite this strategic position that natural forests occupy 
in the national economy (at least in the minds of those who appreciate 
this importance), and given the potential ripple effects that could arise 
from the mismanagement of these forests, forest degradation is not being 
addressed with the speed and urgency it deserves. The Forestry 
Department (FD), an institution mandated to manage Zambia‟s forests, 
has not developed any clear strategies to combat this problem.  
In fact, forest degradation is particularly pronounced in the 
protected forest areas (PFAs), the estates directly administered by the 
Forestry Department, a central government bureau, than in the open 
forests which fall under the local Chiefs‟ jurisdiction. For instance, in 
1986 it was estimated that Zambia was losing between 250,000 to 
300,000 hectares (ha.) of forests per year,6 an outdated figure that 
Forestry Department continues to use to date. Since that time the 
department has not undertaken any forest inventory to establish the rate 
                                                 
5
  Felix Ndlovu, et al., Key Threats and Opportunities to Biological Diversity Conservation in the 
Copperbelt Province, 2004. 
6
 De Baker; Castro M.; Moses Chakanga, et. al., Wood Consumption Resource Survey, Technical Findings 
and Conclusion. Field Document No. 2, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Zambia. 1986. 
 
 M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L ,  P a g e  | 3 
 
 
of forest loss. Yet, considering the intricate connections that indigenous 
forests have in people‟s daily lives and the national economy at large, one 
would expect FD to have taken this as a priority issue because left 
unresolved forest degradation could have far reaching ripple effects 
across the nation. 
For over two decades (since mid 1980s) when forest degradation 
touched down and became recognized as a national problem, FD 
managers have continued to complain about inadequate funding and 
field personnel as two major constraints working against their efforts to 
manage the forest estates effectively. This argument is so entrenched it 
has become FD‟s mantra, and prominently features in all the 
department‟s official statements and reports both as an introduction as 
well as a conclusion. But since the department knows what is (or has 
been) causing forest degradation all these years, why has it continued to 
baby sit the problem for so long? How long should we buy into this 
argument that inadequate funding and labor shortage are really the 
[only] constraints not anything else? Why is it taking forever for the 
department to deal with a problem it has known for decades? Also 
considering that indigenous forests were in better shape at a time the 
department had fewer and a less qualified (skilled) labor force, doesn‟t 
this point towards managerial [in]competence rather than the other two 
capacities the department has championed every year? Obviously, this 
complaint raises an interesting hypothesis worth investigation.  
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It is important to note upfront that although FD is only directly 
responsible for the management of protected forest areas (PFAs), the 
focus of this study, the department also has indirect jurisdictional 
control over all natural (indigenous) forests in the country in that all 
forms of resource extractions (except those for home consumption) are 
licensed by the Forestry Department. It is therefore not an exaggeration 
to conceive FD‟s role as a guardian of all natural forests including open 
forests too, a public good and communally owned resource that changes 
hands through generational inheritance.7  
Taking FD‟s official statements as an entry point, this study 
investigates why deforestation and, as a consequence, forest degradation 
have remained unresolved for so long. Why has FD failed to stop forest 
degradation? How do we explain the long staying power of this problem? 
In other words, what factors account for the decline in the extent and 
quality of protected forest estates, including the seemingly community 
indifference towards forest conservation? Is this due to lack of 
institutional capacity (IC)? Is IC the only capacity needed? Are there no 
other factors at play? And what is institutional capacity? I address these 
questions in the discussion that follow throughout this dissertation.  
                                                 
7
  Land ownership in Chiefs‟ areas is based on one‟s lineage to a particular ethnic group. In the spirit of 
“One Zambia One Nation,” Chiefs use their discretion to embrace people from other ethnic groups who 
choose to settle in other areas away from their ethnic groups. This topic is discussed later in Chapter 5 
under the land tenure and ownership arrangements. 
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Institutional capacity means different things to different people.8 
Some focus on tangible resources (as in factors of production);9 others on 
the technical knowledge and skills;10 while others emphasize the 
functional aspects that highlight the centrality of the human factor,11 the 
glue that binds other resources to produce desirable outcome(s). In this 
study I conceptualize IC as comprising all the above: an organization has 
capacity when it has adequate and appropriate resources required to 
undertake a given task and to attain its goals.  
From a functional perspective I define IC as an organization‟s 
ability to create and sustain an environment and relationships that 
facilitate and support purposeful, collective action geared towards 
achieving its objectives.12 This definition is certainly more appropriate 
because it operationalizes IC and goes beyond the traditional conception 
that portrays IC in terms of quantity of the factors of production and 
overlooks the functional and relational interactions of the human factor 
with other factors both within and outside an organization. In this 
                                                 
8
  This topic is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
9
  Paul C. Nutt, Making Tough Decisions: Tactics for Improving Managerial Decision-Making, 1989; 
Victor A. Thompson, Decision Theory, Pure and Applied, 1971; Herbert A. Simon, et. al., Public 
Administration, 1950; Gortner, et. al., Organization Theory: A Public Perspective, (Dorsey Press), 1987. 
10
  Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems (Earthscan 
Publications), 2002. 
11
 Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research 
(Westview Press), 1997; Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 1990; Sue E. Crawford and 
Elinor Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” American Political Science Review, 89, No. 3, 1995:582-3; 
Richard W. Scott, Institutions and Organizations (Sage), 1989:21. 
12
 This definition draws on different scholars‟ conception of IC, e.g. Christine Lambert and Nick Oatley, 
“Capacity and Planning for Growth,” in: Goran Cars, et. al. (eds.), Urban Governance, Institutional 
Capacity and Social Milieux, 2002. 
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respect, IC is conceived both in terms of tangible inputs as well as the 
functional aspects. 
Although the focus of this study is strictly institutional capacity 
and how this has influenced FD‟s performance outcomes on natural 
forests management, it is also important to note that other intervening 
factors such as climate, population growth, political economy dynamics, 
international treaties on forestry and the environment, and government 
policy reforms and interventions (e.g. the [in]famous World Bank/IMF 
sponsored structural adjustment program and its conditionalities) which 
have the potential to tilt the scale are also acknowledged as part of the 
larger discussion.  
However, initially these external factors are kept constant so we 
can first analyze the institutional capacity dimension and its impacts. 
This is done on the assumption that these conditions applied equally to 
all sectors and agencies not just to forestry and the forest agency. The 
only difference is how the managers in respective bureaus responded to 
such conditions, which speaks to the idea of managerial capacity, the 
focus of this dissertation. For this reason, external factors re-appear as 
part of the larger discussion. As we will see later this helps to put FD‟s 
achievements and shortcomings into context that managerial capacity 
has been a defining characteristic on what was and was not achieved, 
and now continues to be a major weakness. And why should anyone care 
about this? One reason is that this kind of inquiry gives us the 
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opportunity to launch into a larger question of why forestry in Zambia 
contributes so little to the national gross domestic product (GDP), 
ranging from 0.02 to 0.09%.13 Secondly, and better still, since state 
capacity is a sum of its parts (i.e. its agencies), understanding the factors 
affecting the performance of individual bureaus is a good starting point 
to get to know how weak states, a common phenomenon on the African 
continent, come about. And Zambia is no exception. For instance, 
despite its natural wealth both below and above ground, Zambia has 
been successfully managed into oblivion. The country has fallen from 
being a medium high income nation to becoming a highly indebted poor 
country (HIPC). So the larger question worth investigating, which this 
study partially contributes to, is how did the Zambian government lose 
the ability to manage its economic affairs effectively? And what can be 
done to rectify the situation? Before addressing these institutional / state 
capacity issues a brief history about the case study and forestry work in 
Zambia will be appropriate. 
 
The Case Study 
 Zambia covers a total area of 752,612 square kilometers (km2), just 
slightly bigger than the state of Texas, and shares borders with eight 
neighbors: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Administratively, the 
                                                 
13
  CSO, Monthly Digest of Statistics, from 1970 to 2005. 
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country is divided into nine provinces,14 and currently has a total 
population of 11.7 million15 people of which 35% live in urban areas and 
the remaining 65% are in the rural areas.16 This has been an interesting 
shift considering that for a long time Zambia has been the most 
urbanized country in Southern Africa, a phenomenon the Kaunda 
administration tried to change through its “go back to the land” policy 
but which never worked. Better living conditions in the urban areas (paid 
employment, good wages and availability of social services) acted as 
strong magnets that accelerated the rural-urban drift. But following 
some policy reforms in the 1990s and beyond that necessitated 
downsizing of the public service and closure of previously state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) people have been forced to seek other means of 
livelihoods, and going back to the land became a natural, if not, the only 
choice. As a former colony British, and particularly for purposes of 
unifying the different ethnic groupings, English has been retained as the 
official language. Traditionally, Zambia boasts of 73 local languages 
(compressed to 7 for administrative convenience),17 which translate into 
an enormous cultural and linguistic diversity the Zambian social 
landscape is famous for (Figure 1.1).18  
 
                                                 
14
  CSO, Living Conditions 2004c:1, 13. 
15
  CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html.  Accessed 
May 28, 2008.   
16
  CSO, Living Conditions, Monitoring Survey Report, 2002-2003, (CSO: Lusaka), 2004c:13 
17
  Hywel D. Davies, Zambia in Maps, (University of London Press), 1971:35; George Kay, A Social 
Geography of Zambia, 1967:44-45. 
18
  Scott. D. Taylor, Cultures and Customs of Zambia, (Greenwood Press: West Port, Connecticut), 2006. 
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Figure 1.1: Cultural and Linguistic Diversity in Zambia.  
 
 
Source: Hywel D. Davies, Zambia in Maps (1967). 
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Politically, this cultural and ethnic diversity is a huge challenge in 
that these social groupings have different demands on the state. Not only 
do bureaucrats have to deal with various Chiefs in one Province, but they 
also have to know and respect the cultural aspects of these ethno-
linguistic groupings. Therefore, to ensure program success, creating 
rapport with the indigenous people in their tribal areas is a must.  
In terms of forestry resources, Zambia is one of the most forested 
countries in Southern Africa. Out of its total land mass (752,612 km2) 
about 60% (446,000 Km2) of it is covered by indigenous forests, of which 
roughly 9.8% (73,783 km2) are protected forest areas (directly managed 
by Forestry Department) while 8.4% are National Parks and Game 
Reserves (Figure 1.2), exclusively set aside as wildlife habitats and are 
managed by the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). Together this brings 
the total protected forest area to 18.2%.19 The remaining forest cover 
constitutes unprotected forests, commonly called open forests, which fall 
under the Chiefs‟ jurisdiction. A word of caution is appropriate here: the 
figures just quoted above should be taken with a pinch of salt in that the 
last forest survey was done in 1986 and since then a lot has changed.20  
 
                                                 
19
 Most likely these figures may have changed due to proposed degazettement of portions of some PFAs for 
human settlements and agricultural purposes. Also note that FD does not exclude forests that are already 
illegally settled. Thus, even without degazettement, the actual area on the ground is lower than what the 
official reports say. For some specific examples, see Felix Njovu, et. al., Key Threats and Opportunities to 
Biological Diversity Conservation in the Copperbelt Province, 2004. 
20
 Each year Forestry Department Annual Reports acknowledge that illegal encroachment is the biggest 
problem the department faces, including right now, so much so that some forests have since been 
degazetted. But FD still uses the outdated deforestation rates generated over 20 years during the 1986 forest 
survey where it was estimated that Zambia lost 250,000 to 300,000 ha. of indigenous forests each year.   
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Protected Forest Areas in Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map created by: Rose Makano 
Based on data from Forestry Department, Provincial Forest Action Programme, 2005
21
 
Insert accessed from:  http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1997/ofr-97-470/OF97-470A/  
                                                 
21
  This map is based on data that has not been adjusted to incorporate forest loss due to illegal settlements. 
Because such areas have not been officially been degazetted, the Forestry Department counts them as if 
they still exist. Except for National Parks which are likely to be intact, the situation on the ground is quite 
different with respect to Protected Forests.  
Provincial boundaries
National Parks
Protected Forests
Zambia: Protected Forests and National Parks
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For instance, the consumption of forest products has gone up due 
to due population growth and also the high unemployment rate that has 
forced more people to depend on forests. Second, following the free 
market policy espoused under the structural adjustment program (SAP), 
a policy initiative dictated by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), there has been an increase in the number of 
timber processing companies from 4 commercial sawmills in 1984 to 264 
in 2000. When these companies are grouped according to the type of 
species they processed, 61.74% of these sawmills extract indigenous 
timber and only 38.26% dealt with plantation timber (Table 1.1).22 
Therefore, with this increase in sawmills timber extracted will certainly 
be higher than what was extracted when sawmills were few, meaning 
that the deforestation rate should be higher now than then. 
 
Table 1.1: Number of Timber Processing Companies, 1984-2000.  
 
CATEGORY 
SIZE AND TYPE OF SAWMILL 
TOTAL 
% of 
TOTAL  
 
Commercial Medium Small Pit-saws 
Indigenous-based 59 - - 104* 163 61.74 
Plantation-based 8 10 83 - 101 38.26 
 
TOTAL 
 
67 
 
10 
 
83 
 
104 
 
264 
 
100 
% OF TOTAL 25.38 3.79 31.44 39.39 
 
* This figure covers only the period from 1994-2000. 
                                                 
22
  The summary in Table 1.1 is based on information accessed from Export Board of Zambia, 2000; 
Forestry Department Annual Reports, 1984 to 2000. See also Rosemary Makano, The Effect of the 
Structural Adjustment Program on Forest Management in Zambia, (University of Missouri-St. Louis), 
MPPA Thesis, 2002 [unpublished]. 
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Yet, forest managers continue to use old figures from 1986 wood 
consumption survey23 as though no changes have taken place since 
then. What is the logic behind using outdated information that does not 
reflect the situation on the ground? Why doesn‟t FD update its data? I 
address these questions in Chapter 4 where the research findings are 
discussed. For now let us briefly look at how forestry has evolved as an 
enterprise and what FD has done over the years. 
 
Forestry Development in Zambia: An Overview. 
Forestry work in Zambia began in 1931 as a section under the 
Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development. The primary purpose of the section was to deal with 
forestry issues faced by farmers. Later in 1947 the forestry section was 
transformed into a fully-fledged department: one that could deal with all 
forestry issues, including those related to commercial exploitation (e.g. 
timber for the mining industry, transportation, construction, etc. 
sectors), rather than for subsistence use only as the primary mandate 
seems to suggest. Thus, following this upgrade in 1947 the forestry 
section was moved from the Department of Agriculture to become a fully-
fledged department, headed by the Chief Conservator of Forests,24 in the 
                                                 
23
  De Baker; Castro M.; Moses Chakanga, et. al., Wood Consumption Resource Survey, 1986. 
24
 A name change to Director was proposed in the Forestry Act of 2000, which has not yet become law. 
There has been strong speculation that because this Act has proposed phasing out the Forestry Department 
to create the Forestry Commission (FC), the Director and probably others in the upper r echelon are fearful 
of draining their own pond. The phasing out of the department means that all FD employees have to re-
apply to join the FC. 
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Ministry of Lands and Water Affairs. And its mandate was substantially 
expanded. Although the forestry section was created in 1931, generally 
1947 is taken as the beginning of scientific forest management in Zambia 
since that is the year when FD became a full-fledged department and 
embarked on a new course of systematic forest management, an area 
where the department performed exceptionally beyond expectations until 
the mid 1980s when the situation seemingly fell apart.  The department 
was no longer able to increase the size of its estates let alone maintain 
the existing ones. Thus, both the size and quality of its estates started to 
deteriorate as evidence currently shows in the number of forests taken 
over by illegal settlers, which have further accelerated forest degradation. 
The question I ask and answer in this dissertation is how and why did 
this happen?  
 In the discussion that follows, I lay out in very broad strokes some 
of the issues or areas that may have led to the current problem, all of 
which have connections to management choices that the department 
took over the years. Either the department did something about the 
issue(s) and failed, done a little and abandoned it, completely ignored the 
issue(s), or was simply unaware of the issue(s) and therefore did not 
attend to them at all. Whatever the situation, we can only point a finger 
at forest managers and demand that keeping the status quo is certainly 
not working well, and therefore a new approach is needed. 
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Forestry Department’s Mandate 
Prior to 1965, the Forestry Department‟s mandate can be 
summarized as covering the following areas:25 
a) To supply timber to the copper mines; 
b) To carry out enumeration surveys and to prepare 
management plans; 
c) To supply timber to industry; 
d) To carry out forest research and extension; 
e) To carry out reservation of forest estates in cooperation with 
the Chiefs and local government authorities; and  
f) To train junior staff in forestry.26 
 
But after 1965 the policy changed substantially to FD to do more 
than just forest conservation but also to develop forestry into an 
economic sector capable of creating job opportunities, a task partially 
achieved.  
In terms of policy implementation, notice that that the law 
specifically mandated the department to work cooperatively with the 
Local Chiefs and local government authorities. This is particularly not 
inconsequential because Chiefs own much of the land in Zambia. Out of 
the nation‟s total landmass, Chiefs have 93.9% (70.5 million ha.) broken 
down into two categories: 57.7% (43.3 million ha) is Trust land, and 
                                                 
25
 GRZ, Forest Ordinance of 1947. 
26
  The training at this time was limited to non-degree level, mainly aimed at training Forest Rangers (1 
year training) and Forest Guards (6 months training program). 
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36.2% (27.2 million ha) as Reserve land27, while only 6% (4.5 million ha.) 
of the land, mainly found along the line of rail and commonly referred to 
as State land, belongs to central government. This land ownership 
arrangement dates back to the colonial era and the new republic chose to 
maintain it mainly because the modern contemporary or Weberian state 
could not dismantle the traditional state structures (kingdoms and 
chiefdoms) to create a unified state. Instead, the modern state 
superimposed itself over these traditional structures, choosing to work 
through them rather than destroy them as that could have created more 
problems. Thus, with respect to land tenure these two types of authority 
operate side by side, each with a different degree and sphere of control. I 
will discuss how this complicates land use in Zambia at a later stage. For 
now let us just note that this land ownership pattern has always put the 
Chiefs in a stronger position as to what can or cannot be done with their 
land. Central government cannot do anything in Chiefs‟ areas until each 
respective Chief approves it. In other words, when it comes to land, 
central government only has paper power: it has to get permission to use 
any portion of land that belongs to the Chiefs. At times central 
government has to exchange land with the Chiefs to implement certain 
projects of in Chiefs‟ areas. The Lake Kariba project in Southern 
Province, which feeds the Kariba Hydro-Power Station, the nation‟s 
                                                 
27
 M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in 
Ng‟andwe, A. (ed.), Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third 
Republic of Zambia, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45 
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largest power source, is a good example in this regard. Central 
government had to give up part of its land to accommodate the people 
who were misplaced by the Lake Kariba project. 
Also since the land given to central government for forest 
conservation is not sold but Chiefs only get into an agreement with 
central government that ascribes legal powers to FD to act as a manager 
over such lands, strictly speaking these forests still remain the Chiefs‟ 
property and can revert to the Chiefs whenever the Chiefs communicate 
to central government that they want their land back. This means that 
the FD operates at the Chiefs‟ pleasure. The department is obliged to 
abide by what the Chiefs want in their areas, which in this case may 
explain why local communities have the liberty to taken over the forests 
whenever they want.  
Therefore, if FD has to be successful in getting more land from the 
Chiefs for protection, it needs both the blessings of the Chiefs (to operate 
in their Chiefdoms), and the cooperation of the larger community in 
those respective areas. This is the kind of support FD had always 
received and relied upon and gave FD the unmatched strength it 
exhibited. And because the Forest Act allowed the local communities free 
access to the forest resources provided the resource in question was for 
subsistence consumption, declaring any land a protected forest area did 
not alter, threaten or curtail people‟s access rights in any way. People 
paid fees only if one was extracting a resource for commercial use – i.e. 
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for resale. In a way this legal provision humanized government‟s 
intentions and dispelled fears for government take-over of communal 
lands. Free access for subsistence use assured the local communities 
that their government cared for their needs and gave them further hope 
that government would live by its word of managing these forests in a 
way that would create more job opportunities for them. As a result, there 
was a strong sense of government and local community partnership. And 
for the most part this arrangement worked quite well: there was mutual 
respect and trust between the FD and the local communities. 
But as the FD exerted more power over the management of the 
PFAs and started to see the local communities as a problem and not part 
of the management team, this compromised local people‟s trust and 
sowed seeds of mistrust. For instance, government promulgated the laws 
on PFAs with no input from the Chiefs and their subjects, acting as 
though such lands no longer belonged to the Chiefs. This shift in 
relations created a sense of alienation among the local communities who 
saw the government as the new owners and managers of what previously 
belonged to them and felt cheated as having given up their property. 
Their alienation and eventual withdrawal of their involvement in forest 
conservation weakened the very source of the department‟s strength. 
Some people might wonder: is this information necessary in a 
study looking at institutional capacity and not land ownership? The 
response is: certainly, yes! Part of the reason why there has been an 
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upswing in forest encroachments (which is contributing to forest 
degradation) is because people feel cheated and are now trying to reclaim 
their property. Whether their reaction is legal or illegal is a different 
matter all together. The key issue here is that these state-society 
relations need to be revisited if a lasting solution to forest degradation is 
to be found.  
Sadly, the FD hardly views this problem from this angle. Instead, it 
sees these local communities as simply non-law abiding citizens who 
need to be dealt with legally. If anything, the best the department has 
done is pay lip service to the issue. Forest managers agree that they need 
to adopt joint forest management (JFM), an approach which incorporates 
local communities as equal partners in forest management. Yet, this idea 
still remains on government shelves. The 2000 Forest Act which gave 
legal recognition to the JFM concept has yet to become law. The Forestry 
Director has not prepared a Statutory Instrument, the last piece of paper 
work required to activate any Act into law. In the meantime, forest 
encroachments are on the rise. And as history has shown so far, 
whenever a forest has been heavily encroached, illegal settlers have 
always won – those forests always get degazetted!28  In short, the strategy 
has been successful and underscores the fact that central government is 
aware of its power limitations over communal lands, and is therefore 
                                                 
28
  FD, Annual Reports from 1988 to 2005;  Davy Siame, 1997; Felix Njovu, et. al., 2004  
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usually not keen to put up a fight over what is known to belong to the 
people.  
A point to note here is that this challenge is not peculiar to 
Zambia. It is a problem faced by any government where traditional 
structures of governance exist side by side with the modern 
contemporary state. The real challenge is how should these two layers of 
authority be reconciled to become one rather than continue to exist as 
two different entities, sharing the power base? I address these questions 
in Chapter 6 where I also offer some recommendations. 
In terms of policy, although the latest Forest Policy of 1999 places 
more emphasis on provision of extension services, overall the policy 
intent in the two previous National Forest Policy documents (1947, and 
1965) have more or less remained the same, essentially retaining the five 
main areas specified in the National Forest Policy of 1965. 
 
The Economic Importance of Natural Forests 
As noted in my opening statement, the economic importance of 
forests in Zambia is a matter that requires no further defense. To begin 
with, forests are the only secure safety net available to most people. 
About 80% of Zambia‟s population (or 90% in rural areas) depends on 
wood-based energy for cooking and heating their houses,29 including a 
host of other products and services mentioned earlier. In other words, 
                                                 
29
 MENR, Zambia Forest Action Plan, Vol. II, 1998:16-17 
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these natural forests are literally the only source of survival available to 
most Zambians in one way or another. Viewed from a modern or western 
conception these forests are a drug store, a supermarket, a hardware 
outlet for timber and other building materials, as well as being ecological 
stabilizers. In terms of actual income, it has been estimated that forests 
contribute about US$197 million annually to rural household incomes. 
But this figure drops to around US$175 million (roughly 11% reduction) 
when forest degradation sets in,30 meaning that when the forests are 
denuded of their ability to sustain rural life by providing basic necessities 
this has grave consequences on the rural and even unemployed urban 
population.  
While the effect of forest degradation on rural income might look minimal 
to some above average (or well paid) sections of society, for a person 
solely dependent on these forests as their only or major source of 
livelihood, any decline is monumental. Any loss of income can be a 
matter of life and death for families without any other means of 
livelihood. This is precisely one reason why forest degradation is or has 
become a source of concern, particularly to the local communities 
around such forests that have been on the receiving end of the negative 
impacts that have arisen from this phenomenon. For many of these 
forest-dependent communities, whose survival rests entirely on the 
bounty provisions from mother nature that these forests provide in the 
                                                 
30
  Puustjarvi, Mickels-Kokwe and Chakanga, The Contribution of the Forest Sector to the National 
Economy, September 2005; 
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form of food, wood energy (fuelwood, charcoal), building materials, 
medicines and a host of other services e.g. the protection of headwaters, 
streams and rivers, etc., the loss of any forest has meant a corresponding 
loss of income and a slump in their socio-economic well being.  
From a national perspective, forestry still occupies a very 
important and strategic position in the national economy through its 
connection to numerous industries in the manufacturing, mining, 
construction, transportation, energy, water, agriculture and, tourism 
sectors, including all the wood processing and allied industries that 
derive their existence directly from these natural forests. Left unchecked 
forest degradation has the potential to bring these industries to their 
knees, and the ripple effects on the economic well being of the nation are 
quite obvious.  
For a long time forestry was perceived as a twin pillar to copper 
mining, Zambia‟s economic backbone. Thanks to previous FD 
management teams who successfully marketed the department as 
deserving this position and recognition. Prior to 1970s timber served as a 
major and cheapest energy source in the mining operations. Though not 
extensively used as a source of energy, timber still remains an important 
input for underground construction and support works.31  
Unfortunately, these economic connections have not been 
highlighted and reinforced by latter FD management teams thereby 
                                                 
31
  Dennis Musaba, Snr., Geologist (and Retired Mine Captain) under Chibuluma Copper Mines – personal 
communication, 2007.  
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making forestry look as though it has no economic value of national 
importance. This is one area where the FD has terribly failed. When 
forestry was seen as sustaining copper mining, the economic muscle of 
the nation, the department had unparalleled prominence in the policy 
arena. And this helped in making both the general and specific 
arguments about the economic importance of forests. Now FD‟s linkage 
to copper mining has waned off, leaving us to question why.  
Although it is not easy to state with certainty how and why copper 
mining and forestry ceased to be seen as two sides of the same coin,32 
one can speculate that the „divorce‟ occurred (or at least that relationship 
was weakened) when the copper mines switched to using electricity as 
their source of energy. Timber was no longer the critical resource it had 
been portrayed to be for copper mining. As a result, the policy makers‟ 
perception of the importance of forests also changed. And since FD 
management has failed to re-invent or re-position the department either 
by reclaiming its previous position with the copper mines since timber is 
still extensively used for underground works, or connecting the 
department to other sectors such as health, agriculture, tourism, 
construction, wood processing industries, etc., where forests have close 
ties, this managerial failure has driven FD almost into oblivion, despite 
the various opportunities available. For instance, the heightened global 
interest and concerns about sustainable development and environmental 
                                                 
32
  This is another possible area worth investigating since no specific study has been conducted 
in this respect. 
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management gives FD a seamless opportunity to be seen again as an 
important bureau. Also FD can still reposition itself using the numerous 
sectors and services that forestry supports and provides, respectively.  
The second reason for FD‟s fall from grace can be found in the 
perceived sense of accomplishment that central government felt seeing 
the department‟s achievements. What do I mean by this? Simply put, the 
success of the industrial plantations project which culminated into 
planting over 60,000 hectares of plantations in the Copperbelt Province, 
home to copper mining, clearly demonstrated to central government that 
the country was able to handle any timber needs for the mines as well as 
other sectors. Consequently, this gave central government a sense of 
security to move on and support other sectors to reach a similar level of 
achievement and independence.  
The third reason is the financial hard times and the regional 
political engagements that the Zambian government found itself in, both 
of which necessitated cutting down support to some sectors which in this 
case included forestry.  
Finally, but definitely not the least, there is the question of 
national security. As a land-locked nation surrounded by eight 
neighbors, in a region still not completely free of civil wars and political 
upheaval,33 Zambia‟s national security owes a lot to how its forests 
                                                 
33
  For instance, political liberation movements that characterized the region since 1960s to early 1990s 
offer good examples of how FD‟s professional excellence kept Zambia free of these potential problems. 
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within and along its borders are managed. Both rebel groups and 
migrating civilians running away from conflict zones are a political risk 
and can pose potential problems for a receiving peaceful nation like 
Zambia whose forests can easily be turned into illegal camps if they are 
not well policed and managed.  And the opposite has been just as true. 
With respect to management [in]capacity, FD‟s failure to manage 
these natural forests and especially its inability to deal with the problem 
of deforestation for so long raises concerns that there is much more to 
this problem than just inadequate funding and labor shortage at field 
staff level. Looking at this issue from a higher level, this may probably 
suggest that this type of work ethic permeates the Zambian bureaucracy 
so much so that it could explain why the country has not taken 
advantage of its natural capital to push its economy to a higher level. 
Therefore, FD‟s failure to manage the nation‟s natural capital 
compromises people‟s livelihoods and negates the department‟s 
usefulness to society. For this reason, it becomes pertinent to question 
why the department is failing to fulfill its mandate and obligations.   
 
The Global and Local Perspective  
Although countries differ in the route they took to attain higher 
levels of economic development there is however one common 
denominator: those who excelled built their institutional capacities and 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, the ongoing civil war in Congo DR, up north, and the political instability in Zimbabwe now 
stand as new challenges Zambian foresters have to be on the lookout for.  
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used their resources prudently.34 Of course this does not gloss over the 
fact that some countries learned this the hard way: they mortgaged long-
term benefits for short-term economic gains. Japan, which harvested 
almost all of its forests for the ship industry, is a good example in this 
respect. However, Japan later embraced plantation forestry to rectify the 
error, which again speaks to the idea of having or building institutional 
capacity to do this. It takes visionary leaders to do this, which is clearly 
lacking in FD. In fact, if what is happening in the Forestry Department is 
an indicator of a general trend across the Zambian civil service, then it is 
time institutional capacity is taken as an issue requiring immediate 
attention on the national agenda.   
As the world has come to appreciate, effects of forest degradation 
go beyond the immediate vicinity to affect people miles away, both within 
the national borders and beyond. In some cases land degradation has led 
to misplacement of people as such lands become inhabitable. In extreme 
cases such developments have ultimately lead to conflicts as people 
compete for the remaining parcels of land. The conflict in Dar Fur, Sudan 
presents itself as a classical example accelerated by shortage of land due 
to degradation.35 For example, forest degradation in Zambia has been 
found to be an underlying cause to water shortage in some parts of the 
                                                 
34
  Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal, A Concise Economic History of the World, (Oxford University Press), 
2003; Edward B. Barbier, Natural Resources and Economic Development, (Cambridge University Press), 
2005; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence, (Cambridge 
University Press), 1994 
35
  For more details on Dar Fur, see Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Gadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder), 2006.  
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Copperbelt Province and else.  Forest depletion in the Lamba headwaters 
catchment area (source of the Kafue River and its tributaries) is causing 
soil erosion and choking the streams that feed into the Kafue River, the 
main supplier of water to the Copperbelt and other provinces 
downstream. If not mitigated this problem could escalate to affect other 
infrastructure such as the Kafue Gorge hydro-power station which is fed 
from the same river. As other case studies have shown, environmental 
problems associated with forest depletion are not unusual. They have 
been noted in varying degrees elsewhere too. For instance, Nepal, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Guinea faced similar challenges that 
fortunately have since been reversed with USAID‟s help.36  
Globally about one quarter of the world‟s rural population directly 
depend on forests for its livelihood.37 And when forest degradation sets in 
their livelihood is compromised. Thus, forest degradation has gone 
beyond creating energy problems to affecting whole livelihoods. 
Indirectly, forest degradation has and continues to exacerbate food 
insecurity (and by extension poverty levels) as whole communities lose 
their crops due to flooding, soil erosion or drought thus creating more 
impoverished people in need of help.  
In Zambia, the Eastern, Central and Northern Provinces, especially 
areas along the Luangwa River, have particularly suffered from flooding 
                                                 
36
  Robert Clausen and Amelia Hube, USAID’s Enduring Legacy in Natural Forests: Livelihoods, 
Landscapes, and Governance, Vol. I, 2007:2-3 
37
 Clausen and Hube, USAID’s Enduring Legacy in Natural Resources, Vol. I, 2007:1. 
 M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L ,  P a g e  | 28 
 
 
while the people in Southern Province have been victims of drought. 
Either way the loss of crops (and farming areas) has accelerated their 
vulnerability to food insecurity. Also because forest loss, mainly due to 
unsustainable agricultural activities,38 is higher in these provinces than 
elsewhere, forest degradation has been identified as having a connection 
to these problems in these provinces. Yet, for all these years the Forestry 
Department (FD) has just continued to stand by doing nothing to stop 
forest degradation. In an era when the global community has embraced 
sustainable development and its attention drawn towards achieving the 
millennium goals, one of which is poverty reduction, unfortunately FD is 
completely unaware of its role in working towards these global goals. 
This is in spite of the enormous potential that forests have to supply 
countless products and services all of which can lift people out of 
poverty. As case studies from across the globe have shown when forests 
are well managed there is a corresponding level of well being among 
those who derive their livelihood from there, either directly or indirectly.39  
National Economic and Political Importance 
 
  Strictly speaking Zambia is not poor, at least not from its natural 
resource endowment. All across the country there is an abundance of 
natural resources both under and above ground, and all of it with 
                                                 
38
  The Chitemene system of agriculture is overwhelmingly blamed for being responsible for extensive loss 
of forests in Northern and some parts of Central Provinces. 
39
 Clausen and Hube, USAID’s Enduring Legacy in Natural Forests: Livelihoods, Landscapes, and 
Governance, Vol. I, II and III, 2007.  
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enormous economic value.40 None of the 9 Provinces can be singled out 
as not having anything of value. And this is particularly true on natural 
forests that are estimated to cover 60% (about 446 Km2) of the country‟s 
landmass; of which 9.6% are protected forest reserves,41 directly 
managed by the Forestry Department, and another 8.4% are in the form 
of National Parks (NPs) and Game Management Areas (GMAs)42 that fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). Thus, in 
total 18% of Zambia‟s landmass is technically classified as a protected 
forest area (Figure 1.2), while the rest are open forests that fall under 
the jurisdiction of traditional rulers (local Chiefs) or Ministry of Lands 
(State Land).  
In respect to other natural resources, Zambia is also blessed with 
abundant water resources (Figure 1.3), fertile soils and a good tropical 
climate all of which are important ingredients that could propel a nation 
to economic and social well being. Furthermore, apart from its natural 
resource endowment, Zambia‟s other strength lies in being a 
demographically young nation which means that finding young energetic 
labor suitable for forestry jobs would not be a problem.   
 Out of its 11.7 million total population 51.4% is between 15-64 
years of age, 45.8% is under 15 years, and only 2.8% is above 65 years 
                                                 
40
  MENR, Zambia Forestry Action Plan, Vol. II – Challenges and Opportunities, 1996:1 
41
  A note of caution is appropriate here. These figures have not been updated in years. The area under 
PFAs is less than what Forestry Department reports as this study has discovered and subsequently 
highlighted. See for instance MENR, ZFAP, Vol. II, 1996:58 and FD Annual Report for 2005 both of which 
quote the same figures 9 years apart despite their central argument that deforestation has been in the rise. 
42
  Davy Siame, “Forest Resource Management and Drought”, in: IUCN, The Environmental Impact of the 
1991-1992 Drought on Zambia, Proceedings of the IUCN Drought study Follow-up Workshop. 1997:74 
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old.43 At 89% literacy level, and with 65% of the population living in rural 
areas,44 availability of skilled labor force is also not a problem: it can be 
found everywhere. This social capital is clearly an economic asset if put 
to productive use.  
 
Figure 1.3: Zambia: Major Freshwater Bodies. 
 
 
 
Source:  http://unimaps.com/zambia/index.html.      Accessed:  Sunday, May 25, 2008  
 
 
                                                 
43
  CSO, Living Conditions, 2004c:15 
44
  CSO, Living Conditions, 2004c:14. This literacy rate refers to people 15 years and older.  
 M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L ,  P a g e  | 31 
 
 
While the nation‟s social capital is under threat from the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic (15.6% of the adult population was estimated to be HIV 
positive in 2001-2002),45 there are positive signs that the situation is 
getting under control. Therefore, with the above factors of production in 
place the cloth is well cut for both government and private entrepreneurs 
to derive some economic benefits from these assets.  
However, despite this enormous natural endowment, Zambia has 
slipped from being a medium income country to join the [in]famous club 
of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), a status earned in 2005. 
Unlike some countries that have had political upheavals, Zambia has 
enjoyed a relatively peaceful and stable political climate since 
independence.46  The question then is why is a country so rich be poor? 
Could this be due to lack of institutional capacity in respective 
government agencies that are mandated to oversee how the country‟s 
resources are managed and utilized? Or are there other factors beyond 
this managerial capacity equation?  
  One such possibility would be climate change that has 
intermittently caused drought and floods, particularly starting from the 
1990s. However, there is no evidence yet that shows a direct destructive 
effect of drought/floods over the forest resources.47 The forests have been 
                                                 
45
  CSO, Zambia: Sexual Behaviour Survey 2003, CSO: Lusaka. March 2004a 
46
  It is important to note that the country has experienced two coup attempts; one each during President 
Kenneth Kaunda‟s and Frederick Chiluba‟s administrations. But none of them caused any major 
disruptions.  
47
  No research has been conducted on this topic yet. But the general observations shared during a review of 
the impact of the 1991/92 drought point to the fact that forestry and other sectors such as agriculture and 
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quite resilient to these climatic changes. Instead, the impact from climate 
change may be rather indirect. For instance, loss of agricultural 
production (crops and livestock) due to drought and, or floods has 
generally forced the affected populations to look to and (I dare say) 
“mine” the forests for their survival and livelihood. And this has been 
particularly telling in an era of high unemployment (over 50%) that has 
been accelerated by a poor economy.48 In this context climate change 
may qualify to be on the list of “drivers” to forest loss. 
Another factor relates to the policy choices or policy shifts that the 
Zambian government has embraced over the years, some of which were 
not sympathetic to forestry. The SAP qualifies here for its role and impact 
that arose from downsizing the Zambian bureaucracy (which cut down 
forestry personnel). While the SAP‟s underlying rationale of promoting 
fiscal responsibility, a free market economy, and reducing government 
expenditures to balance the national budget were all noble in principle, 
their impact in forestry circles have been devastating. Reduction in 
government expenditure translated into low allocations to forestry 
programs and therefore ultimately dictated what could and could not be 
done. Currency devaluation, which was meant to make local products 
cheaper and therefore supposedly stimulate more exports, did the exact 
                                                                                                                                                 
tourism all suffered either directly or indirectly. For more details on this, see IUCN-The World 
Conservation Union, The Impact of the 1991/92 Drought on Zambia, 1997. 
48
  Based on its poor economic status, Zambia was finally classified in 2005 as a Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC). See CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/za.html.  Accessed May 28, 2008   
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opposite both at individual and corporate levels. At the very best, 
currency devaluation only eroded people‟s lifelong savings and made it 
difficult for new investments to emerge. Put together these and other SAP 
conditionalities indirectly created a new set of challenges that forestry 
managers were hardly prepared to deal with. For example, privatization 
of parastatal companies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), one condition 
and outcome of the SAP, led to the closure of these companies and 
ultimately contributed to the high unemployment. This loss of jobs forced 
more people to seek a livelihood from forests. Hence, like climate change, 
the impact from SAP has also been indirect.  
Furthermore, the increase in national population and 
unemployment rates, all of which have potential to drive changes in 
forest status, are issues that need close examination. As population has 
grown from 3.4 million people at independence49 in 1964 to 11.7 million 
to date,50 so has the need for land and other resources. On the other 
hand, the high unemployment is in double figures, 11% in 2002-03,51 
and currently estimated at around 50%. Therefore, forest loss may come 
not as a consequence of managerial incapacity but as a natural 
progression responding to population growth. I return to discuss these 
issues in Chapter 5 and 6. 
                                                 
49
 George Kay, The Social Geography of Zambia (University of London Press), 1957:46-47 
50
 CIA - The World Factbook-Zambia,  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/za.html.  Accessed: May 28, 2008.  In 2004 the Central Statistical Office in Zambia had 
estimated the national population to be 10, 757,192. see CSO, Living Conditions, Monitoring Survey Report 
2002-2003, (Central Statistical Office: Lusaka), November 2004c:13 
51
  CSO, Living Conditions, 2004c:62 
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And finally, the policy reforms on land ownership cannot be 
ignored. There have been numerous changes to the Land Policy, one of 
which introduced title to land in Chiefs‟ areas to encourage private 
property ownership.52 Prior to this no title was allowed. Instead, land in 
Chiefs areas was (and still is) held as communal property, overseen by 
the local Chief, and passed along through generational inheritance. By 
allowing title to land in Chiefs‟ areas, the new policy has not just created 
new land tenure arrangements but has also opened up such lands to 
outsiders too who do not necessarily belong to that ethnic group.53 
People want to have security on property ownership, which title to land 
provides. And this is likely to encourage more people to seek land in 
Chiefs‟ areas.  
What the discussion points to is that whether acting individually or 
together, put together, these factors have the potential to cause changes 
in forest estates. It is, therefore, reasonable to take them as alternative 
hypotheses that could affect forest quality. However, in spite of these 
connections I have just highlighted, how managers responded to these 
challenges will remain the deciding factor between good and poor 
performance. I return to these issues in Chapter 5 and 6 where I show 
why managerial in[capacity] still stands as an overriding factor to forest 
degradation and not these other possible factors. 
                                                 
52
  The National Land Policy of 1996. 
53
  Although people can access land and settle anywhere they like, however, land in Zambia is split along 
ethnic Chiefdoms, each region representing a particular ethnic grouping.  
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Although natural resource endowment is no guarantee that a 
country would automatically be propelled into economic well being,54 
however, there are also numerous examples across the globe pointing to 
the fact that resource endowment plays an important role in the 
economic development of a nation.55 A case in point comes from early 
empires such as Great Britain that derived their economic power from 
their natural endowments such as coal as well as additional supplies of 
other commodities from their colonies.56 In recent times, Malaysia stands 
out as another good example of a resource abundant nation that has 
demonstrated the economic power of natural wealth when supported by 
appropriate government investment behavior.57 And of course the 
success story of the four “Tiger Nations” confirms that building strong 
economies and strong nations takes more than resource abundance.58 
Therefore, managed properly natural wealth has always acted as a 
springboard to the economic well being of many nations.  
Notice here that by implication the word management suggests and 
brings into focus the presence and influence of managerial capacity and 
human capital on the natural wealth, thereby introducing it as an 
                                                 
54
  See Richard M. Auty (ed.), Resource Abundance and Economic Development, (Oxford University 
Press), 2001; Edward B. Barbier, Natural Resources and Economic Development,(Cambridge University 
Press: NY), 2005  
55
  See for instance arguments advanced by Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal, A Concise Economic History 
of the World, (Oxford University Press), 2003; and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin 
America Since Independence, (Cambridge University Press), 1994 
56
  Cameron and Neal, A Concise Economic History of the World, 2003 
57
  Mahani Zainal Abidin, “Competitive Industrialization with Natural Resource Abundance: Malaysia,” in: 
Richard Auty (ed.), Natural Resource Abundance  (2001), Chapter 9, pp147-164.  
58
  World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, (Oxford University Press, 
NY), 1993. 
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important input. As Abidin (2001) explains, one reason for Malaysia‟s 
success lies in the fact its government “invested heavily in human 
resource development,”59 a strategy meant to create a large pool of skilled 
workers especially for the manufacturing industry that was expanding 
rapidly. By 1991 Malaysia‟s total expenditure on education was 5.5% of 
its GNP, a figure that surpassed even some developed countries such as 
the United States and Japan which invested 5.3% and 4.7% of their 
expenditures, respectively.60 
And all this is in agreement with what many scholars and 
practitioners have pointed out: the major determinant to economic 
development lies in how each nation uses its resource endowments, 
which is essentially an aspect of state / institutional capacity. Therefore, 
having a country that is naturally rich but economically poor, as Zambia 
is, raises an interesting question worth investigating. Given that Zambia 
has a rich natural resource base, state capacity seems to be a possible 
missing link that could explain government‟s poor performance. And 
since state capacity comes from the performance of individual bureaus, 
the best way to investigate state capacity is to look at what is happening 
at bureau level. Taking the management of indigenous forests in Zambia 
as a case study I pursue this line of inquiry to illustrate the point that 
managerial capacity matters. It is as important as the commonly known 
capacities, vis-à-vis the factors of production.  
                                                 
59
  Mahani Abidin, “Competitive Industrialization with Natural Resource Abundance,” 2001:160-161 
60
  Abidin, 2001:160. 
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Forestry offers a good example in that Forestry Department‟s 
achievements up until the 1970s stand in stark contrast with the current 
forest degradation that has become the order of the day. There is 
sufficient evidence of good performance prior to 1970s (a time when the 
department had a leaner and less educated work force and a moderate 
annual budget). And there is supporting evidence too for poor 
performance since the 1980s, a time when FD had slightly more and 
better qualified personnel. Yet, for the most part, Forestry Department 
claims that insufficient field staff and poor annual allocations are 
responsible for forest degradation. As a category of employees responsible 
for monitoring field operations field staff are essentially the first 
responders to all forest activities. And since they are right where action 
takes place, field staff are the department‟s eyes in the word‟s true 
meaning. Hence, field staff have a crucial role to play in ensuring that 
forests are managed well. Clearly, one can sympathize with the FD that 
operating from a position of insufficiency at this level puts the 
department in a tight corner. And of course the situation is made worse 
when the department is perpetually underfunded. This makes it harder, 
if not impossible, for its staff to get out in the field such that undertaking 
any fieldwork clearly becomes an uphill battle.   
Indeed, the above arguments are credible, but considering that 
capacity includes far much more that human resources and finances, as 
some scholars have argued, should the department‟s argument pass for a 
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final conclusion? Is underfunding and insufficient field staff the only 
factors at play? This is where this study comes in. It sets out to test the 
department‟s assertion, to find out how true or valid this argument is. So 
we ask the question: Why are protected forest areas (PFAs) in Zambia in 
a state of decline – both in the area they cover and the quality of stock 
they contain? Is this decline really due to inadequate labor force and 
insufficient annual allocations? Could these problems be due to lack of 
institutional capacity in the Forestry Department? Or could this be due 
to other factors beyond the department‟s control?  
Learning from the department‟s brief history – its successes, 
failures and apparently untamed opportunities – it is justifiable to believe 
that the department‟s shortcomings cannot simply be explained away by 
insufficient labor force and financial resources, though there is some 
credibility in that argument. Instead, the managerial dimension seems to 
be a plausible explanation which urgently requires scrutiny too. And this 
dissertation does just that. I posit that managerial capacity is a very 
important factor worth bringing to the fore because, as the data 
indicates, during the early days of FD‟s existence when the department 
had a relatively lean work force compared to its current level which is 
slightly higher (as in number of staff), the department was able to 
increase its forest estates and these forests were also well managed.61 
Furthermore, FD has more and better qualified personnel now than in 
                                                 
61
 See Appendix 5. 
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the early years of the department‟s existence. Therefore, the question we 
need to answer is: how did the department do so well at a time it had 
fewer and less technically qualified personnel? What capacities can we 
point to beyond labor and funds? Against this background, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that managerial capacity is probably the 
missing link that has contributed to the current state of affairs. The 
stronger the department‟s managerial capacity the more likely that its 
forest estates would be well managed and vice versa. A quick look at the 
department‟s brief history seems to agree with observation. To help put 
this argument into context I sketch, in very broad strokes, the 
department‟s successes and current challenges to show why managerial 
[in]capacity seems to be the missing link. And I employ this historical 
approach because the data it offers serves both as a laboratory and a 
validation tool. We should not ignore the facts (i.e. what has happened). 
Rather we should use these facts to understand and, possibly try to 
explain, the present even as we plan for the future. Thus, FD‟s past 
experience is an excellent laboratory that should serve its rightful 
purpose in shaping the future of forest management in Zambia. 
 
The Forestry Department: Its Successes and Current Challenges 
If there is one public agency in Zambia for which there are still 
some „remnants‟ of evidence as having been effective in its performance 
at one time, the Forestry Department scores not one but several 
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accolades. I call them remnants because much of what used to be 
protected forest areas are no longer there, except on paper. And this is 
where the argument becomes fluid. What should be counted as protected 
forests areas? Is it the hecterage of gazetted areas even when no forest 
exists on such lands anymore? Is it the number of forests with quality 
stock in them? Or is it both? From FD‟s point of view, the department 
seems content with counting the area covered regardless of the state of 
such forests – meaning that the area is counted even when that land has 
been depleted of its forest stock. But the big is question is: of what use is 
it to count an area which has been turned into farmland or human 
settlement? Isn‟t it misleading to count such areas which no longer have 
the resources they were reserved for? I choose not to offer any opinion 
now but come back to these issues in Chapter 5 and 6.   
The other „remnant‟ relates to the industrial plantations that the 
department established in the Copperbelt Province. Once a prominent 
feature in that province, these plantations are slowly disappearing even 
as arguments to privatize or keep them as state property remain 
unresolved.   
From its humble beginning in 1931 as a section under the 
Department of Agriculture, the Forestry Department later emerged to 
become one among the best performing public agencies in Zambia. Prior 
to this the department‟s contributions were almost insignificant, 
generally absorbed under the agricultural extension services as a section 
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that provided technical advice to farmers on trees. Later as forestry 
became more defined as a discipline quite separate from agriculture, this 
led to the creation of a Forest Department in 1947. Over the years the 
Forest Department vigorously pursued an ambitious mission of making 
Zambia self-sufficient in timber and related forest products and ensuring 
that the forests are well managed.62 All this has been achieved.  
Initially, forest research and forest inventories dominated earlier 
work that ultimately laid to a firm foundation for the scientific 
management techniques that followed and guided the FD‟s operations,63 
and whose dividends are now evident both in the extent of protected 
forest areas and the industrial plantations that were established across 
the nation over the years.  
As at 1962 the Forest Department had 5 million hectares (ha.) of 
PFAs for which it has direct control, in addition to the open forests where 
the department also has indirect control. By 1983 PFAs had been 
increased to 7.6 million ha., the highest level reached.  
On the exotic plantations side, the department planted over 1,000 
ha. exclusively devoted to research purposes. And these research efforts 
later supported the establishment of 56,149 ha of industrial 
plantations,64 of which 50,490 ha. were planted in the Copperbelt 
Province to supply timber to the copper mines. Based on the copper 
                                                 
62
  For details see Forest Department, Zambia National Forestry Policy 1965; an abridged version of this 
policy is made available as Appendix 2 to this study. 
63
  The Forest Research Library in Kitwe with its numerous stacks of publications attests to this effort.  
64
  FAO, Zambia: Identification of Forestry Investment Projects, 1996. 
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mines demand for wood, which outweighed the regeneration rates of 
natural forests, foresters were quick to point out that such consumption 
could not be supported by natural forests alone. It therefore threatened 
their existence. Instead, there was urgent need to grow fast growing 
exotic species to supplement wood from the natural forest. And this 
marked the beginning of the industrial plantations project. In short, the 
industrial plantations were meant to become a buffer to the natural 
forests, while at the same time supporting copper mining. They helped 
deter over-logging (deforestation) of natural forests.  
Although plantation establishment took place in all the 9 
Provinces, the Copperbelt Province was taken as a special case due to the 
high demand for wood from the copper mines. Hence, FD deliberately 
concentrated its efforts of establishing the industrial plantations in 
Copperbelt Province. To speed up the process of plantation 
establishment, at a rate that matched demand for wood from the copper 
mines, the FD accessed a $5.3 million loan from the World Bank in 1968 
to finance the industrial plantations project.65 And a new division, the 
Industrial Plantations Division (IPD) was created to oversee the project. 
Elsewhere, plantation establishment was undertaken through their 
respective Provincial Forest Offices, financed by central government. The 
success of these endeavors has made Zambia become self-sufficient in 
timber with surplus for export.  
                                                 
65
  This project phase ran from January 1, 1969 to June 30, 1977.  
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In the meantime, the Forest Department also pursued a vigorous 
human resource development program, raising the level of its staff from 
zero (local) professionals at independence (1964) to over 50 by 1981.66 
This figure reflects only those people who remained to work in the Forest 
Department and not necessarily the total number trained which is 
definitely higher. Some professional staff left the department for greener 
pastures elsewhere. A similar positive trend occurred in other staff 
categories too. By 1982 the department had 597 technical and field staff 
(up from 416 in 1970), an increase of 43.5%.67  
 While the department scored numerous achievements from all its 
divisions – Forest Research, Forest Management (indigenous and 
plantations), Human Resource development and, Extension Services – 
the industrial plantations project deserves special mention. It stands out 
as the biggest landmark achievement not only in the extent of the 
plantations established but more importantly in its positive economic 
impact on society. This is one example where Forest Department clearly 
demonstrated its ability to translate government policy into tangible 
achievable goals as exemplified in the professional and managerial 
competence to deliver on government policy. The department successfully 
implemented each and every policy prescription68 as I pointed out earlier, 
and has numerous positive outcomes to show for each policy 
                                                 
66
   
67
  See Forest Department, Forestry in Zambia Since Independence: 10 Years, 1975; Forest Department 
Annual Reports from 1965 to 1987 and Appendix 5 in this dissertation. 
68
  Refer to the National Forestry Policy of 1965 in Appendix 1 to this dissertation.  
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prescription, an amazing achievement for a department that for the most 
part was least funded compared to other bureaus.69 And nowhere is this 
achievement so visible than under the industrial plantations project 
whose positive economic impact endures to date.  
The industrial plantations project was so successful that IPD, the 
project management unit, was eventually incorporated into a parastatal 
company called ZAFFICO and became the largest timber company to own 
both the plantations and the sawmills. The other timber companies are 
wood processors that depend on ZAFFICO plantations or the natural 
forests. ZAFFICO employed over 3,000 people, and its impact on society 
is larger than this due to the ripple effects it has had on other industries. 
For instance, ZAFFICO plantations support numerous wood processing 
companies, carpentry and furniture shops. And there are also other 
industries that are indirectly supported by ZAFFICO such as the 
transportation industry, and so on. All this arose out of the wonderful 
work that FD executed so successfully.  
Unfortunately, despite this seemingly solid foundation, the FD has 
not sustained this momentum. Since mid (and especially from late) 
1980s the department‟s performance indicators all went south. Most of 
the activities that used to done are no longer carried out. Apparently, the 
department has lost its vision and or the motivation to exist. Its 
                                                 
69
  Jones Akapelwa, “Forestry Policies of Selected Countries in Africa,” in: FAO, Paper No. 132, 
1996:527-546. 
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managers are frustrated and highly de-motivated. Consequently, the 
department has moved from being a star agency on the block to one that 
policymakers do not even pay attention to (or count) as an important 
bureau. 
FD‟s performance since late 1980s has not been inspirational at 
all. Its forest estates are degraded and most of them illegally settled or 
exploited. Compared to the department‟s achievements in earlier years 
and the current deplorable state of its estates one wonders and questions 
what has befallen this previously high performing agency. Why has the 
department degenerated into a non-performer? Is this due to external 
pressures or simply a lack of institutional capacity within the 
department? I‟m persuaded to think that this problem has its roots in 
managerial capacity and here is why I think so. 
 When one looks at the history of forestry development in Zambia 
two things stand out prominently. First, compared to other government 
agencies the FD has generally operated on a modest budget and a lean 
structure over its lifetime. Yet its achievements defied those constraints. 
Second, for a long time the Zambian government was engrossed in the 
political liberation struggle of the region by supporting freedom fighters 
in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe;70 a 
                                                 
70
 For instance, Namibian SWAPO and South African ANC had bases in Zambia, while the other three 
countries were actively supported wherever they had set up camp.  For more details see, Douglas Anglin 
and Timothy Shaw, Zambia’s Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence, Westview Press) 
1979:234-271 (Chap. 6); Marcia M. Burdette, Zambia: Between Two Worlds (Westview Press), 1988; 
Richard Hall, Zambia (Praeger: NY), 1965; Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the 
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commitment that deviated resources to this regional endeavor instead of 
being invested locally. By allowing freedom fighters from the region to 
have bases in Zambia, South Africa and Zimbabwe subsequently 
classified Zambia as aiding terrorists and therefore deserved to pay for its 
involvement. In fact, South African President, John B. Vorster, is on 
record as having vowed that, “South Africa will hit Zambia so hard that 
she will never forget”.71 And both Zimbabwe and South Africa waged 
military campaigns against Zambia though Zambia never responded, 
which helped to stop such military confrontations from escalating into 
full blown war. Based on such threats and subsequent direct military 
reprisals from South Africa and Zimbabwe72 the Zambian government 
was kept on its toes to secure its borders. Consequently, military 
spending was substantially increased to contain the situation.  
Therefore, it is not an overstatement to say forestry programs paid 
the price as can be seen from the reductions in government funding to 
the department.73 In fact, these political choices also created an 
additional layer of challenge for forest management in that foresters had 
to be even more vigilant in securing the forests to ensure national 
security.  
                                                                                                                                                 
White South (Africana Publishing Corporation: NY), 1970; Jan Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict 
(Davison Publishing Limited), 1974;  
71
  Quoted by Aquino de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), The African Liberation Reader Vol. 3 
(Zed Press), 1982:125. 
72
  de Braganca and Wallerstein (eds.), The African Liberation Reader Vol. 3, p.125, 1982. See also Vol. 2 
by the same authors. 
73
  Forestry Department, Annual Reports (1965 to 2005); GRZ, Financial Reports (1970 to 2005). 
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Remember, as I mentioned earlier, five out of eight countries that 
share boundaries with Zambia were actively engaged in political 
liberation struggles which had potential for their freedom fighters to use 
Zambia‟s forests as a safe haven, especially those groups not officially 
recognized by the Zambian government. Also the movement of refugees 
from conflict areas, freedom fighters, soldiers and even traders were 
issues of great national concern74 in which forestry staff played a crucial 
role. But due to strong managerial competence the Forestry Department 
was able to handle these challenges with ease.   
Notice that in spite of these constraints, FD achieved wonders 
under those difficult circumstances. The largest increase in plantation 
establishment, indigenous forest reservations, and human resource 
development occurred at the very time when the Zambian government 
relentlessly committed its national resources to the liberation struggle, 
determined to free the region from all forms of colonialism.75  
It is no secret that Zambia‟s role in the political liberation of the 
Southern African region did not come cheaply as government‟s degree of 
involvement suggests. In particular, the Kenneth Kaunda administration 
made a deliberate choice to house liberation movements from Namibia, 
South Africa, and Zimbabwe. These included: the South-West African 
People‟s Organization (SWAPO) from Namibia, headed by Sam Nujoma; 
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  Jan Pettman, Zambia: Security and Conflict, 1974:152 
75
  Marcia Burdette,  Zambia: Between Two Worlds, 1988; Richard Hall, Zambia, 1965; Richard Hall, The 
High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South, 1970 
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Nelson Mandela‟s party, the African National Congress (ANC) from South 
Africa; and Joshua Nkomo‟s Zimbabwe African People‟s Union (ZAPU) 
from Southern Rhodesia. In addition, the Zambian government also gave 
unwavering support to those who did not set up camp in Zambia but 
remained in their countries e.g. Jonas Savimbi‟s UNITA (National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola and, Samora Machel‟s 
FRELIMO76 (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in Mozambique.  
Surprisingly, all these political challenges that characterized the 
nation (and the region), which would have otherwise slowed the FD‟s 
operations, never did. Instead, the department defied all these odds and 
forged ahead, reaping so many successes that are now slowly becoming 
part of the good old days history and “there used to be”… is quickly 
becoming part of the everyday forestry vocabulary.   
 Without getting weighed down in the details of the broader 
challenges of the day, one simple question we can at least attempt to 
answer is: why is FD failing to manage its forest estates? What has 
happened to the once „star‟ agency? It is important to get to know what 
has caused the FD to fall from grace because failures at agency level 
ultimately spiral upwards to national level. In any case the success of 
any nation is a mirror image of what happens at agency level, and vice 
versa. Therefore, getting to know the problems and solving them at 
                                                 
76
  Also known in Portuguese as Frente de Libertaçâo de Moçambique. 
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agency level is the best way to solve what generally end up being national 
problems. 
 
Conclusion 
As I have repeatedly pointed out, Zambia is not poor. What has 
driven the country into becoming one among the poorest and highly 
indebted countries is clearly not lack of economic resources. Rather the 
problem can be attributed to lack of capacity to wisely manage and 
utilize its natural resource endowment. The lack of institutional capacity 
(at agency level) offers the only plausible explanation to this problem.   
In this study institutional capacity is conceived as having adequate 
and appropriate productive resources required to undertake a given task.  
It means Forest Department has the ability to create and sustain an 
environment and relationships that facilitate and support purposeful, 
collective action geared towards achieving its objectives.77 Extending the 
definition of IC in this manner makes it possible to quantify and analyze 
how IC becomes a defining factor in institutional performance from all 
the different angles. In fact, this Zambian case study provides a good 
example in that FD‟s past strength was derived from the strong ties and 
relationships that the department had with the local Chiefs and their 
people. But as central government assumed dominance, wanting to 
                                                 
77
 This definition draws on different scholars‟ conception of IC, e.g. Christine Lambert and Nick Oatley, 
“Capacity and Planning for Growth,” in: Goran Cars, et. al. (eds.) Urban Governance, Institutional 
Capacity and Social Milieux, (2002). 
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control all aspects of forest management in a policing fashion, this 
alienated the local people communities who eventually withdrew their 
support. Add this development to the modest budget that the department 
operated under, the result is total disaster. FD‟s capacity was 
subsequently weakened and therefore could not effectively manage its 
estates.   
  Given the Forestry Department‟s humble beginnings, counting its 
achievements over the years, and now observing its apparent death, the 
FD offers an excellent case study to test the hypothesis about state / 
institutional capacity and its effects on performance outcomes. 
 In this study, I argue that although FD was clearly affected by 
external factors, such as the IMF/World Bank sponsored Structural 
Adjustment Program, the main reason that accounts for its poor 
performance now is lack of institutional capacity. In particular, the 
department lacks visionary leadership and managerial capabilities to 
bring it back to its past glory. I follow this line of inquiry and 
demonstrate that given the modest budget and lean structure that FD 
has always operated under, the potential for failure or under-achieving 
was quite high. Forestry Department could have failed to achieve what it 
did had it not been for its managers‟ competence to plan, mobilize and 
utilize the resources at their disposal. Their effectiveness and footprints 
are easily noticeable in the presence of strategic and management plans, 
district management books, public-private partnerships (e.g. TV and 
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Radio Programs); a variety of programs they initiated and executed, and 
above all their active and enduring presence in the policy arena that 
helped influence government policy in favor of forestry to an extent where 
forestry and copper mining (Zambia‟s economic back-bone) were seen as 
two sides of the same coin, even though there was hardly any forest 
exports to brag about at the time. How did these managers do it? FD as a 
supplier of timber, a major source of energy in the copper mines at that 
time, forest managers seized the moment; they tied forestry to copper 
mining portraying it as a twin pillar to the copper mining industry. 
Naturally, this raised the department‟s profile and forestry in general. 
This also helped to make people to see forests as an important national 
asset.  
Generally speaking, these managers were highly visionary and 
creative: they thought and operated outside the black box, mainly 
tapping into other types of capacities outside the department. For 
instance, as part of its vigorous campaign strategy, aimed at reaching a 
wider audience, FD developed TV and Radio forest extension programs 
and offered them to private companies interested to sponsor them in 
exchange for “free” advertising. The initiative was highly successful, 
private companies grabbed the moment. As a result, the department was 
able to air numerous TV and radio programs and this paid back 
immensely. Not only did this strategy enhance public awareness on 
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forestry but more importantly it created some loyal forestry supporters 
across all sections of society.  
With international recognition of the important of and advocacy for 
sustainable development becoming stronger, the moment couldn‟t be 
better for these forest managers. In a triad partnership between FD, 
IUCN-The World Conservation Union and the Natural Resources 
Department, a National Conservation Strategy was developed. This 
document went beyond forests to emphasize integrated natural resources 
and environmental management.  The National Conservation Strategy 
became a building block to what later became the National 
Environmental Policy.  
Other landmark initiatives, to mention but a few, included the 
development of forestry clubs at schools (K-G12), community agro-
forestry clubs and the declaration (by the Republican President, Dr. 
Kenneth Kaunda) of the National Tree Planting Day (December 15th) and 
National Tree Planting Month (December 15th  to January 15th)78. Not 
only was this national tree planting program launched by the Republican 
President, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, but he remained a constant Guest of 
Honor thereafter, which helped to keep the department‟s profile visibly 
high in the policy arena. Similarly, in each respective province, high level 
officials in government and the private sector emulated the president‟s 
                                                 
78
  To encourage tree planting, each year the Forestry Department gave up to a maximum of 100 free 
seedlings to any individual or group (e.g. community, „conservation‟ or school clubs) who wanted to plant 
some trees during the annual tree planting day/month. See for instance, FD Annual Report for the Year 
1988, p.1 
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example.79 All these initiatives demonstrate not only managerial 
competence but their creativity too. Sadly, none of this is happening 
today.  
Therefore, as these examples demonstrate, it is reasonable to argue 
that, in addition to the other capacities, managerial competence has 
always been the department‟s strongest asset and not necessarily the 
quantities of other productive resources at its disposal, which have 
generally been meager. Of course this does not in any way under-
estimate the importance of the other productive inputs but to emphasize 
the point that managerial competence acts as the glue that unites the 
other resources together to achieve the desired outcomes through 
collective action. Of course the availability of the primary factors of 
production is always an added advantage. However, without managerial 
competence these inputs would not yield much on their own.  
 The point I am making is that sometime back the Forest 
Department had strong management competence. Consequently, the 
department was able to design and implement government policy 
effectively going by the numerous achievements accrued over the years. 
Unfortunately, this momentum has been lost along the way, at least 
                                                 
79
 This tree planting program attracted such national attention and appeal that FD had to adjust its seedling 
distribution: 100 for each Primary and Secondary (High) School, 500 to each Institution of Higher 
Learning.  ZIMCO had an obligation to finance the program – K50,000.00 for the Lusaka Fuel Wood 
Project, and K50,000.00 for the raising seedlings for the National Tree Planting Program. Refer to FD 
Annual Report for the Year 1988, p21-22. 
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since late 1980s. And its effects are particularly evident in the deplorable 
state of the forest estates.  
As several scholars and practitioners80 have unanimously agreed, 
institutional capacity clearly matters for any organization to function 
effectively. But I also add that knowing which capacity is lacking is even 
more important; it is the only way a dysfunctional organization such as 
FD can be pushed back on track by making the missing capacity 
available. Any organization with a weak institutional capacity is most 
likely doomed to fail. I build on this theme in the chapters that follow to 
illustrate that IC is clearly the only viable bridge that connects the policy 
implementation highway to the final destination – the policy outcomes.  
 
Dissertation Layout 
This dissertation is organized in six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the 
question under investigation, “why are protected forest areas (PFAs) in 
Zambia in a state of decline – both in the area they cover and the quality 
of stock they contain?” Besides highlighting the research question, 
Chapter 1 also provides a brief historical perspective on the case study, 
giving a general overview on the extent of forest estates in Zambia, who is 
                                                 
80
  See, Kate McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects, 
(Routledge: London), 2002; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old 
Problems, )Earthscan Publications) 2002; Goran Cars, et. al., Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity 
and Social Milieux, (Ashgate: Burlington, USA), 2002; Robert Picciotto and Eduardo Wiesner, Evaluation 
and Development: The Institutional Dimension, (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, USA), 1998; 
Richard Walker and George Boyne, “Public Management and Organizational Performance…” Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 25, number2, 2006:371-393; Patricia W. Ingraham, et. al., 
Government Performance: Why Management Matters, (The Johns Hopkins University Press), 2003. 
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responsible for what, and how this fits into the different land tenure 
arrangements.81  
In particular, Chapter 1 also lays in very broad strokes the 
development of forestry in Zambia, vis-à-vis, how forestry has evolved 
over time both as a science and as an enterprise. The Chapter highlights 
Forestry Department‟s achievements and traces the challenges the 
department has confronted as a forestry manager over the years, and 
then questions why that momentum has been lost. Given the current 
deplorable condition of the forest estates, Chapter 1 ends with a question 
wanting to know what has led to this situation and leads us into the rest 
of the Chapters (4-6) that are devoted to answer this question.  
 Government policy goal on forestry aims at having at least 15% of 
Zambia‟s landmass to be reserved as protected forest areas;82 a mandate 
that Forestry Department (FD), the sole manager of Zambia‟s forestry 
resources, is supposed to pursue. But as the foregoing discussion 
illustrates, this task is becoming more illusive each day that passes. 
                                                 
81
  Zambia has two land tenure systems: State land, and Trust land / Reserve land. Central government 
owns the State land, while Trust / Reserve land falls under the jurisdiction of traditional rulers (Chiefs). To 
create PFAs or alienate land for any purpose in the Trust / Reserve land, government has to get permission 
from the Chiefs.  
For more details on this topic see: GRZ, Report of the Land Commission, (Lusaka), August 1967; GRZ, 
Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970; GRZ The Land Policy 1995;  D.J. 
Siddle, "Colonial Land Rights," in: Hywel D. Davies (ed.), Zambia in Maps, University of London Press, 
Ltd, 1971:48-49; M. P. Mvunga, The Colonial Foundations of Zambia’s Land Tenure System, (NecZam: 
Lusaka), 1980; M.P. Mvunga, Land Law and Policy in Zambia, (Mambo Press: Institute for African 
Studies, Zambian Papers No.17), 1982; Gear Kajoba, The Landmarks of Zambia’s Land Tenure System: 
From Protectionism to Empowerment, (A Paper presented at the International Conference on Land Tenure 
in the Developing World with a Focus on Southern Africa, held at the University of Capetown, South 
Africa, 27-29 January, 1998); M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land 
allocation in Zambia", in Ng‟andwe, A. (ed.), Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal 
Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45 
82
 Zambia Forestry Policy 1965: Item 5 
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Evidently, FD‟s most productive years in working towards this goal were 
during the 1960s through to early 1980s. Since then hardly any forest 
reservations have taken place; instead forest degazettions83  have become 
the order of the day.  
Apart from degazettions the remaining forest estates are also in a 
deplorable state; either there are illegal settlements or someone is 
illegally over-exploiting the resources thus compromising the purpose for 
which these forests were established.84 It is these sad developments that 
have inspired this study asking the question: are these problems due to 
lack of institutional capacity in the Forestry Department? Or is it due to 
other factors beyond the department‟s control?  
Chapter 2 delves into the theoretical basis of institutional capacity 
and its practical application. In particular, the Chapter gives a road map 
on how institutional capacity is connected or related to effective 
management and how this eventually influences [performance] outcomes. 
The chapter argues that it is almost inconceivable to talk about outcomes 
without looking back at IC, which covers both the physical (tangible) 
resources and the rules that regulate people‟s behavior: both as 
employees within an organization or as that organization‟s clientele. 
                                                 
83
  Refers to the forest estates that cease to be protected, declared through an act of law. It is the opposite of 
the protected (gazetted) forests or the legal process of setting aside a forest for conservation. Degazetted 
forest estates are released back to the owners (e.g. the local Chiefs, Central or Local Government) who will 
have expressed the desire to put such land to other land uses. 
84
  PFAs are established to serve as protective or productive forests. Protective forests provide protective 
roles e.g. for water catchment areas, on mountains and along lakes to deter soil erosion; whereas productive 
forests are reserved as reservoirs of forest resources to be accessed in an organized manner based on 
Forestry Department‟s license system.    
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Since human resources drive action in any given situation, much of the 
discussion on IC revolves around people: how their actions can (and do) 
orient an organization towards success or failure. Managerial 
competence is identified as one important ingredient that leads to 
creation of effective organizations.  
Chapter 3 explains how this study was conducted, and is linked to 
the theoretical aspects discussed in Chapter 2. It explains how 
institutional capacity is connected to forest degradation (one of FD‟s 
performance indicators) and how this connection has been assessed in 
this study. 
The study findings are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 
deals mainly with secondary aggregate data that were collected from 
public documents, from which we establish some connections between 
changes in the extent and quality of PFAs (a dependent variable) and 
institutional capacity (the explanatory variable) that is represented by 
levels of annual government funding to FD, and the number of staff in 
the Forestry Department. Given the central position that rules85 and 
norms86 occupy in shaping people‟s behavior and choices, the wider 
discussion also covers national statutes on forestry, traditional norms as 
well as other regulations that have a bearing on forestry (e.g. 
international treaties). These are part of the institutional capacity 
                                                 
85
  Douglass North, Institutions, 1990; Oliver Williams, The Mechanisms of Governance, 1996. 
86
 Powell and DiMaggio, Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 1991; André Lecours, New 
Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis (University of Toronto Press), 2005 
 M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L ,  P a g e  | 58 
 
 
variable, which in this case are considered as a control variable. The 
purpose is to highlight how these statutes have shaped the department‟s 
choices. The discussion in Chapter 4 is further complemented by a 
second layer of data from a survey of forestry officers, a subject of 
Chapter 5.  
Chapter 5 discusses the field survey part of this study, based on 
information collected from 91 forest managers (drawn from senior, 
middle and junior management ranks)87 who participated in the survey 
and commented on the extent of their involvement in the administration 
of the department as well as their knowledge about the structural 
adjustment program (an economic reform policy that Zambia has 
pursued since 1985).88 In particular, this chapter highlights how much 
these managers know about government policy on forestry, and their role 
in working towards achieving the policy prescriptions. This is a chapter 
that dwells on management style and practices and their role in charting 
the department‟s path towards achieving its mission.  
Finally, Chapter 6 pulls together the issues that have been 
identified as contributing to the department‟s poor performance, and 
offers some suggestions on how these problems can be resolved.   
 
                                                 
87
  Senior Managers typically are 4 year degree holders and above, Middle and Junior Managers must have 
a Forestry Diploma (equivalent to a 2 year Associate Degree) and a Certificate in Forestry, respectively.    
88
 Although official records indicate 1985 as the year when Zambia adopted SAP, in reality this program 
started in 1973 when the Zambian government accessed the first stabilization loan from the IMF. By all 
stripes and intent, stabilization loans always marked the beginning of the road to SAP. 1985 marked the 
adoption of a full SAP.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Institutional Capacity: An Overview 
 
 In this chapter I discuss the concept of institutional capacity (IC) 
and show how IC relates to effective management and performance 
outcomes. The first section focuses on the conceptual framework of IC. It 
traces the theoretical underpinnings of IC from classic management and 
administrative theorists89 to the current schools of thought on state 
capacity,90 the news ways of governing91 and capacity building.92 Arising 
from this literature review, it is easy to notice that IC is a multi-
dimensional and multi-disciplinary concept that embraces management, 
organization, administrative, political, sociological, and economic 
theories; with each discipline emphasizing certain aspects of IC – e.g. 
                                                 
89
 A sample of this literature includes: Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science 
Quarterly, vol. II, No. 2 (June 1887), pp.197-222; Herbert Simon, “Proverbs of Administration,” Public 
Administration Review, vol. 6 (Winter 1946), pp. 53-67; Herbert Simon, et. al., Public Administration 
(Knopf: NY), 1950; Luther Gulick, “Notes on the Theory of Organization,” in: Gulick and Urwick, (eds.), 
Papers on the Science of Administration. Sentry Press: New York.  P.3-45; Frederick Taylor, “The 
Principles of Scientific Management”, in: Shafritz and Hyde (eds.), Classic of Public Administration, 1987; 
Henry Fayol, The Administrative Theory in the State”, in: Gulick and Urwick (eds.) Papers on the Science 
of Administration 1937:106. 
90
  Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,” in: Peter Evans et. al. (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, 
1985; Migdal, Kohli, and Shue, (eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in 
the Third World, 1994; Merilee S. Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America 
and Africa, 1996. 
91
 For more details on this topic see, Kate McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), New Public Management: Current 
Trends and Future Prospects, (Routledge: London), 2002; Goran Cars, et. al., Urban Governance, 
Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux, (Ashgate: Burlington, USA), 2002; Robert Picciotto and 
Eduardo Wiesner, Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension, (Transaction Publishers: 
New Brunswick, USA), 1998; Richard Walker and George Boyne, “Public Management and 
Organizational Performance…” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 25, number2, 2006:371-
393  
92
 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems, (Earthscan 
Publications) 2002 
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focusing on tangible resources, skills, relationships, the environment or 
simply rules.  
Although some exceptions abound in each discipline, generally 
speaking, the administrative, management and organization theorists 
tend to emphasize management of productive inputs (tangible resources), 
people skills, the work environment and relationships among workers, 
which help to organize people and other factors of production. On the 
other hand the political, sociological and economic theorists lean towards 
rules (commonly referred to as institutions in economic conceptions), 
skills (strategic maneuvers), and relationships. While economists 
particularly emphasize that rules determine the outcomes by 
manipulating human behavior,93 all the other groups also agree that 
rules are a common denominator: not only do rules influence human 
behavior and their choices but they particularly create and structure the 
environment where people finally operate.94 Thus, there are clearly 
overlaps in how the different disciplines characterize and or define IC.  
In the second section of this chapter I look at the applied version of 
IC: how different scholars and practitioners have defined and applied this 
concept. As noted above, their differences are cosmetic in nature; they 
                                                 
93
  See for instance, Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
(Cambridge University Press), 1990; Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, (Oxford 
University Press), 1996; Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), Evaluation and Development (Transaction 
Publishers: New Brunswick, USA), 1998; Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (Anchor Books: NY), 
1999. 
94
  The new institutionalism is particularly strong in this respect. See, Water W. Powell and Paul J. 
DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, (The University of Chicago Press), 
1991  
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tend to hold certain aspects of IC constant to emphasize other aspects 
perceived to be more important in their respective disciplines.  
Finally, the third section deals with the importance of IC and its 
implications for today‟s organizations. For our case study, I use a policy 
history road map as a narrative tool based on its strength that enables 
us to see the effects of policy change over time.95 This is especially 
important for this case study because the development of forestry in 
Zambia, both as a science and a business, is a product of incremental 
developments that have occurred over a long period of time, caused by 
shifts in government policy. A policy history road map enables us to see 
through the different phases and how each phase influenced the 
department‟s operations. Having said that what is institutional capacity? 
And how is it connected to outcomes? Does institutional capacity matter? 
 
What is Institutional Capacity?  
The word ‘institution’ means different things to different people. It 
may mean the rules, regulations, laws or statues that shape the work 
ethic or behavior of an organization96, or it may refer to an entire 
organization; in which case it includes both the people and the rules97 
                                                 
95
 Julian E. Zelizer, “Introduction: New Directions in Policy History,” Journal of Policy History, vol. 17, 
No. 1, 2005:3,6-7 
96
 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 1990; Jeffrey Nugent, “Institutions, Markets, and 
Development Outcomes” in: Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), Evaluation and Development, 1998: 9-10 
97
 Kent R. Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, “Assessing the Effects of Institutions,” in: Weaver & Rockman 
(eds.), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, 1993; Joseph 
Litterer (ed.), Organizations: Structure and Behavior, 1980; Arturo Israel, Institutional Development: 
Incentives to Performance, 1987; Thrainn Eggertsson, “Comments on „Institutions, Markets, and 
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that govern their behavior.98 Attempting to define institution is as 
problematic as agreeing on its application; it depends on the discipline 
and the thematic area.99 For instance, within the old institutionalism 
movement institutions were generally conceptualized as material entities. 
“They were constitutions, cabinets, parliaments, bureaucracies, courts, 
armies, .…and in some instances, party systems. In other words, 
institutions referred to the state” or more precisely to “government.”100 
And most institutionalists accept this material or structural definition.  
However, not all new institutionalists agree with this position. For 
instance, the rational choice institutionalists conceptualize institutions 
from an actor-centered perspective101 that focuses on the rules of the 
game and highlights how institutions shape action by creating 
opportunities and constraints.102 Their main concern is “not so much 
what institutions are but what they represent: an equilibrium.”103 Yet, 
other new institutionalists with a rationalistic orientation concentrate on 
the relationship between institutions and agents arguing that 
institutions only provide the context within which agents (actors) drive 
                                                                                                                                                 
Development Outcomes‟ by Nugent” ” in: Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), Evaluation and Development, 
1998:24   
98
 For a detailed treatment of this application, see: Max Weber‟s Bureaucracy (1987) [original work 1922], 
where he conceptualized government as an institution with people and rules to regulate their behavior. See 
also Harold Gortner, et. al., Organization Theory: A Public Perspective, (The Dorsey Press, Chicago, Il.), 
1987:3 
99
  André Lecours, New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis (University of Toronto Press), 2005:6-11 
100
  André Lecours, New Institutionalism, 2005:6 
101
  Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research 
(Westview Press), 1997 
102
  North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 1990; Sue E. Crawford and Elinor Ostrom, “A Grammar of 
Institutions,” American Political Science Review, 89, No. 3, 1995:582-3 
103
  Lecours, 2005:6; Crawford and Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” APSR, 89, No. 3, 1995:582-3 
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action.104 This stands in contrast with the other strand of conception 
that comes from those who posit that institutions drive human action by 
influencing their behavior by constraining people‟s choices.105 But others 
are quick to point out that human behavior is not only shaped by utility 
calculations but more so from cultural norms and values or 
institutionalized standards that by themselves reproduce anticipated 
expectations, identity and habit.106 Sociological institutionalists agree 
with this conception. They too view institutions in terms of norms, 
beliefs, values, and cognitive frameworks.107 They stress the fact that 
cultural norms, beliefs, values, and ideas are internalized and once 
formed such institutions become entrenched (or institutionalized), 
allowing little room for acting outside the black box. This is problematic 
because it tends to stifle innovation or acceptance of new ideas. 
Despite the different angles these definitions emphasize there are 
some common features or overlaps that bring these groups together. One 
is that the common purpose of institutions is to create a sense of 
continuity rather than change. For this reason, institutional continuity 
encourages and produces repetitive behavior, which ultimately affects 
the outcomes. Second, institutions (whether they be rules, values or 
                                                 
104
  James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (Free 
Press), 1989; James March and Johan Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political 
Life,” American Political Science Review, 78, 1984:734-49; James March and Johan Olsen, Democratic 
Governance, (Free Press), 1995 
105
  North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 1990; Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, 
1996 
106
  Lecours, 2005:10 
107
 Richard W. Scott, Institutions and Organizations (Sage), 1989:21 
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organizations) are people-centered and people-oriented. They are 
intended to organize and regulate human behavior with a view of 
achieving some desired outcome.  
It follows therefore that whatever angle one takes in defining and 
analyzing institutions it is impossible to ignore their connection with the 
people. For instance, those who look at institutions as rules 
conceptualize them in the context of how rules shape human behavior 
and their environment, while those who view institutions as 
organizations consider them as complete entities encompassing both the 
rules and the people that constitute them. Therefore, although coming 
from different entry points, both groups essentially look at people, the 
environment and the outcomes.  
In this dissertation, unless otherwise indicated, institution means 
an organization. It refers to an entity comprising of people engaged in 
specialized yet interdependent activities108 and, who have agreed to 
cooperate to accomplish a common goal.109 And this institution is subject 
to the rules that give it its mandate and jurisdictional boundaries, 
prescribes its structure (e.g. the reporting hierarchy and resource 
requirements), and ultimately regulates the behavior of the people that 
constitute it. Although much of the literature on institutions portrays 
organizations as “passive, reacting entity entrapped or responding to 
                                                 
108
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coercive or cultural forces in its environment,” I take  the view that 
organizations are active entities, comprising of “purposeful rational 
actors who are goal-oriented and in control of their own fate.”110 An 
organization is a place for collective action that may happen through 
bounded rationality, producing “institutions which in turn control and 
govern an organization‟s actions.”111 Thus, it is almost impossible to 
separate organizations from institutions, they tend to create and 
reproduce each other. For this reason, institution and organization will 
be used interchangeably here. However, for purposes of clarity, whenever 
reference is made to institutions as in rules, laws or statutes this will be 
stated explicitly as such.  
How about capacity, how is this understood? Capacity also has 
various meanings: ranging from the notion of physical or mental space to 
hold or accommodate knowledge/something, to the ability to perform a 
duty/role, or as a force to induce a particular outcome.112 In this study, 
capacity refers to an institution‟s ability to effectively perform its 
functions and attain its goals. Capacity is considered as an enabling 
force113 that leads to particular desirable outcome. For our purposes, this 
latter definition is preferred because it operationalizes capacity as being a 
facilitator to achieving an outcome. It implies having adequate productive 
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  Joseph Galaskiewicz, “Making Corporate Actors Accountable: Institutional Building in Minneapolis-St. 
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111
  Galaskiewicz, “Making Corporate Actors Accountable,” 1991:293 
112
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resources – (e.g. human, capital, technological resources and an enabling 
environment) – that are necessary for an organization to function 
effectively,114 which simply means that an organization has the ability to 
follow through its mission and achieve its goals.   
However, in so far as capacity implies the ability or effectiveness in 
getting the expected result, measuring the final outcome also requires 
attention to quality as well as quantity. Just as absence of an outcome is 
an indicator of lack of capacity so too are poor or inferior outcomes; they 
also point in the same direction. For instance, it is better to have one 
good outcome than several outcomes of poor quality. For reason, no 
organization would qualify as having capacity if it produces poor 
outcomes. That by itself is an indicator of lack of capacity that would 
need to be addressed.  
Similarly, attention to quantity and quality applies to resource 
availability too. When people talk about adequate capacity there is an 
implied assumption these resources are of good quality and in the right 
amounts needed for the job. Hence, adequate capacity implies 
availability, quantity and quality of that ability. Based on the strength of 
this assumption, rarely do people even care to specify what capacity 
means. In short therefore, capacity simply means having adequate and 
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appropriate productive resources required to undertake a given task.  
And this is the working definition adopted in this study. 
As can be seen from these explanations above capacity too (like 
institutions) has strong connections with the human factor; either as 
part of the capacity itself or as a resource at the center of organizing and 
utilizing other capacities (resources) to achieve a particular goal. 
Although capacity may be reduced to mean only what constitutes it (i.e. 
its inputs), at that level it remains only an abstract concept until it is 
attached to an outcome. In other words, the existence of capacity, be it at 
individual, group or national level, can only be confirmed when there is a 
product (outcome) to show for it. What do I mean by this?  
For instance, if an organization has all the resources it needs to 
undertake a particular activity but fails to attain the anticipated 
outcomes, does it have the capacity or not? Asked differently, how do we 
know an organization has capacity? The best way is through its ability to 
achieve its goals. If an organization fails to achieve its goals that means 
there is a lack of capacity somewhere. And this may not be necessarily 
due to lack of resources (e.g. the quantity of its productive inputs) but 
probably be due to the type, or the environment is not conducive, or 
simply a lack managerial skills to put the available resources to good 
use. And because some of these aspects are embedded in other 
resources, they may not be easily identifiable and might be assumed as 
available, when in fact they are not, just because the resource they are 
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associated with is available. For example, if an organization has the 
required number of personnel as the organization structure prescribes 
one might assume there is adequate human resource capacity. Yet this 
might camouflage lack of managerial skills. This is a case in point in the 
Forest Department. Although its senior managers have more than the 
minimum professional qualifications115 required for these positions, all 
(but one senior manager with a Bachelor‟s degree) have Masters‟ degrees 
with over 8 years of field experience, yet the department‟s performance is 
way below the expected standards, suggesting that there is a managerial 
problem and not the quantity problem. Therefore, when analyzing 
capacity it is important that special attention is paid to these intricacies, 
which also tends to replay at national level as Bade Onimode (1988) and 
Nicholas Van de Walle (2001) have illustrated for Africa.116  
As Christopher Clapham (2004) further explains, organizational 
failure is not necessarily due to lack of resources, sometimes productive 
resources might be available but that does not automatically translate 
into capacity. He points out that Africa, for instance, is highly endowed 
in natural resources yet it remains the least developed continent mainly 
due to poor leadership. Consequently, this has led to bad governance 
and poor political stewardship in most African states; with only a few 
exceptions such as Botswana, which at least has managed to use its 
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resources wisely to sustain both political and economic stability.117 In 
this case managerial and technical skills, integrity over public assets, 
etc. are just as important as other tangible resources. Therefore, 
whenever we discuss institutional capacity, it is important to put it into 
context. Capacity in and by itself is meaningless until measured in terms 
of outcomes, and as this will soon become evident, human intervention 
almost always is the defining factor. And this brings us back to the 
original question, what then is institutional capacity?  
 
The Concept of Institutional Capacity 
 
The literature on institutional capacity is rather sparse, and those 
who have done some work in this area don‟t seem to agree on one single 
definition.118 In general, institutional capacity refers to an organization‟s 
ability to do what it is designed to do. In the case of a government 
institution – the focus of this study – this means being able to formulate 
and successfully implement and evaluate government policies.  
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I define institutional capacity (IC) as an organization’s ability to 
create and sustain an environment and relationships that facilitate and 
support purposeful, collective action geared towards achieving its 
objectives.119 I find this definition to be most appropriate in the sense 
that it encompasses key aspects of what constitutes institution and 
capacity that I talked about earlier. It also operationalizes the concept 
making it possible to assess and analyze how IC becomes a defining 
factor in institutional performance.  
First and foremost, creating a productive environment starts with 
the availability of factors of production, vis-à-vis: human, capital,120 
infrastructural and technological resources121 as well as entrepreneurial 
skills. It is from these resources that an organization draws its strength 
to operate effectively. Second, it requires harnessing the skills of the 
social capital (employees) towards achieving an organization‟s objectives. 
In order to have a healthy and productive working environment people 
need to work cooperatively, both within and outside the organization, 
and that they are motivated to work towards a common goal, supported 
by the prevailing rules. Collective action is not something that creates 
itself; it comes from different levels of capacities and motivation such as 
management skills that create a sense of teamwork, individual choice to 
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belong or self-interest propelled by anticipated gains from being involved 
in a particular activity. Hence, whatever angle is taken on IC, one fact 
remains intact: it is a bridge between the means and ends. It facilitates 
policy implementation. Put differently, when an institution has capacity 
it can be seen in its ability to plan and set goals, to create and sustain 
productive relationships,122 to solve problems and finally in its ability to 
achieve goals.123  
From an operational stand point IC can be broken down into three 
broad categories. The first represents the factors of production: human, 
capital, infrastructure, and technological resources; as basic inputs that 
any organization needs to function. The second relates to the rules that 
regulate human behavior both within and outside the organization. The 
third covers administrative competences of the staff to organize and 
utilize the other factors of production, and their ability to make decisions 
on what should or should not be done.  It follows therefore, that an 
organization has capacity if it has these levels of capacities (inputs) that 
are considered essential for pursuing an organization‟s mandate.124  
As mentioned earlier, it is important to note that the presence of 
capacity (i.e. the availability of resources) does not automatically 
guarantee effectiveness in attainment of goals. Other parameters come to 
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bear, and these relate mainly to staff competences. For instance, how 
effective are managers (or supervisors) in organizing and utilizing the 
other resources under their jurisdictions? How well connected is the 
head of the organization to the political powerhouse – in or outside that 
organization?125 Do all employees understand their role in achieving the 
organization‟s objectives? These and other managerial and political 
abilities are extremely important in pursuing an organization‟s mission. 
As Lambert and Oatley remind us, those who are “well connected and 
well informed” are able to mobilize quickly and capture the 
opportunities.126 And the opposite is just as true for those who are not 
politically agile.   
The Forestry Department provides an excellent example. Although 
the department oversees a sector from where more than 80% of the 
Zambian population derives its energy needs, senior managers have not 
marketed the department to policy makers and elected officials in a 
manner that highlights this and several other aspects of national 
importance. Consequently, the department hardly exists in the policy 
arena. This stands in contrast with previous forest managers who 
marketed the department as a backbone to copper mining, which 
depended on wood energy for its smelter plants. Naturally, government 
paid high priority to the department until some mines switched to 
electric power, which somehow weakened the marriage between forestry 
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and copper mining. The point I‟m making is that what determines the 
effectiveness of an organization is not necessarily the availability of 
factors of production, although this is clearly essential. What is more 
important is the ability of its managers (or staff in general) to mobilize 
(organize) and utilize (allocate) those resources in a way that leads to 
accomplishment of an organization‟s goals.  
An organization may have the resources but if it lacks the 
administrative competence to utilize them it would be as good as not 
having those resources. For this reason IC should be considered as a 
cocktail of capacities, representing both tangible and intangible inputs. It 
reflects an organization‟s ability to effectively mobilize and utilize these 
capacities, with managerial and political abilities being key ingredients in 
the policy implementation process. Expressed differently, capacity exists 
if an organization has these ingredients that are considered essential for 
policy implementation.127 In short, institutional capacity boils down to 
the administrative competences of an institution to pursue its goals.  
Therefore, in analyzing the Forest Department‟s institutional capacity to 
effectively manage its estates, I rely and draw upon these benchmarks 
discussed above. 
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The Importance of Institutional Capacity 
Why should we study institutional capacity? What benefits or 
additions will this bring to the scholastic menu? One good reason is that 
IC is both the fuel and engine that propels action in any organization. 
Studying IC helps us to understand why some institutions perform better 
than others. This is especially valuable and timely for those interested in 
the Third World economic development dilemma.  
In particular, if one takes the policy implementation framework to 
be schematically represented as an input-output-outcome-impacts process, 
clearly, the inputs in this equation represent institutional capacity. And it 
is these inputs that facilitate policy implementation, and therefore tends 
to determine policy failure or success depending on how they are utilized. 
An inquiry into the IC of Third World governments allows us to start 
addressing the problem of policy failure from the first portion of the 
policy implementation framework, instead of focusing on the effects of 
policy outcomes. As Arturo Israel (1987) and Peter Evans (1985) remind 
us weak state capacities, especially in the developing countries, has been 
a defining factor on how they have performed administratively, 
economically and politically.128 The economic turn around and the 
ensuring economic boom that some East Asian countries have 
experienced in the recent past confirm this reality. As Robert Wade 
(1990) explains, government leadership through targeted investment 
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accelerated development in these East Asian countries. Hence, 
government leadership, which promoted certain activities before others 
should be considered an important “variable, not a constant.”129 And 
many lessons abound in the global arena. The gap between rich and poor 
countries, which has also continued to grow wider, can easily be 
explained by the differences in the IC of their governments.130 However, 
the best way be confirm or refute such speculations is through evidence-
based research as this study does. And Israel also notes: 
“When that [institutional] capacity is particularly weak, as in many 
countries in Sub-Sahara Africa and elsewhere, the real choices are quite 
dramatic – but the choices become apparent only after a detailed 
analysis of the institutional capacity, and such analysis is seldom 
made.”131 (text in italics is my emphasis). 
 
But analyses on institutional capacity need not be scarce because 
this is the only way to see if an organization is able to achieve its goals. 
Therefore, when evaluating a country‟s economic performance or its 
[in]ability to execute specific programs, such work ought to take into 
account state capacity132 because a country‟s “pattern of strengths and 
weaknesses” is not the same for all policies.133 And this scenario repeats 
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itself at agency level too.134 The point I‟m trying to make is that 
institutional capacity should be considered as an important variable in 
explaining performance, and its use should be “optimized” for future 
program design and implementation.135 
I begin by acknowledging that organizations are created for a 
particular purpose.136 To accomplish its mission an organization requires 
a certain type and quantity of resources.137 Therefore, assessing an 
institution‟s capacity would help to establish whether or not that 
institution is capable of realizing its mandate,.138 Yet despite this 
straightforward sketch of what IC entails and why it is important to 
study it, it seems there is no agreement on its definition, and 
consequently this has implications on how its connection to outcomes 
are analyzed and explained. 
Grindle (1996) defines institutional capacity as the presence of 
rules to “regulate economic and political interactions” of a nation i.e. “the 
ability to assert the primacy of national policies, legal conventions, and 
norms of social and political behavior over those of other groupings.”139 
She differentiates institutional capacity from the other forms of 
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capacities, namely: technical, administrative, and political.140 Grindle 
highlights the fact that capacity entails having the resources as well as 
the ability to use them. However, Grindle does not say what these 
resources are. For Michael Bratton (1994) “capacity exists when an 
organization possesses the full range of resources – human, financial, 
material, coercive [power], and symbolic [recognition]141 – that are 
required for the implementers to get things done.”142 Bratton‟s argument 
is that unless these resources are available there is not much an 
organization can achieve. On the other hand, Israel (1987) views 
institutional capacity from a technical and administrative skills 
perspective. He is especially concerned with the human component and 
specifically advocates special investment in human resources because 
“…human resources are more important to development than natural 
resources or technology.”143 In this respect, Israel is in agreement with 
the extensive literature on organization management, which argues that 
people are the primary building blocks of any organization.144 According 
to Israel institutional capacity is a scarce resource and therefore needs 
special attention.  
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“Institutional capabilities are not only one of the most important 
resources for development, but also one of the most scarce, if not the 
scarcest. It should be explicitly considered a separate resource in the 
design of development strategies.” 145   
 
Furthermore, Israel argues that because IC is scarce, this in itself 
should provide a new perspective why its use should be optimized.146 
But Skocpol (1985), Migdal (1988; 1994) and Evans (1985) view IC 
from a political angle. They emphasize the state‟s political ability to 
effectively use the resources at its disposal to get things done.147  
Skocpol (1985) specifically defines capacity as the means “to 
implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition 
of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socio-economic 
circumstances.”148 But capacity need not be appreciated only when there 
is some form of opposition as Skocpol seems to suggest. In my view, 
being able to get things done even when there is no opposition on an 
issue also reflects capacity.  
For Migdal (1988), state capabilities “include capacities to 
penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and 
                                                 
145
 Israel, 1987:117; 119 
146
  Israel, 1987:117; 119 
147
 Theda Skocpol, 1985; Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World, 1988; Joel Migdal, “The State in Society: An approach to Struggles for 
Domination,” in: Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (eds.) State Power and Social Forces, 1994; Peter Evans, 1985 
148
 Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,”1985:9 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 79 
 
 
appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”149 Peter Evans (1985), 
on the other hand, understands the “classic locus of state power” as 
being its ability to regulate relations with the outside world.150 Evans is 
more concerned with the state‟s capability to handle trans-national 
challenges than internal matters.  
The current schools of thought take institutional capacity to mean 
a state‟s ability to govern. In this group, they too take availability of 
resources for granted and instead focus on creation and sustaining 
relations and environments that support achievement of goals.151 They 
argue that having the resources without the skills to motivate people to 
cooperate and work towards achieving a common goal is as good as not 
having those productive resources.152 Sociologists and economists are 
particularly strong on this type of characterization. They point out that 
outcomes are a product of both the choices people make as well as the 
relations they create in working towards a common goal or for self-gain, 
as in the case of economists and rational choice theorists.153  
Another level of capacity is identified as relating to the institutions 
(rules, laws, norms) that shape human behavior. Economists, 
psychologists and even sociologists define capacity as something 
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embedded in the rules that regulate human behavior.154 In their view, 
not only do rules shape human behavior, they also limit the choices 
available to the people too!155 This line of argument runs deeply in 
Douglass North‟s renditions. Because rules have potential to facilitate or 
inhibit resource availability, this means that rules ultimately influence 
the final outcomes. They further argue that institutions also demarcate 
boundaries on what can and cannot be done and consequently tend to 
influence how people operate and what resources they can tap into. 
Therefore, when evaluating the performance of any organization rules 
have a central role in shaping not only people‟s behavior but how much 
of each resource an organization can have at any given time. But 
Douglass North is quick to acknowledge and point out that people do 
ultimately influence the outcomes because “they define and enforce the 
economic rules.”156 
Mustapha Nabli (1998) also agrees with this line of argument and 
advises that for this reason those dealing with institutions need to 
provide a clear definition of what they mean by institution. Specifically, 
Nabli argues that there is need to make a distinction between 
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institutions and policies and how to measure their impact on 
outcomes.157 
“Whether one uses a restrictive definition of institutions, such as 
“formal and informal rules that constrain behavior” or a more 
extensive one, such as argued by Jeffrey Nugent, the distinction 
has to be clearly kept in mind.”158  
 
According to Nugent, quoted in Picciotto and Wiesner (1998), an 
institution is a set of constraints that governs the behavioral relations 
among individuals and groups”.159 In this context, therefore, most 
organizations are institutions because they provide rules that shape and 
govern the relationships between their members and non-members. 
Furthermore, it is important to differentiate between how rules apply in 
an individual institution (institutional arrangement) and to a set of other 
institutions in which the institutional arrangement is embedded (the 
institutional structure).160 
For instance, rules prescribe the size of organization, such as how 
many employees an organization may have and what other resources 
would be at its disposal. Depending on the circumstances, such 
prescriptions may become limitations and probably work against the 
survival of an organization or its desire to try new ways of doing things. 
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This is especially true for a public institution like FD which is restricted 
to follow prescribed procedures. Unlike in a private company where 
owners can make changes anytime as circumstances dictate, FD does 
not have this flexibility. As a public institution it is bound to follow 
established standards of doing things.  
For instance, its managers cannot alter the labor force 
requirements even though particular categories of staff may or may not 
be needed. This can only be done after such clearance is granted from 
Personnel Division at Cabinet Office. And neither can the department 
change the way it issues licenses until Parliament gives that approval. 
And for each of these actions there is a process to be followed that is also 
governed by its own rules. Thus, when evaluating the performance of 
public institutions it is important to factor in these institutionalized 
standards that quite often cause public organizations to be slow in the 
way they respond to various situations.  
For whatever this is worth, advocates argue that observance of 
such procedures are not meant to cause delay but to create 
transparency, accountability, and more importantly to protect employees 
and civil society at large from abuse of power from those who may be 
privileged to hold such offices. If the recent fiasco at the World Bank 
involving its President, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, over his girlfriend‟s (Shaha Ali 
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Riza) pay161 has anything we can learn, I am persuaded to think that the 
advocates for adherence to rules and procedures have something in their 
favor. As Murray Waas points out, “Had the bank's board adhered to its 
ordinary rules, as Riza was shifted over to the State Department, she 
should have only been eligible for a raise of about $20,000. Instead she 
was given a raise of $47,340, whereupon her salary became $180,000. 
Then last year, she received yet another raise which brought her salary to 
$193,950. That salary increase not only meant that Riza earned more 
than Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, but apparently made her the 
single highest paid State Department official.”162  
Looking at the role of institutions, Oliver Williamson (1996) takes 
the topic to another level arguing that rules tend to influence capacity by 
creating transaction costs, which stop or prompt people from responding 
in a certain way. As rational creatures, people evaluate their choices 
using a cost-benefit scale. Before taking a particular course of action, 
they weigh their options against the transaction costs and this has 
implications the type of choices taken and eventually on the final 
outcomes. Of course, unlike in the economic perspective where this sort 
of calculation is mainly from a monetary point of view, in the political 
and policy arenas this quite often includes moral considerations as part 
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of the cost-benefit consideration, and the concern revolves around the 
impact of the outcome and who would be affected positively or negatively. 
As Deborah Stone (1997) puts it these considerations have no easy 
solutions: policy interventions and rules almost always tend to draw 
boundaries by permitting some aspects and excluding others, in which 
case they become exclusionary.163 Similarly, public programs are 
analyzed in the same way such that an agency whose program 
intervention promises the highest positive impact is usually looked upon 
favorably.  
The Forestry Department provides a good example of how these 
considerations play out in the real world. Because the effects of poor 
forest management are not usually immediate or as obvious as the ones 
from agriculture (e.g. food shortage due to drought) or health (due to 
disease outbreak), forestry hardly takes any front seats in the policy 
arena. It is not considered as important as agriculture or health. Thus, 
when central government shares the national cake, the Forestry 
Department is one among the least funded agencies.164 I return to 
discuss these issues in greater detail later on in Chapter 5 and 6. The 
point I‟m trying to make here is that even at central government level 
cost-benefit considerations are a key factor in deciding what bureau gets 
the most support.  
                                                 
163
  Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making  (WW Norton & Company: NY), 
1997: Part II (Goals) and IV (Solutions). 
164
  Jones S. Akapelwa, “Forestry Policies of Selected Countries in Africa,” in: FAO, Paper No. 132, 
1996:527-546. 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 85 
 
 
Douglass North (2002) concurs with Oliver Williamson (1996) and 
notes that even without the issue of transaction costs, political and 
economic institutions (rules) in and by themselves do set the parameters 
for what is permissible, and this makes people to react in a certain way 
and therefore shape the way people behave and make choices. Clearly, 
rules and individual choices are important determinants of the 
effectiveness of organizations. They argue that governance, including 
economic, social and political behaviors are shaped not only by choices 
people make but more importantly by the rules that create the 
environment to which people respond.165  In other words, institutions do 
facilitate or inhibit the way people operate, and by extension the 
outcomes.   
But the rational-actor and public choice theorists take a slightly 
different view, highlighting the fact that actually it is the people who 
create such environments through their opportunistic, self-interested 
tendencies. They argue that people develop institutions that can yield 
what they desire. And it doesn‟t matter whether this is at individual or 
national level or for public or private gain. The motive remains the same. 
These individual choices have an enormous impact on the institutions 
that eventually get created. Therefore, it is erroneous to portray 
institutions as creating the environment that people eventually respond 
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to. Instead, it should be the other way round: people create their own 
environment and by extension determine their fate. 
The new sociological institutionalists take issue with this 
characterization.166 Arguing against some institutional economists and 
public choice theorists that posit that people “construct the institutions 
that achieve the outcomes they desire,”167 Powell & DiMaggio concur with 
Douglass North (1990) and Oliver Williamson (1996) and note that the 
opposite is what happens: institutions force people to adapt and behave 
in a particular manner, not vice versa. Although Powell and DiMaggio 
acknowledge “individuals‟ attributes or motives” as factors in the larger 
equation, they still reject the rational-actor models arguing that 
institutions must be taken as “independent variables”168 to which people 
respond. 
Like Douglass North (1990), Powell and DiMaggio (1991) see 
institutionalism (e.g. institutionalized norms, beliefs, standards, etc.) as 
being potently powerful in creating certain social relationships and 
actions, which over time comes to be taken for granted. For this reason, 
they see the public choice, rational-actor, and self-interest theories as 
being wrapped wrongly. In their view, institutions have a stronger impact 
on the people than people do on the institutions. “In the sociological 
tradition, institutionalization is both a „phenomenological process‟ by 
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  Powell & DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 1991. 
167
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which certain social relationships and actions come to be taken for 
granted” as well as a “state of affairs in which shared cognitions define 
what has meaning and what actions are possible.”169 Powell & DiMaggio 
(1991) further note that: 
“Institutionalized arrangements are reproduced because 
individuals often cannot even conceive of appropriate alternatives 
(or because they regard as unrealistic the alternatives they 
imagine). Institutions do not just constrain options: they establish 
the criteria by which people discover their preferences. In other 
words, some of the very sunk costs are cognitive.”170 
 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) further explain that this type of 
assumption jumps the boat in that some institutional economists and 
public choice theorists rarely ask “where the preferences come from” and 
most likely do not even consider “feedback mechanisms between 
interests and institutions.”171 To drive their point home Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991) ask the question: “Do institutions reflect preferences of 
individuals or corporate actors, or do they represent collective outcomes 
that are not the simple sum of individual interests?”172 In their view, 
there is no cut and dry response to this question due to various reasons. 
One is that individuals cannot choose their options outside the accepted 
                                                 
169
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170
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“institutions, customs, social norms or legal procedures”.173 People are 
confined (and in a way forced) to follow institutionalized standards. For 
example, “one cannot decide to divorce in a new manner” outside the 
institutionalized procedures. The other is that individual choices mirror 
the “cultural and historical frameworks in which they are embedded.”174 
Although Powell and DiMaggio (1991) agree with economic and 
public choice theorists that people‟s options are constrained by “sunk 
costs in existing arrangements” and “technical interdependence” that are 
partly responsible for creating institutional inertial and sometimes 
yielding “unintended effects”, they however still maintain their ground 
arguing that the thrust of this argument still remains the same: it is 
meant to convey the idea that institutional arrangements are a product 
of “opportunism, imperfect or asymmetric information, and costly 
monitoring” mechanisms.175 
Another consideration relates to autonomy, plasticity, and 
efficiency of institutions as well as response to change – the question of 
which has the most influence over the other; is it the institutions or the 
people? Powell and DiMaggio point out that institutions have a greater 
impact on the people because they are not easily malleable,176 and they 
find alliances on this point from some political science and economic 
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institutionalists too.177 Shepsle (1986, 1989), in particular, agrees to this 
view and gives an example of political institutions that are wired in such 
a way that it is not easy to change them, starting with the constitution. 
Instead, elected officials must adapt to those institutions if they have to 
make any progress. Economists, Nelson and Winter (1982), also agree 
with this view and single out the role of rules, norms, and culture in 
organizational change. Furthermore, Powell and DiMaggio emphasize 
that not only do institutional arrangements restrict individual behavior 
by rendering some options unviable, or simply prohibiting certain actions 
all together, but more importantly these constraints also restrain certain 
“patterns of resource allocation.”178 As I have pointed out earlier, the 
point to note from these arguments is that any action that affects 
resource availability and allocation will ultimately affect capacity, 
performance and finally the outcomes. 
In fact, when discussing capacity, individual preferences and 
economic development in general, Amartya Sen (1999) brings out one 
interesting point; he notes that institutionalism and individual choice or 
“freedom of choice” actually tend to be at each other‟s throats, 
particularly in this era of modernity. According to him when societies 
embrace a “freedom-oriented perspective” people essentially strive for the 
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liberty “to participate in deciding what traditions to observe” and don‟t 
want any restrictions to be imposed by the institutions, national or local 
“guardians”, the “ayatollahs (or any religious authorities)”, political 
rulers, and not even by “cultural experts” be they local or foreign.179 
However, what this freedom generates is a struggle and conflict in 
deciding whether to preserve and what traditions should be preserved 
versus embracing the advantages of modernity.180 And there are no easy 
solutions to these choices or considerations. Instead, they are or become 
real challenges for many organizations, especially those wanting to try 
new ways of doing things.  
The US experience on “reinventing government” during Bill 
Clinton‟s administration, over which Vice President Al Gore presided, 
stands as a good example.181 With respect to our case study, 
decentralization of the Forest Department‟s operations whereby 
provincial forest offices are supposed to fall under the local government 
jurisdiction in their respective provinces and districts has always failed 
because FD Headquarters has always been uncomfortable relinquishing 
their control and power over the provincial offices.  
As the “power to people” movement has taken a stronger voice all 
across the nation, as part of a process of implementing the 
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180
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Decentralization Policy, all Provincial Forest Offices now fall under their 
respective provincial jurisdictions. However, their linkage to central 
government still remains through Forestry Department Headquarters 
rather than their Provincial Permanent Secretary‟s office. In other words, 
Provincial officers have to report to two offices – FD Headquarters and 
Provincial Permanent Secretary (PS). But since their funding now comes 
through the Provincial PS‟s office, their relationship with FD HQ is slowly 
becoming weaker, and there is no motivation for them to report to FD HQ 
since the FD is not responsible for their budgets.  
Indeed, all the issues raised in the foregoing arguments are quite 
pertinent, especially to public organizations where their employees are 
expected to follow existing procedures, almost to the letter. And yet in 
their daily activities these public employees do have some level of 
autonomy and freedom to decide on what is the best course of action, 
which might include whether to adhere to the established „standards‟ 
and „traditions‟ or to try something new. In my view, this is where the 
response to the question what impacts the other most would simply be, 
“it depends” on the timeframe and possibly the prevailing circumstances. 
By timeframe I mean the point being evaluated.  
For instance, is it at a time when the institutions are being 
developed or are they already in existence? If they are just being created, 
the architects of such institutions will definitely try to cater for their self-
interests – whatever purpose they envision to achieve. This is the point at 
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which rational-actor and public choice theorists are discussing. However, 
if these institutions are already in existence, people would have reacted 
to them over time, and established some sort of „tradition‟ on what 
values, standards, norms, etc. that such institutions have helped to 
create and society has chosen to preserve them. Over time those 
standards, norms or expectations become institutionalized. This is the 
point where sociological conceptions (and others who think institutions 
impact people more) are taking place.  In short, both groups have 
something to offer.  
For capacity building specialists, institutional capacity is almost 
synonymous to good governance182 whose general indicators include 
having a representative government183 that arise through democratic 
means (e.g. competitive elections); a transparent government free of 
corruption184 that is accountable and efficient in its use of public 
resources; has a free judiciary, practices fairness and the rule of law, and 
upholds human rights185. As a performance indicator, adherence to good 
governance (GG) is expected to ensure that government institutions are 
efficient and effective in serving civil society; meaning that they ought to 
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have a vision and goals to work towards, and be accountable to the 
people in delivering public goods.186  
However, Kettl (2000) quickly cautions that government 
institutions may not achieve this level of effective delivery systems until 
they orient themselves to a market economy in which chief executives of 
government agencies are rewarded just like their counterparts in the 
private sector. This would act as an incentive for them to work hard and 
be innovative in their service delivery.187 By extension this would ensure 
that GG flourishes.188 The problem with this incentive strategy is that 
rewarding the top tier only and leaving out the people below those ranks 
would clearly de-motivate the very people who are policy implementers. 
According to our survey results, the Forestry Department currently has a 
highly de-motivated workforce partly because their counterparts in other 
agencies e.g. in the Department of Agriculture are on higher salary scales 
than forestry personnel although they have similar workloads.  Having 
been short-changed in this way, forestry personnel are not motivated to 
work hard. As can be expected this is having a toll on their department‟s 
overall performance.  
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According to the IMF, their view of GG concentrates on those 
aspects of governance that contribute to creating a stable macroeconomic 
environment that supports efficient private sector activities. It is from 
this perspective that the IMF/Bank uses GG as a surveillance tool to 
monitor success of the programs they have financed. But GG is as 
problematic to define as it is to measure simply because it is loaded with 
concepts such as democracy that have no single definition.189 Even 
accountability is not easily agreed upon depending on what aspects one 
emphasizes. And neither have the IMF and the Bank, the strongest 
advocates for GG surveillance, provided any measurable indicators of 
these requirements thus leaving this issue open for anyone to set their 
own criteria and targets. This is where the GG concept starts to unravel. 
Accordingly, instead of being useful for capacity building GG, in fact, 
continues to attract suspicion and resentment from Third World 
governments who see the IMF and the Bank as overstepping their 
jurisdictional boundaries as project financiers to becoming political 
surveillance institutions. Except for the IMF and the World Bank who 
insist on GG as a measure of institutional capacity, its use as an 
analytical tool has not yet permeated the mainstream research arena.  
                                                 
189
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In another arena, management scholars and practitioners define 
institutions from two angles: first, as an entity (with structure shaped by 
its mandate and job positions) and second, as a system in which human 
interactions and resource allocation takes place. Their concern is on how 
to harness these interactions to promote good working relations that 
would eventually lead to high productivity.  
In recent years, practitioners have taken transparency, 
accountability and good governance as new measures of productivity and 
effectiveness. That is to say, how open is the public entity to outside and 
inside oversight (audit); how good is the system at service delivery; and is 
that organization responding to people‟s needs in a fair and effective 
manner? Hence, capacity building has become an operative song. But a 
word of caution is appropriate here. When some practitioners talk about 
capacity building they tend to imply building technical skills that would 
ultimately lead to or enhance accountability and good governance190 
rather than the general view this dissertation has taken for which 
capacity improvement means making available the necessary productive 
resources, including technical skills.  
As the above literature suggests, there are numerous conceptions 
and definitions of institutions. However, whether one looks at 
institutions from a materialist, rules or values (principles) perspective, 
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the arguments converge on one point that: institutions shape behavior 
and influence the actions people take. People are motivated or 
constrained in one way or another by these institutions.191 Furthermore, 
despite how differently institutional capacity is different, it also converges 
on one theme: that capacity deals with “how implementation is 
achieved.”192 And this is the theme this dissertation draws its strength 
from. 
As the foregoing discussion shows, the concept of institutional 
capacity is not new. The only difference is how it is labeled. Skocpol193 
labels it as state capacity, Stepan194 and Shue195 call it state power, while 
Migdal196 sees it as state authority / domination or in a more general way 
as state-society relations.197 For example, Skocpol (1985) claims that the 
state has control over policy, underscoring the fact that state capacity 
matters in national development.198 Stepan (1985) and Shue (1994) 
follow a similar angle but emphasize social power, showing that state 
power is not cast in steel but that it is a shifting target constantly 
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redefined by social forces.199 Migdal too walks the thin line on state-
society relationships to show how state and society impact each other to 
shape a nation‟s socio-economic choices.200 The general theme is that the 
state and society both play a role in a nation‟s development process, and 
that quite often each group has its own priorities at any given time. For 
this reason, some form of compromise between state and society is 
always necessary. Therefore, success with any government policy 
depends on the level of support government receives from society. And 
this is where state capacity to solicit cooperation from civil society comes 
into play.  
Clearly, Skocpol (1985), Migdal (1988; 1994) and Evans (1985) 
assume the resources exist and only care about how they are used. They 
view capacity from a functional role of putting resources to use and not 
from an input side that looks at what type of capacities exist. And their 
view generally resonates with the underlying assumptions found in the 
economic, management and administration literature. This, however, is 
the point of departure between their work and this study, which does not 
take resource availability for granted. Instead, we try to establish, 
starting at the input side, if the Forestry Department in Zambia had the 
capacity to design and implement government policy. The department‟s 
ability to design policy and programs it can effectively implement would 
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be a good indicator of both its leadership and managerial capacity. Since 
IC drives policy implementation and by implication determines policy 
outcomes, an assessment of the department‟s capacity will make it 
possible to see which type of capacities are lacking and how this has 
affected the department‟s performance. In a way this might also help us 
understand the sector‟s [poor] contribution to the national economy, 
which ranges between 0.02 to 0.09% of GDP.201 Therefore, unless we find 
out what capacities exist or are lacking in the department, any strategies 
to fix the department‟s poor performance will at best be speculative in 
nature. Solving this problem is most likely going to resolve the larger 
question too on why the sector contributes minimally to the national 
economy. Indeed, on a wider scale, investigations into the institutional 
capacity of nations are just as worthwhile if we can link a nation‟s ability 
to successfully implement programs that propel it to economic 
development.202 
Yet, as Israel explains, not many people are keen to take on this 
challenge. Researchers find institutional capacity a messy area and 
therefore unattractive to delve into. Neither management science nor 
development administration can easily be applied, especially to the 
problems of developing countries.203   
                                                 
201
 Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, [1965 to 2005] 
202
 Peter Evans, “Transnational linkages and the Economic Role of the State,” in: Bringing the State Back 
In 1985:192-226 
203
  Israel, 1987:1-7 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 99 
 
 
“Institutional weakness is considered to be one of those problems about 
which not much can be done. Until recently many practitioners had 
given up trying. Instead, they suggested intensifying on other factors – 
investments, education, even cultural change – to see whether these 
troublesome institutional weaknesses could be overcome or bypassed, or 
whether institutions might solve the problem by themselves. Other 
specialists have adopted an intellectually elegant form of escapism; they 
ignore those aspects of the development process, such as institutional 
issues, that cannot be nicely quantified and concentrate on those that 
can be analyzed through equations.”204  
 
Furthermore, Israel explains that the field of “development theory 
and practice” has been dominated by economists who have placed 
emphasis on “resource allocation and allocative efficiency” rather than 
“on the most effective ways” of using the available resources.205 In 
addition, even development strategies focus on planning and appraisal 
instead of implementation206.   
But, as reality on Third World development issues shows, none of 
the above reasons offers a solution. Therefore, it is not right to succumb 
to escapism. Careful diagnosis of policy failure is important if the right 
treatment is to be prescribed for any ailing economy.207 And taking 
institutional capacity for granted is definitely not the best option either. 
Although the aforementioned scholars have addressed the general 
theoretical question, “why some governments are more effective in their 
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roles than others,” and agree that state capacity matters in shaping the 
socio-economic status of a nation,208 their perspective has generally 
looked at this question from a political stand point as in state-society 
relationships that tend to influence policy implementation rather than 
from an administrative perspective. They gloss over the issue of IC, which 
apparently they take for granted. Instead, they focus on how state 
capacity or social forces shape policy outcomes; and do not tell us what 
these states and social actors have that allows them do what they do. In 
other words, the question that needs attention is: what makes state-
society capacities and their relationships with civil society work or fail to 
achieve policy objectives across nations? Is this due to their political 
systems, [in]ability to use the resources at their disposal, or simply lack 
of resources? Whichever route is taken is likely to circle back to the issue 
of capacity because organizations “have real limits” in what they can and 
cannot do.209 Knowing what the state-society actors have (an issue not 
addressed by these scholars) and how these resources are utilized is one 
of the core themes this study addresses. In fact, this is one of the 
contributions this study brings to the table in the way institutional 
capacity should be assessed and understood. 
The limits of state power on society or society‟s influence over the 
state can be linked to the resources at their disposal as well as the 
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prevailing circumstances that the state and society have to work with,210 
e.g. in times of peace versus war time. Knowing the locus of such limits 
is only possible if their capacity is assessed from an input perspective. 
Because governments are an amalgamation of various agencies, and 
knowing that the state‟s power (and economic development) depends on 
the contributions of each agency, it is important that states are 
disaggregated to understand the influence of their power at agency level. 
Thus, assessing the institutional capacity of individual state agencies – 
as this study does – is a good starting point in coming to grips with what 
makes some states (or their agencies) more effective in implementing 
their programs than others. This is one way to detect agencies that might 
have competence problems and specifically in which areas. 
 
Theoretical Basis of Institutional Capacity 
Conceptually, if we take the inputs-outputs-outcomes-impacts 
process as a universal framework for analyzing policy outcomes,211 and 
therefore an institution‟s performance, one can see that institutional 
capacity is represented by inputs, which would then lead to the 
anticipated policy outcomes depending on how those inputs are utilized.  
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In theory, institutional capacity does not necessarily stand alone; it 
is wired indirectly in the organization, management and administrative 
theories212 where it is conveyed through various underlying principles 
such as organization structure;213 division of labor;214 scientific 
management;215 personnel relations and behavior;216 and leadership 
styles and patterns.217 Thus, institutional capacity is a multi-discipline 
concept that cannot be reduced to one single theory. Therefore, it is 
important to understand what constitutes the theories in which it is 
anchored – namely, organization, management and administration. 
Discoveries made by theorists in these areas offer a road map on how to 
deal with management problems that may arise due to institutional 
capacity challenges. 
The literature on these theories is extensive. What is used here is 
just a snap shot giving the historical context of their development and 
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the key concepts embedded in them. Without underrating the 
contributions that have been made over the years by various scholars, 
organization management is generally traced back to Max Weber and 
Frederick Taylor. Other classics of the time include Luther Gulick and 
Henry Fayol.  
Max Weber developed what is known today as common features of 
an ideal bureaucracy.218 According to Weber, an ideal bureaucratic 
organization would have 1) career bureaucrats who are 2) appointed to 
specific positions based on their 3) technical qualifications and whose 4) 
positions reflect some form of hierarchy in seniority among officers. 
Legally, each officer would have a 5) clearly defined sphere of official 
responsibility reflecting 6) the competence required for that position. 7) 
None of these officers own the organization but work for it. The job would 
be 8) a full time occupation, with 9) a salary commensurate with the 
position‟s duties and required skills. Other rewards of the job include 10) 
promotions, which are dependent on the judgment of superiors, and 11) 
pensions.219 According to Gortner, it is these features that make the 
public bureaucracy a superior organization over others in that it 
guarantees precision, stability, discipline, and reliability.220  
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While the ideal organization concept may offer promise for 
effectiveness and possibly efficiency, the same features also create 
problems. For instance, a defined hierarchy among officers, which 
creates unity of command and is good for formal communication, may 
also create conditions ideal for abuse of authority by senior officers who 
may not be questioned by their junior staff, except through whistle 
blowing. Fortunately, Weber was aware of the limitations of his ideal 
model in the real world. His expectation was that organizations would 
perform better as they approached the ideals he envisioned. The 
challenge is that only a few of these ideals are achieved in most 
organizations and “no organization achieves all of the ideal” 
characteristics described.221 But the problem is not Weber‟s model, 
rather these problems occur because what is supposed to be a rational 
model is put into effect by limitedly rational human beings, whose 
rationality is constrained by numerous factors.222 These include, but not 
limited to: the extent of knowledge and information an individual has for 
a particular activity; the capacity to analyze all the available alternatives; 
one‟s skills, habits, values as well as conceptions of purpose.223    
While Max Weber looked at the entire structure of an organization 
to find “one best way to arrange the offices and tasks so that maximum 
organizational coordination and efficiency could be attained,” Frederick 
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Taylor (and his followers) concentrated on the individual and the actual 
job performed. Taylor, in his “scientific management,” was concerned 
with finding “one best way” to do a particular job;224 convinced that 
increased productivity required improvement in how each job was 
performed, and his investigations led to the development of numerous 
job evaluation techniques. He observed that many employees performed 
way below their full capacity, as he noted in an article published 
posthumously that, “…the average government employee does no more 
than one-third to one-half of a proper day‟s work.”225 He therefore 
advocated for maximizing production from each employee through 
division of labor and specialization; arguing that this would not only 
increase productivity but also efficiency.226 In order to gain cooperation 
from workers, Taylor and his followers also acknowledged that human 
motivation was important.227   
These two major strands of organization management developed by 
Weber and Taylor (including their respective followers) were afterwards 
found inadequate in that they forgot or simply ignored the human side of 
the organization. As Morgan explains, classical management theorists 
such as Frederick Taylor and others viewed “the design of organizations 
as a technical problem” until this was reduced to a problem of “paying 
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the right rate for the job.”228 Following the Hawthorne studies, 
integrating the needs of individuals and the organizations became a 
burning issue.229 Theorists on the human side of the enterprise argued 
that Weber and Taylor‟s theories presented a closed system, which did 
not reflect the real world.   
“In each case the theorists have ignored the implications of the fact 
that they are dealing with human beings. In order to improve the 
theories so that they are useful in managing the modern 
organization, it is essential to rediscover human beings. It is 
impossible to recognize man as a sociological and psychological 
being who may be rational, but who may also be irrational, and to 
maintain the closed system concept for which the theorists are 
striving.”230 
 
Thus, another group emerged that focused on investigating the 
structure of the organization in search of “one best way” to organize the 
offices and tasks. These men were convinced that if the “universal rules 
of organization” were used, “functions of management would be made 
more efficient and successful.”231 Gortner further explains that, “the 
number and order of these principles varied according to the author, but 
most rules were subsumed under five categories: unity of command; 
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authority commensurate to responsibility; maximum delegation of 
authority; limited span of control; and power to organize.232  
Various scholars further elaborated on the importance of these 
concepts arguing that not only does an organization require structure 
but also how labor is organized functionally, e.g. who supervises who 
and what are their accountabilities.233 It was during this time that 
Luther Gulick coined the popularly quoted acronym POSDCORB 
(Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and 
Budgeting) to highlight the importance of organization theory in 
management.234 For practical application, POSDCORB235 simply 
describes the basic management functions / duties every manager 
should perform if the organization is to run smoothly and effectively. 
Another management practice widely used is PMOC, which stands for 
Planning, Motivating, Organizing, and Controlling.236 Unfortunately, out 
of all these important functions, the only activity forest managers 
perform is budgeting mainly because they have no choice or else the 
department would not be funded.  
Concerns regarding the important role of humans in an 
organization paved the way to what is widely referred to as the behavioral 
sciences, which incorporated the human aspects to improve on earlier 
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theories. Thus, organization theory, management theory, and 
administrative theory became dominant areas of study.  
Organization theory (OT) aims at efficiency; it offers the principles 
aimed at allocating and utilizing the available resources in the best way 
possible. It is a theory concerned with the structure, inter-relationships 
and functions of the individuals and groups that constitute those 
organizations.237 It seeks to maximize “organizational rationality – 
narrowly defined as efficiency: the ratio of outputs to inputs.”238 And 
even though there is some disagreement on what areas OT emphasizes 
e.g. structure or human relationships, and whether organization 
behavior is a separate area of inquiry or a subfield of OT,239 one can see 
that the theory is people-centered and activity-oriented; covering 
decision-making, human relations within or among organizations and 
resource utilization.240 In practice, organization theory is also about 
management and administrative practices. Hence, OT is not a single 
theory. Rather it is multi-discipline in character, and draws its strength 
from various disciplines such as administration, political science, 
economics, psychology, 241 to name but a few.  
For instance, public administrators and political scientists have 
enriched organization theory through policy analysis, where they 
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investigate ways in which the political, professional, and technical 
characteristics of public organizations influence public policy making 
and execution. “These disciplines study the relationships between public 
organizations and their political environment.”242 Economic analyses 
have also contributed to decision-making theories, while behavioral 
studies in psychology (and in particular industrial psychology) have 
focused on leadership, motivation, group interaction, and conflict.243 In 
sum, OT is a loose aggregate of various approaches that deal with 
organizational analysis.244 
Like OT, management theory (MT) does not stand alone either. It 
incorporates aspects of OT and administration. Generally defined as 
“getting things done through others,”245 MT is concerned with efficiency 
in resource utilization. The theory embraces the idea of assembling the 
resources and directing them towards achieving the organization‟s goals. 
Management is also process-oriented as reflected in Taylor‟s “scientific 
management” theory, where he argues that there is more than one way 
to manage people, and offers a set of universal principles to be applied, 
e.g. providing staff training so they can do the work well; gaining staff 
cooperation to do the assigned job; and division of work based on staff 
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weakness and strengths.246 That is to say the right person for the right 
job.  
Management involves administration in that both theories focus on 
people and decision-making. Specifically, the process of managing draws 
heavily on the fundamental principle of administration, that of efficiency 
maximization. As Simon puts it, “good” administration means adopting a 
decision (e.g. an intervention) that uses the least expenditure which 
leads to the greatest accomplishment.247 And this is just as true for 
management too. Thus, in practice, the line between management and 
administrative theories is not that obvious. The two theories seat side by 
side. Managerial functions constitute an administrative component just 
as administrative functions also constitute management functions. The 
other way to look at this is that management functions are long term, 
involving aspects of planning and resource allocation. On the other hand, 
the administrative role is transactional, making things done. It is a tactic 
to achieve a management goal. Management focuses on what needs to be 
done, while administration looks at how it needs to be done. In short, 
management equals effectiveness whereas administration goes for 
efficiency. 
It should be clear by now that administrative theory shares 
common ground with OT and MT, and that all of them are intertwined. 
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Administrative theory is concerned with “how an organization should be 
constructed and operated in order to accomplish its work efficiently.”248 
The theory emphasizes efficiency and effectiveness in managing the 
resources under one‟s jurisdiction.249 According to Dahl, quoting Luther 
Gulick: “in the science of administration, whether public or private, the 
basic “good” is efficiency.”250 Administrative theory is centered on 
decision-making and advocates the principle of choice and rationality.251  
“A fundamental principle of administration, which follows almost 
immediately from the rational character of “good” administration, 
is that among several alternatives involving the same expenditure 
the one should always be selected which leads to the greatest 
accomplishment of administrative objectives; and among several 
alternatives that lead to the same accomplishment, the one should 
be selected which involves the least expenditure.”252   
 
Administration entails the ability to plan, organize, command, 
coordinate, and control the activities relating to utilization of the 
resources.253 Administrative theory is both human and process-oriented. 
The theory is human-centered in that it takes the human resource as a 
center of activity: one that should decide what to do with the other 
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resources. Yet it is also processed oriented because it emphasizes the 
aspect of input versus outcomes. Each activity – from planning to control 
– is aimed at efficiency: using the input with the least cost that gives 
highest outcome.254 Because information is never complete for any given 
situation and the fact that it is not possible to evaluate all possible 
alternatives, decisions adopted are often a matter of speculation.255 In 
practice, administration is management as its application suggests.256 In 
short, administration is about decision-making and selecting the best 
choice among several alternatives.  
“Since the “principle of efficiency” is basically characteristic of any 
activity that attempts rationally to maximize the attainment of 
certain ends with the use of scarce means, it is characteristic of 
economic theory as it is of administrative theory. The 
“administrative man” takes his place alongside the classical 
“economic man.”257  
 
Evidently, the general theme that runs through the above theories 
suggests that resource availability is a must if an organization is to 
operate as intended; needless to say these resources ought to be 
efficiently allocated to achieve the desired goals. The theory clearly takes 
resource availability for granted as can be seen from its emphasis on how 
to get the best out of the available resources. Like in the economic 
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literature where efficiency theory runs deeply and assumes availability of 
the resources to be utilized,258 the administration, organization, and 
management theories follow similar reasoning. They too take 
institutional capacity for granted and assume that the resources are 
available. The only challenge, therefore, is to figure out how [best] to 
organize and utilize those resources to achieve the best results at a 
minimum cost possible.259 In other words, management develops the 
policies and procedures, while administration implements them. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
How does institutional capacity relate to the above theories? One 
simple answer is that an assessment of capacity does not end at 
itemizing the resource inputs. The principles espoused in the above 
theories are part of what constitutes institutional capacity. However, in 
addition to having the actual inputs required for a particular task, an 
institution‟s ability to mobilize, organize, and utilize these resources to 
attain its policy goals are even more important aspects of institutional 
capacity. The latter reflects the managerial, leadership and 
organizational skills of the human resources who are supposed to 
mobilize and allocate other resources for various tasks.  
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Human relationships within and across organizations are an 
important factor that too often either gets overlooked or simply taken for 
granted as if they fall in place automatically. And this is where Skocpol‟s 
(1985), Migdal‟s (1988; 1994), and Evans‟ (1985) state-society functional 
models become helpful because managerial capabilities are very 
important. But quite often managerial capacities are subject to societal 
forces whose interests the state has to accommodate, at least in a 
responsive government. And since no organization operates in a vacuum 
devoid of such forces, be it from within or outside the organization, the 
effectiveness of an organization will depend on how well it responds to 
such pressures. 
Fortunately, there is some agreement that organizations are 
dynamic social systems, driven by “patterned activities” of their 
members260 whose combined effort makes it possible to attain a common 
goal.261 As a resource responsible for mobilizing, organizing, allocating 
and utilizing the other productive inputs, managers (and their staff) have 
a direct influence on an organization‟s ability to achieve its goals. Sadly, 
not all institutions possess this capacity: to supervise, coordinate and 
manage the other productive resources to achieve their goals.262 In our 
case study, this is one among the several challenges the Forestry 
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Department is facing. The department‟s physical presence to monitor 
forest activities has been declining since 1986 due to reductions in labor 
force and budgetary allocations from central government for its 
programs.263 For instance, its total labor force declined from the highest 
level of 3,280 in 1986264 to 814 (2004), while capital funding fell from 
K794.1 million (1986) to K57 million in 2000;265 representing a reduction 
of 25% on labor and 7.2% capital allocations to the dept, respectively.   
Because policy implementation is a process that requires inputs on 
one end, and projected outputs/outcomes on the other end,266 a 
reduction in its inputs would clearly affect the outcomes. On the other 
hand, taking up another program, as Zambia did with the structural 
adjustment program (SAP), introduces additional responsibilities and 
increases performance expectations for the organization and its clients. 
All this requires additional capacity. This is where priority setting 
becomes crucial. However, deciding on what programs to implement first, 
let alone what changes to introduce in the course of implementing a new 
program is not an easy task because information to guide the decision 
making process is never complete.267 Also human inadequacy to precisely 
predict what the future holds adds to the complexity managers have to 
face and overcome to steer their organizations to success. Due to these 
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uncertainties, incrementalism in decision making tends to have more 
appeal.268 
The theories that underpin institutional capacity also convey the 
idea that resource utilization is about making choices. In our case, this 
means that the type of policy choices central government took 
subsequently determined the type of outcomes that could be 
anticipated.269 However, it is important to note that political commitment 
to follow through its policy choices, the zeal and commitment career 
bureaucrats attach to implementing these decisions have a huge impact 
too.270 Given the layers of decision makers in government, and the 
numerous policy choices to select from, information overload and 
uncertainty on which of the policy choices might work better can be 
daunting. It is therefore not surprising that agencies tend to adopt policy 
choices with minimum risk; not because these offer the best solutions 
but because it is not easy to fully account for uncertainty in the 
future.271 It may also be the safest way to avoid blame for failure to attain 
projected outputs, just in case unintended consequences outweigh 
projected benefits.272 Somehow, this is happening in forestry circles in 
Zambia, a topic I explore further in Chapter 5 and 6.  
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After implementing the civil service reforms, and noticing a 
corresponding increase in illegal activities in the forest estates, one 
would expect government officials to own up to the problem as part of the 
unintended consequences of the reforms, and hopefully hear some 
possible strategies being offered to address the problem. Surprisingly, FD 
managers have been busy blaming the victim, civil society, for the 
deplorable state of the forests, claiming that resource users are 
uncooperative and are fomenting a culture of lawlessness. Yet as this 
study has revealed, this problem lies internally in the bureau, whose 
capacity has been reduced and does not match its obligations: FD is no 
longer able to reach its clients and provide the necessary services.  
While the foregoing theories are useful in linking capacity to 
performance, resource allocation across government agencies is a highly 
contested political battle that invites questions of who should get what, 
when, and how;273 and I would add why. From an administrative angle 
this almost always raises the question of resource availability and 
optimality. Does the agency have the capacity to implement a particular 
program? What type (and or quantity) of resources are needed? At what 
level is a particular resource optimal? And what level is performance 
ideal?274 Since individual organizations have different optimal 
benchmarks, theory has not prescribed a universal standard applicable 
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to all: it is simply not practical to do so. Even Frederick Taylor in his 
extensive work on scientific management did not attempt to do this. 
What comes close to being practical, in my opinion, is the use of an 
organization chart as a benchmark. Since an organization 
structure/chart275 shows not only a hierarchy of ranks and authority 
boundaries but also the implied activities to be carried out, it can serve 
as a basis for estimating, at least, the human resource required for an 
organization.276 The human resources then estimate the other input 
requirements that are needed to carry out their respective functions. This 
study draws heavily on this structural-functional model in determining 
the human resource requirements for the Forestry Department.   
   Obviously, the level of autonomy that managers have in making 
decisions and implementing them has enormous implications on an 
institution‟s performance.277 Managers can delay, facilitate or simply stop 
a program from being undertaken. The Forestry Department has 
numerous experiences in this regard. The department‟s successes in the 
1960s to 1970s can easily be traced to the professional and highly 
inspirational leadership that existed in the department at the time, re-
enforced by teamwork – a spirit of working towards a common goal. The 
                                                 
275
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creation of the industrial plantations and protected forest areas are some 
of the success stories.  
Accountability is another factor worth mentioning. When employees 
are held accountable, they tend to be more responsible both in their 
decisions and how they execute the functions of their offices. But for 
most government agencies this is where institutional weakness also 
begins. Despite their well-defined structures278 that neatly arrange 
employees in a “hierarchy of authority,”279 apportioning blame to 
individuals for program failure is not common in government, except if it 
takes the shape of theft, abuse of power, or corruption charges. 
Generally speaking, government work is considered as collective action 
that involves all employees.280 This feature has enormous implications 
not only on the role of institutional capacity on performance but also on 
how to explain its interactions with other confounding factors such as 
the influence of policy elites,281 the political regime, and changing trends 
in the global markets. The Forest Department is a classical example in 
this respect. Despite the deplorable state of the forests, no one has been 
charged for negligence in carrying out their duties.  
                                                 
278
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The influence of the policy elites on public policy and the interplay 
of politics in governance is a matter that needs no elaboration.282 Politics 
is part of administration and has a huge influence on government 
choices.283 As Oliver Williamson (1996), quoting Douglass North explains, 
people do have a significant impact on economic performance because 
they define and enforce the rules.284 On the other hand, government is 
also big business in so far as its policies influence economic activity.285 
Thus, the interplay of politics and administration is a real challenge on 
matters concerning public policy and its implementation. Although 
policy-making is a shared responsibility between enactment (policy 
makers) and implementation (bureaucrats), quite often implementers 
tend to control the outcomes of any policy,286 underscoring the influence 
that staff have in determining program success/failure.  
A country may have good policies and programs but if the 
implementers (bureaucrats) do not support or understand those policies, 
such programs remain policy wishes. Quite frankly, the Zambian forest 
service fits in this mould from all dimensions. If achievements of yester 
years in forestry (e.g. the establishment of industrial timber plantations) 
can be taken as indicators of effectiveness, it seems the department‟s 
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personnel at that time fully understood government policy goals on 
forestry, and worked towards achieving them. Zambia today has surplus 
timber because the bureaucrats in the FD pursued this policy goal. But 
the opposite is what is happening now. Out of 80 people (senior and 
middle managers) that responded to our survey, 55% said they have no 
idea whether or not the department develops annual plans; 89.6% said 
they don‟t have any plans to implement; and 70% are not involved in the 
department‟s performance evaluation, if at all any takes place. If senior 
and middle managers, who are the program implementers, do not know 
the policy goals they are supposed to achieve, can the department 
operate effectively?  
Indeed, a theoretical presentation of institutional capacity (and 
performance) would be incomplete without mentioning incentives. 
Organizations, like individuals, respond to incentives. Starting with 
Taylor‟s scientific management287 to Maslow‟s human motivation 
theory,288 it is evident that people respond to incentives provided by their 
environment. However, Israel cautions that despite this general belief 
that incentives motivate people to perform better and that there is a 
linear relationship between incentives and performance, this does not 
stay constantly positive.289 As in any utility function, incentives stimulate 
performance only up to a certain peak point after which any additional 
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incentives have no effect on improving performance. At that point, 
performance may remain the same or decline despite additional 
incentives.290  By extension, this law of diminishing returns applies 
equally to the production function of an organization too.  
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, none of the theories 
spells out what constitutes institutional capacity, much less how to 
assess it. Instead, they offer principles that would help create efficient 
and effective organizations. Organization management and 
administrative theorists concentrate on how best to organize and utilize 
the available resources, while political scientists dwell on relationships 
and ensuing outcomes, and barely show what capacities lead to those 
outcomes – which apparently is usually their main focus.  All of them 
simply take institutional capacity for granted. 
But in order to know what makes some institutions perform better 
than others understanding the differences in their institutional capacity 
offers a good starting point. Among the scholars that have touched on 
institutional capacity, only Bratton offers a framework that is possible to 
do this. Thus, this study draws heavily on Bratton‟s291 conception of 
institutional capacity, and combines it with Grindle‟s292 definition, which 
together offers the input and functional aspects of capacity. As mentioned 
earlier, I conceptualize institutional capacity representing those basic 
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inputs needed for an organization to do its work, which includes: human, 
financial, and technological resources. In discussing the human element, 
their technical, administrative, and political capabilities are also 
covered.293 My argument is that when evaluating institutional 
performance it is important to start from the inputs side rather than 
focusing on policy outcomes and impacts. I should point out that policy 
can be evaluated at any stage of the inputs-outputs-outcomes-impacts 
framework. The point I‟m making is that in order to understand the role 
of institutional capacity on performance (outcomes), it is important to 
assess the availability of the inputs first because this is what drives 
achievement of the outcomes later on.  
Probably the more complex question is the one I raised earlier: how 
does one know when the inputs are sufficient in relation to or 
independent of the anticipated outcomes? There is no simple answer to 
this. As I suggested earlier the organization structure is a good starting 
point; it specifies the initial human resource requirements and their 
managerial competences. These people would later determine what would 
be needed to pursue the mission of the organization, and adjust these 
requirements as they go along. It is for this reason that this study takes 
special interest in both the tangible inputs that were at FD‟s disposal as 
well as the managerial competences of its managers to design and 
implement government policy. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the above, 
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the nature of the bureaucracy is also likely to influence and eventually 
determine how these resources are organized and utilized.294 Agency 
rivalry in respect to sharing the national cake is another case in point. 
Those bureaus with prominent images on the policy arena are likely to be 
favored. 
In conclusion, it is gratifying to note that regardless of the different 
conceptions people have of IC at least there is agreement that the 
presence of capacity and, more importantly, how it is applied are two 
fundamental ingredients that separates dysfunctional from effective 
organizations. In fact, the question we should be answering is not 
„whether institutional capacity matters‟ because of course it does matter. 
Instead, what we should be concerned with is to investigate ‘what 
capacities matter’ most if dysfunctional organizations were to perform 
better. The chapters that follow build on this principle and illustrate how 
this has played out in the Zambian case study. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Understanding the Connections 
 
Interest in institutional capacity has been gaining momentum 
since the mid 1980s; the first of these concerns having been raised by 
political scientists295 who framed the issue in terms of state capacity. 
Later economists,296 practitioners (especially the multi-lateral lending 
institutions),297 policy analysts, administrators and management 
scholars 298 also joined – each highlighting specific aspects of capacity 
and their implications for the state‟s ability to govern. Although these 
scholars differ in how they conceptualize capacity, their view on how 
institutional capacity (IC) is related to performance outcomes is somehow 
a straightforward issue. They all agree that a strong institutional 
capacity matters if an organization is to perform effectively and achieve 
its goals. Where the debate becomes slippery is on the question of what 
constitutes institutional capacity, which capacity matters most and, 
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especially how each of the various (or potential) IC parameters contribute 
to or impact the outcomes. None of the above provides a comprehensive 
solution. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, management practitioners generally tend 
to interpret institutional capacity to imply availability of factors of 
production (including the technical skills) and argue that performance 
outcome depends on them. But political scientists, economists, 
sociologists and institutional scholars (from across different disciplines) 
disagree with this emphatic conclusion. While agreeing that these are 
important, they also point to other aspects such as the presence of an 
enabling environment e.g. the presence of appropriate statutes, national 
policy choices, stable government,299 etc. as being more important. They 
argue that performance outcomes are not strictly a function of factors of 
production but also depend on how people respond to their environment. 
In their view, the environment facilitates or inhibits certain choices. Even 
if the factors of production were available, if the environment is not 
supportive it could hinder the way any organization operates. Therefore, 
capacity is much more than the traditional conception of having 
productive resources. The question then is: what constitutes capacity? 
What is an ideal level of capacity? And how can we measure what portion 
of capacity is responsible for what outcome(s)?  
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This study addresses these questions using the Zambian Forestry 
Agency as a case study. We ask whether inadequate financial and 
human resources, as the bureaucrats in FD claim, are the only 
constraints contributing to forest degradation. Or are there other factors 
at play, as the literature suggests? As we have seen already, current 
theories leave this challenge for managers (or management teams) to 
decide what is appropriate in their situation. It is at this point that this 
study comes in to bridge the gap, albeit in a small way.  
 
Defining the Problem 
This study explores the nexus between public administration and 
policy implementation, looking specifically at institutional capacity and 
performance outcomes. Considering the department‟s previous 
achievements versus its current failures today this raises a red flag and 
makes us to ask what has caused this negative transition from being a 
high performing star agency to one that is almost non-existent.   
For a long time forest managers have been complaining about 
inadequate labor force and financial outlays as two major reasons why 
the department has been failing to perform below expectation, vis-à-vis, 
effective management of its estates. They have espoused this claim for 
over two decades and no solution seems to be in sight,300 in spite of 
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numerous recommendations offered by various researchers.301 In 
addition, despite the re-organization of the Zambian civil service as a 
whole, which incidentally which started with the Forestry Department as 
the first bureau to be restructured in 1997 (as a part of a broader 
intervention geared towards making the government more effective and 
efficient), unfortunately this too has not helped either. Gauging from the 
state of its estates, the department‟s performance has continued its 
downward spiral. Are inadequate labor force and financial outlays for 
forestry programs the only factors contributing to the department‟s poor 
performance?  Can we continue to trust this assessment? Or could there 
be other factors at play that the department may have overlooked?  
The best way to address the department‟s position is re-examine 
its assessment to find out how true this is. And this is the central 
question for this study. We take the department‟s complaint and turn it 
in a research hypothesis that the state of the forests depends on the 
strength of the institutional capacity. The stronger the institutional 
capacity the better and well managed the department‟s estates will be, 
and vice versa. In other words, institutional [in]capacity accounts for the 
decline of forest estates in Zambia, decline measured in terms of 
hecterage (or acreage) and quality of forest stock.  
Therefore, taking the input-outcomes production process as a 
simplified framework in assessing an organization‟s performance, this 
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study looks at the inputs side first and then relates it to the outcomes to 
see how those inputs influenced the outcomes. Hence, rather than 
focusing on the outcomes this study contributes to the left side of the 
input-outcomes production process, and argues that since resource 
[in]adequacy (the capacity) is reflected in the outcomes, it is important to 
establish what capacities are available and whether or not that is 
adequate to accomplish the set goals.302 More importantly, the analysis 
goes further to find out how each of these layers of capacities influenced 
the outcome(s) namely, the state of the forests, in this case measured in 
terms their extent and stock quality (which in this case is manifested in 
forest degradation). To illustrate this connection between inputs and 
outcomes, forest degradation is used as a performance indicator.  
However, since it is likely that several other factors could also be at 
play, this investigation does not take FD‟s argument for granted. Rather, 
although this study argues that IC is the major underlying factor, we also 
reflect on those other possible factors such as government policy, 
population growth, and climate effects.   
As the literature review in Chapter 2 reveals, the questions this 
study addresses have no standard answer and therefore challenge the 
existing administrative, economic and management theories that take IC 
for granted and instead focuses on how to organize and utilize the 
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productive resources. These theories assume resource availability and 
indirectly convey the message that all one needs is to figure out the best 
way [how] to use those resources. This assumption is so deeply 
engrained in the organization and management theories that they focus 
more on the best way to manage the available resources. The economic 
field, anchored in efficiency and effective use of the available resources, 
also suffers from this weakness. They assume resource availability (the 
idea that capacity exists) and emphasize tactics to maximize that 
capacity. 
This study, on the other hand, seeks to find out first and foremost 
what capacity exists in terms of personnel and finances. Second, we seek 
to establish how each of these factors is contributing to the problem at 
hand, forest degradation. In other words, this study asks: does the FD 
have the capacity to carry out its mandate? And what part of its capacity 
is more important? Rather than just counting resource availability (the 
first question), this investigation is also interested in knowing the impact 
each of the different types of capacities exerted on the performance 
outcomes, i.e. how each is contributing to forest degradation.  
Therefore, as part of a central argument of this study, knowing 
how each type of capacity contributes to or affects the outcomes is 
clearly important because not only does that knowledge help in designing 
the right interventions but more importantly it would be useful in timing 
and applying it at the point of weakness where the problem lies. As some 
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experiences have shown from capacity builders in the international 
development community most of the failures encountered arise precisely 
from this disconnection; not knowing how each input influenced the 
outcomes.303 And this brings us back to the original question: what 
constitutes institutional capacity? How can one tell when a particular 
resource is adequate? At what level is a given resource ideal and 
adequate? Between efficiency and effectiveness, which one is more 
important? These questions are addressed in subsequent chapters. This 
Chapter lays out the methodology used in this study and highlights why 
this was found appropriate.  
Taking Mills‟ advice that the best way to analyze a scientific 
problem depends on the phenomena being investigated,304 a longitudinal 
approach rendered itself suitable and desirable in this case in the sense 
that it allows us to observe, over time, certain trends that are then used 
in explaining the relationships between forest degradation (the dependent 
variable) and factors that are assumed to accelerate it, namely a weak 
institutional capacity. IC is measured in terms of annual allocations to 
forestry programs and availability of forestry personnel, whereas forest 
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excisions, illegal encroachments and deforestation305 are taken as 
proxies for forest degradation, all of which culminate in changes in PFAs.  
As acknowledged earlier, although there are several factors that 
could be contributing to forest degradation in Zambia, in this study I 
posit that a weak institutional capacity in the Forestry Department offers 
the most plausible explanation for the loss and poor state of protected 
forests. First, without adequate levels of budgetary allocations and 
forestry personnel to plan and oversee overall forest management, it is 
not possible to get out in the field to monitor or evaluate the field 
operations. Second, as an enterprise that relies on the physical presence 
of field personnel who patrol the estates to ensure that forest resource-
users abide by the provisions of their licenses, the need for a strong 
human presence cannot be over emphasized. However, in between 
availability of these resources there is also the role of the forest managers 
(the managerial capacity) – are these people making the best use of what 
is at their disposal?  
Since forest estates in Zambia are essentially public lands, held in 
trust for the people, this has tended to complicate the situation in terms 
of ownership and access to the forest resources.306 With an exception of 
the forest estates in State land, which belong to the central government, 
government (in this case represented by FD) does not own the estates 
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that fall in Chiefs‟ areas. Instead, it only has a surrogate managerial role 
over them. Therefore, as a public good, owned through generational 
inheritance, and I dare say, which had previously been well managed 
communally before government “took over”, does FD still tap into this 
community capacity to manage these forests? Considering that most of 
these forests are now heavily encroached, would one say these forests 
suffering from the tragedy of the commons,307 a phenomenon that never 
existed prior to government‟s take over as a new manager? Or is this 
phenomenon a consequence of the absence of the manager or a perceived 
owner?   
 
Research Questions 
Government‟s policy on forestry can be summarized in two broad 
goals: To set aside sufficient forest areas in each district (at least 15% of 
Zambia‟s total land mass) as forest resource reservoirs to cater for the 
needs of both the present and future generations. Second, as part of a 
broader strategy on rural development, and in view of the challenges 
posed by the rural-urban migration, rural development was identified as 
a priority area308 in which forestry was expected to play a major role in 
creating job opportunities in rural areas where the bulk of the forests are 
                                                 
307
  Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, Vol. 162, 13 December 1968, pp.1243-1248; 
Zebedayo S.K. Mvena, The tragedy of the commons: is it applicable to East Africa? M.S. Thesis, 
University of Missouri-Columbia, 1981. 
308
  Alan Simmance, Urbanization in Zambia, 1972 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 134 
 
 
found.309 Consequently, government looked to forestry and agriculture as 
possible solutions to this rural development dilemma.  
For instance, between the 1960s and 70s the department scored a 
lot of successes in research on the ecology, protection, management, and 
restocking of indigenous forest areas; including the establishment, 
protection and management of plantations310 as per government policy 
expectations.311 Its personnel worked diligently towards reaching the 
15% policy benchmark on PFAs. Forest estates steadily increased from 5 
million ha. in 1962 to over 7 million ha. by 1986 (roughly 9.8% of the 
total forest area), just short of 5.2% to reach the 15% national goal.312 
And each of these forests was fairly well managed.  
For each forest estate there was a management book outlining the 
annual activities to be carried out, which were quite useful in monitoring 
and evaluating not only changes in forest stock but in the overall 
stability of the forest ecosystem. But none of this is done anymore. The 
last management books were prepared in 1986, the very year Mr. BOM 
Chiyabwe, the person most people affectionately remember as the last 
visionary leader to head the department,313 left on promotion to become 
Under Secretary in the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources – where 
FD belonged at the time.  In short, although the FD was quite successful 
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in some other areas, just mentioned above, unfortunately the department 
has not lived up to the expectation of creating job opportunities in the 
rural areas. 
Looking at the department‟s prior successes and comparing the 
same to the current deplorable state of affairs, it attracts interest to 
investigate what has caused such drastic changes. Why are forest estates 
in Zambia in a state of decline both in the area they cover and the quality 
of the forest stock? Is this due to lack of institutional capacity in the 
department or is it due to other factors outside the department‟s 
purview? To answer these questions one would need to look at the 
department‟s performance over the years. 
 
 What is the extent of the forest estates that the department has 
established over the years, and why is it declining?  
 How well managed are these forest estates?  
 What is the status of its labor force? Is it adequate (and sufficiently 
qualified) to manage these forests?  
 What has been central government‟s level of financial support to 
forestry programs? 
 Considering that public policy is a political contest, how much 
political support is the department receiving from elected officials 
and policy makers both at central level and in respective local 
jurisdictions?  
 
It is important to proceed in this manner of inquiry because unless 
the department is working towards fulfilling its primary mandate (the 
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establishment of forest reserves for protection and production purposes) 
there will be no basis to assess the rest of the policy expectations simply 
because there won‟t be any estates to assess. A point to note is here is 
that my emphasis on forest reservation does not in any way trivialize the 
fact that how these estates are managed is not important but to 
emphasize the fact that one would not talk about how well managed the 
forests are if the forests do not exist in the first place. At the same time 
to have the forests that are not well managed is as good as not having 
them at all. Therefore, achieving government‟s goal of creating the 
protected forests is as important as managing them, both of which 
depend on the department‟s institutional capacity to fulfill these policy 
expectations. It is for this reason that institutional capacity has been 
identified as a common denominator that accounts for changes in these 
performance indicators. But why should we care pursuing this line of 
inquiry? 
There are several reasons. First, this apparently small question 
helps us to indirectly address a larger question on why forestry in 
Zambia contributes so minimally to the national GDP. Furthermore, one 
would like to know why Zambia, a relatively rich nation (so well endowed 
in natural resources both below and above the ground), is nonetheless so 
poor. In fact, I would argue that this apparently small question also 
indirectly addresses the larger question of challenges of 
[under]development in the Third World. What are the underlying causes 
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to this dilemma? Is it the statutes that shape and govern the economic 
and social interactions,314 the national policies that set government‟s 
agenda,315 or the implementation challenges?316 Is it the social and 
economic demands exerted by the public317 and or corporations,318 
respectively, or is it a question of state capacity to harness all the 
above?319 The challenge, as Daniel Little (1991) reminds us, lies in how 
the data collected on all these areas is assessed, analyzed and 
interpreted.320  
One plausible explanation for the country‟s failure to pull ahead 
economically seems to be the lack of institutional capacity in respective 
bureaus: the failure to prudently use Zambia‟s natural endowment. 
Because state capacity comes from the sum of its parts (bureaus), when 
problems at agency level are not resolved they spiral up and affect the 
center which, in this case, is central government. In this context, we can 
all agree that state capacity is a reflection of the strength of its 
agencies.321  
                                                 
314
  See for instance, North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 1990; Powell and DiMaggio, The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 1991; Andre Lecours (ed.), New Institutionalism: Theory and 
Analysis, 2005. 
315
  Merilee Grindle and John Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of 
Reform in Developing Countries, 1991, Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of 
Permanent Crisis,1979-1999, 2001;  
316
 Merilee Grindle, Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, 1980 
317
  Deborah Brautigam, “State Capacity and Effective Governance” in: Benno Ndulu and Nicolas van de 
Walle (eds.), Agenda for Africa’s Economic Renewal, 1996. Chapter 2, pp-81-108 
318
  Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy, 1995. 
319
  Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,” 1985 
320
  Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, 1991 
321
 Theda Skocpol, 1985; Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World, 1988; Joel Migdal, “The State in Society: An approach to Struggles for 
Domination,” in: Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (eds.) State Power and Social Forces, 1994; Peter Evans, 1985 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 138 
 
 
The third reason, which is also closely linked to the above point is 
that, instead of using national indices such as the national GDP to 
understand Zambia‟s economic performance, one way to get to the 
bottom of this problem is to undertake sector case studies to see how 
individual agencies in each sector are performing. This permits us to 
identify the opportunities and problems peculiar to each agency. Because 
each agency (or sector) is likely to be affected and respond differently to 
government policy interventions, knowledge of their specific challenges 
becomes useful in finding appropriate interventions that would ensure 
that each agency is pushed to perform to its full potential. A sector 
approach, therefore, offers a great opportunity to see what is happening 
in each sector, and these results might be useful in raising hypotheses 
for other sectors too. Hence, the importance of these case studies cannot 
be over-emphasized. And this is the rationale behind this study. 
Investigating what is happening in each sector will help us get answers 
for the larger question on what is keeping Zambia in such economic 
despondency, despite being a rich country. 
 Coming back to the question under investigation, in order to 
understand why the FD‟s estates have been declining in size and quality, 
there is also a need to look closely at the manager and the other inputs 
at that person‟s (or the department‟s disposal) rather than the policy 
impacts. Resource availability, as I have argued earlier, is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition in the performance equation. Instead, a 
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skilled, entrepreneurial manager that has to put the other factors of 
production to good use is an extremely crucial input.322 As Lynn (1996) 
explains, managerial “leadership counts” a lot.323 Not only do managers 
set the tone and direction on what is to be done, but they are in a 
privileged position to motivate or de-motivate the labor force both of 
which have enormous implications on the outcomes. And it is also 
important to note that availability of managers would not automatically 
fix the performance challenge if these people lack the necessary inputs to 
do their jobs. An ideal situation, therefore, requires the presence of both: 
a good manager and the other factors of production and, preferably both 
must be of good quality, not one or the other. Having said that, the 
responsibility of finding and utilizing these other resources still rests 
with managers. And this is why the role of forest managers, as in any 
organization, is so important. 
For this reason, a total package of institutional capacity is 
considered as comprising adequate resource availability of good quality. 
For instance, is the FD adequately staffed and funded? Does it have 
skilled managers? And do these managers understand government policy 
on forestry? Have they translated these policies into attainable goals? 
What incentives does the department offer to motivate and retain its 
staff? How are the working relationships between FD and other 
                                                 
322
 Lawrence Lynn, Jr. Public Management as Art, Science and Profession (Chatham House Publishers), 
1996:68-80  
323
 Lynn, Public Management as Art, Science and Profession, 1996:69 
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stakeholders? These and other questions open doors to a maze of 
structural, organizational and management issues facing the 
department, which in a way explains (or at least allows us to speculate), 
why the department is doing so poorly. In other words, what this study 
does is to answer a small question, which then contributes in explaining 
the larger problem on forest management, in particular how the FD 
performance fits into this larger picture. 
 
Methodology and Study Design  
This study utilizes two data sets: secondary and primary data 
generated from a desk research and a field survey, respectively.  The 
survey took the form of a mail-in semi-structured questionnaire324 and 
personal interviews with senior government officials at various agencies 
including some all weather friends of the Forestry Department from 
bilateral agencies.325 Secondary data was generated through a desk 
research. 
Overall, our analysis utilizes a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, both of which have been very useful in getting a 
clearer picture on the various interactions. For instance, observing the 
changes (e.g. from line graphs) in forests estates, human resources and 
financials outlays helped to establish the direction of change both in the 
                                                 
324
  Appendix 1 
325
  For a list of people consulted, see Appendix 3. 
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dependent and independent variables. However, it is not possible to tell 
the impact or degree of influence each independent variable is exerting 
on the dependent variable326 by simply looking at the trend of change. 
This is where quantitative analysis became useful; it clarified the data 
further. On the other hand, it was also important to understand what 
caused (or were causing) these changes in the first place (i.e. the 
underlying root causes). The qualitative analysis took an upper hand 
here. Thus, the two methods complement each other very well in this 
study. The regression analysis helped to clarify our findings that could 
have otherwise been misinterpreted or exaggerated the impact of some 
independent variables on the forest estates.  
As King, et. al., (1994) explain, using a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative techniques is not unusual because “most research does 
not fit clearly into one category or the other. The best often combines 
features of each. In the same project, some data may be collected that is 
amenable to statistical analysis, while other equally important 
information is not”.327 And this was clearly the case in this study. The 
qualitative approach was found particularly appropriate in explaining the 
influence of policy elites on forestry policy and programs, which could 
not easily be operationalized to suit the quantitative analysis approaches. 
The managerial and organizational abilities of the forestry managers (or 
                                                 
326
  Donald M. Pilcher, Data Analysis for the Helping Professions: A Practical Guide (Sage Publications: 
Newbury Park, California), 1990:107 
327
  King, et. al., 1994:5 
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lack of it), which is a major theme of this dissertation, also easily fits into 
this category too. 
 
Desk Research 
Secondary aggregate data was mined from public documents328 
through a desk research and helps us to trace changes in three 
variables: 1. the status of forest estates, 2. forestry staff (with special 
emphasis placed on forestry trained personnel who are the front liners on 
forest management) and, 3. Central government‟s funding329 to the 
Forestry Department from 1962 to 2005.  
 
Considering that forestry programs have greatly benefited from 
external financiers such as FINNIDA, UNDP, the EU, World Bank, etc. 
(and continues to do so), these organizations were a great source of 
information too especially on the achievements and problems relating to 
forestry work in Zambia. 
 
                                                 
328
  These include the Forestry Department Annual Reports (1965 to 2005); GRZ Financial Reports (1970 
to 2005); CSO, Monthly Statistical Digests 1973 to 2005; Forestry Act of 1973 and 1999; National Forestry 
Policy, 1965 and 1998; the Land Act, 1967 and 1995; Land Policy, 2000; The First National Development 
Plan 1966 to 1970; Second National Development Plan 1972-1976; Third National Development Plan 
1979-83; New Economic Recovery Programme 1987-89; Transitional National Development Plan 2002-
2005; and the Fifth National Development Plan, 2006-2010. 
329
 In particular, these documents provided data on the extent of forest estates in Zambia, the number and 
quality (qualifications, management competence, etc.) of forestry personnel, central government‟s annual 
budget allocation to the Forestry Department (both for capital and operational expenses), as well as funds 
from external sources – received mainly in the form of bilateral aid, grants or technical assistance to 
Forestry Department (FD). To mention but a few these bilateral sources include the Scandinavian countries 
(Finland, Norway, Sweden), Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, FAO, and recently (since the 1990s) the 
EU. 
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The Model 
The first part of this study utilizes a quantitative analysis using a 
multiple linear regression model to analyze the hypothesis above, which 
posits that change in protected forest areas is dependent on FD‟s 
institutional capacity, herein represented by number of staff and annual 
financial allocations the Forestry Department has had over the years to 
implement its plans. In other words, forest degradation (a performance 
indicator, also a dependent variable) can be explained by changes in 
institutional capacity (the independent variable).330 The stronger the 
department‟s institutional capacity the better managed its forests would 
be, and vice versa.  
 
To get a better understanding of how each category of forestry 
personnel influences this relationship, this variable is further broken 
down into three categories, namely professional, technical and field staff; 
based on the department‟s classification.331   
 
                                                 
330
 Only government funding is included in this model. External sources such as loans, grants and any types 
of aid are excluded because the bulk of this was not for management of natural forests. See Appendix 5. 
331
  Professional staff includes all those with a 4 year degree and above, Technical covers those with a 
Forestry Diploma (equiv. to an Associate degree), while Field staff refers to those with at least 1 year 
forestry training. Senior and middle managers are appointed from the professional group, while junior 
managers are drawn from the technical group too.  
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As a multiple linear332 regression model this hypothesis can be 
expressed as follows: 
CPFA = B0 + B1Staff + B2Funds + e 
 
where,  B0  =  slope intercept; 
 B1, ...Bn  =  slope coefficients;        
 CPFA =  Change in Protected Forest Areas; 
 Staff =  number of staff per annum;  
 (broken down at three levels: professional, technical and field staff) 
 Funds =  annual allocations to the department; 
            (broken down at two levels: operational and capital funds). 
 e  =  error 
 
 
A full model is expressed as: 
CPFA = B0 + B1ProfStaff + B2TechStaff + B3FieldStaff + B4OpFunds + B5CapFunds + e 
 
 
Because this study deals with one case study (one bureau in one 
country), it was possible to initially control for some factors that can 
potentially also cause changes in forest estates such as population 
growth, political ideology, government regulations on trade, and 
climate333 primarily to make the analysis manageable but also based on 
the fact that these conditions also applied equally to other bureaus not 
only to FD. The only difference is how the managers in each bureau 
                                                 
332
  The researcher acknowledges the limitations associated with the assumption of having linear 
relationships as this equation suggests.   
333
  Climatic conditions can affect forest ecology by enhancing or altering the nature of the ecosystem. 
However, in this case study climate has not caused any drastic changes apart from making the forests more 
susceptible to fires in times of drought.  
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responded to the changing circumstances – be it to resource availability 
or policy shifts, and this matters a lot. Note that these variables were 
hardly static, they changed over time, which required a similar approach 
from the managers to adjust to the changing environment. Apparently, 
FD has not been responding in a similar manner. For this reason, the 
analysis pays special attention to management aspects over the various 
policy periods and highlights how the department‟s activities/programs 
were impacted and why.  
It is worth mentioning at this point that funds from external 
sources have been excluded from the regression analysis due to a 
methodological constraint. This variable could not fit into the model. 
Second, although external financiers334 have pumped in over $494 
million335 into forestry programs between 1986 and 2005, much of this 
(about 73%) was not for indigenous forest management. Out of 52 
externally financed projects/programs only 16 of them (equiv. to 27%) 
with a total amount of $135 million went into activities related to 
indigenous forest management such as training in beekeeping and 
provision of forest extension services. Slightly over $2 million was 
specifically spent on capacity building, generally reduced to technical 
training and specifically in forestry. The rest went into industrial 
plantations development and baseline studies.336 However, despite this 
                                                 
334
 MENR, ZFAP Vol. II, 1998 
335
  For more details see Appendix 4. 
336
 Appendix 4 
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imbalance in favor of exotic plantations, the fact that these finances 
supplemented government‟s efforts is something that cannot be ignored. 
Therefore, this is brought back in under the discussion dealing with 
policy changes. 
 
Survey Research 
The second level of analysis is based on survey data generated 
through a mail-in semi-structured questionnaire administered to senior 
middle and junior managers337 in FD as well as from personal interviews 
conducted with a few of them. The questionnaire was found ideal for its 
cost-effectiveness. It is easier and cheaper to reach large samples of 
respondents via a questionnaire than by any other means.338 And this 
worked well in this case where respondents were spread across the whole 
country. Both the questionnaire and personal interviews were aimed at 
assessing forest managers‟ knowledge about government policy on 
forestry as well as their level of involvement in planning and 
management of the department‟s programs. Unlike the questionnaire was 
restricted to the primary target group, coverage for personal interviews 
was expanded to include people from outside FD, namely: senior 
                                                 
337
 Senior managers include the Head of the Department (Director of Forestry), the Head of the Branch (the 
Chief Forest Research Officer and Chief Extension Officer), all Provincial Heads as well as Heads of 
specialized sections such as Forestry Research Sections. Middle Managers are the second in-command to 
the Senior Managers. They serve directly under the senior managers (equiv. to deputies). Junior managers 
are typically in charge of districts. They fall under the Provincial Heads.   
338
  Peter Nardi, Doing Survey Research, 2003:59 
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government officials from Cabinet Office,339 Ministry of Finance, MTENR, 
Central Statistical Office, National Archives, retired forest officers, faculty 
at the University of Zambia (Biology and Development Studies 
Departments), and the Copperbelt University (School of Natural 
Sciences), which offer degrees in natural resource management, and 
forestry, respectively.  
Apart from the generic questions seeking to find out the root 
causes to the problems FD faces today, the interviews were generally 
open-ended and unstructured. Unstructured interviews were preferred 
for their suitability to “exploratory research”340 such as this one where 
there was not as much information to work with. They also create a 
relaxed atmosphere that makes the conversations less formal and 
therefore permits both the interviewer and interviewee to converse 
freely.341  
Furthermore, unstructured interviews give the interviewer the 
flexibility to probe further on an issue or simply to adjust the interview to 
the unfolding scenario thereby achieving more clarity, which would 
otherwise not be possible in a structured interview.342 And since 
recording the interviews makes people uncomfortable and therefore not 
free to express their views freely, most sessions were not recorded for 
                                                 
339
  Out of four divisions under Cabinet Office, the researcher interviewed senior personnel from three 
sections: Management Development Division (MDD), Policy Analysis and Coordination Division (PAC) 
and Public Service Management Division (PSMD). Gender in Development Division (GID) was not 
covered due to its low relevance to this study.  
340
 Nardi, Doing Survey Research, 2003: 60 
341
 Nardi, 2003:60 
342
 Nardi, 2003:60 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 148 
 
 
verbatim transcription except where the interviewees expressed no 
concerns. Instead, the researcher took notes freely which were later 
transcribed.  
The survey generated data on FD‟s management practices/style 
and how well its managers understood government‟s policy on forestry, 
their role in achieving those policy goals, especially the ones promulgated 
under the structural adjustment program (SAP), which has been a 
dominant economic policy instrument since mid 1980s. Due to the 
disastrous effects that have occurred in the forest sector since adoption 
of SAP, we use it for this study as a demarcation line for before and after 
to see if this policy intervention has any connection to the question 
under investigation.  
Because senior and middle managers are the first line of policy 
implementers (since they have the onerous duty of translating policy 
statements into achievable goals), this survey took them as the primary 
target group. But after a pre-test343 of the questionnaire in the field, the 
target group was expanded to include junior managers based on the 
recommendation from some officers344 in Lusaka (at Lusaka Forest 
Provincial Office, MENR and FD headquarters). They pointed out that 
under the department‟s organizational set up345 junior managers were, in 
                                                 
343
 This researcher is grateful to the dissertation committee for this recommendation. 
344
  Davy Siame, Thompson Musonda (MENR HQ); Kenneth Kambeu (PEO, Lusaka Province); Obote 
Shakachite, Jack Mukosha (FD HQ) - Personal communication, July 2005 
345
 According to FD‟s organizational set up the Director, Heads of Extension and Research Branches at FD 
HQ (the Chief Extension and Chief Research Officer) and Provincial Heads (PEOs) belong to senior 
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fact, the actual policy implementers. They are the first people to know 
whether or not a particular policy would be successfully implemented 
given the challenges they encounter in the process. Hence, junior officers 
have always been useful in helping senior managers make the necessary 
modifications to steer whatever is being implemented in the right 
direction. 
The survey was particularly useful in understanding the forest 
managers‟ degree of involvement in the day to day running of the 
department, and particularly what management style was in use. Taking 
our analysis to this lower operational level provided an opportunity to 
understand how managerial decisions in FD and at individual level were 
made and how this management style influenced the overall performance 
both at individual and departmental level.  
Although organizational performance is expressed in constant 
value (e.g. forest degradation), or in aggregate numbers (e.g. revenues, 
production figures, GDPs, or whatever measure one chooses to use), in 
reality these outcomes are a product of a series of decisions and actions 
that managers and their production crews make. Therefore, it is 
important to understand how those decisions are arrived at. The other 
reality is that the more knowledge managers and their staff have on their 
role to implement a program, the higher the chances of success of such a 
program would be, and vice versa. For instance, FD‟s previous successful 
                                                                                                                                                 
management category. Those immediately under these positions are the middle managers. And finally, the 
junior managers who are in charge at district level. 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 150 
 
 
undertaking in exotic plantations speaks for itself.346 The program was 
initiated and successfully implemented by the department, which 
demonstrates the fact that forestry managers who were assigned to 
oversee the industrial plantation project fully understood their roles. It is 
in view of such inspiring examples that it makes sense to find out if a 
similar situation existed on the SAP, which has been a dominant policy 
prescription. Did forestry staff understand SAP and their role in 
implementing it?  
Conducted either in person or by phone, personal interviews were 
particularly useful in clarifying inconsistent data from public documents 
and also some issues that were raised in the survey. For instance, some 
respondents complained that part of the reason they were so de-
motivated is because they were paid less than their counterparts in other 
departments e.g. the Department of Agriculture despite having the same 
qualifications and doing similar jobs. My interviews with officials at 
Cabinet Office (the office responsible for such matters) confirmed that 
this is true and that this scenario is replicated across the civil service. 
The officials at Cabinet Office explained that agriculture and health 
whose mandates have a direct impact on human life generally have 
higher salary scales than other sectors. However, my contact was quick 
to point out that these standards are not cast in stone – they are always 
subject to change as long as a bureau is able to demonstrate how its 
                                                 
346
  Staal and Kufakwandi, 1993; FAO, 1996:5-6; http://worldbank.org/ecternal/project. 
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mandate affects human life directly.  I thought this was a missed 
opportunity for forest managers who have failed to “promote” the 
department in this respect. With over 80% of the population solely 
dependent on forests for their daily survival (from building materials for 
their homes to food, energy, water, medicines, etc.), in a manner that 
essentially resembles forests as providing for their needs “from the cradle 
to grave,” how much more connection and impact does anyone need to 
show how important forests and forestry are in the Zambian context?!  
Since cause and effect associations in social problems typically 
arise from the “intentional behavior of individuals,” as reflected in the 
rational choice theories, normative values, or moral and ideological 
properties of groups and, or institutions,347 the addition of managerial 
aspects to this analysis clearly complemented our attempt in 
understanding how decisions impact action. And since assessing 
performance implies assessing human action, adding managerial aspects 
to this analysis also improved the reliability of our causal inference.348 In 
fact, the very fact that no social problem is independent of human 
impact349 makes it imperative that social explanations be anchored in 
some form of micro-foundations that links cause and effect to human 
action.350  The assertion that forest estates are in a deplorable condition 
(alluding to the idea that FD is performing poorly), essentially calls into 
                                                 
347
  Little, 1991:16 
348
  King, et. al., 1994:29-33 
349
  Little, 1991:16, 19 
350
  Little, 1991:19 
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question the role of forestry personnel in managing these estates or the 
sector as a whole. 
It is important to note that the addition of this second layer of 
factors clearly provided an “additional leverage over the causal 
inference”351 which as our analysis later shows helped in explaining the 
department‟s performance. What could not be accounted for by mere 
availability of staff and funds (or lack of both) were amplified (or at least 
made clearer) by these intervening variables. However, since it was not 
easy to quantitatively model this second layer of variables with the ones 
observed annually, these additional variables were analyzed qualitatively 
to complement the two primary independent variables, namely forestry 
personnel and financial outlays.   
 
Important Land Marks 
Let me turn to the issue of time frames. Why was 1962 chosen as 
the starting point for the question under investigation? Why not any 
other year?  
To begin with, this study is about trying to understand how a once 
star agency has degenerated into non-existence. In other words, it is 
about comparing the time when FD performed better and now when 
nothing is working. For this reason 1962, shortly before the Zambia 
                                                 
351
  King, et. al. 1994:221 
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became an independent state, presents itself as an excellent starting 
point.  
First, 1962 offers an excellent opportunity to see what the Zambian 
government inherited from the British colonial government in 1964, an 
inheritance that became a stepping-stone for the new government to 
build upon. Knowledge about the level of support that the colonial 
government extended to the Forestry Department in terms of annual 
financial allocations, personnel, statutes, and the general infrastructure 
meant to support forestry work are very important benchmarks. For 
instance, did the colonial government recognize forestry as an important 
sector or was this something the new government had to start building 
from the scratch? Considering that more land in Zambia (94%) falls 
under the jurisdiction of the local Chiefs, what did central government do 
that made the Chiefs release some of their land to be gazetted as PFAs? 
Did government get these lands by force or offered some incentives in 
exchange? Understanding the contractual details that promoted such 
cooperative relationships is very important because these eventually 
determine the success or failure of public policies relating to forest 
conservation and, or natural resource management in general.352  
Second, 1962 also makes it possible to see how the Forestry 
Department performed under the colonial government – a period 
                                                 
352
  Peter H. Omara-Ojungu, Resource Management in Developing Countries (Longman Group), 1992: 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5; Owen J. Lynn and Janis B. Alcorn, “Tenurial Rights and Community-based 
Conservation,”  in: David Western, et. al. (eds.), Natural Connections, 1994: Chapter 16 
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associated with an efficient and effective government. Putting aside the 
socio-economic and political inequalities that the colonial government 
perpetuated during its time in office, generally speaking the government 
of the day is credited for good governance and running an efficient social 
service delivery system.353 For this reason, 1962 provides a good baseline 
on what was inherited from a period of good governance and possibly 
good performance. FD‟s achievements dwarfs the colonial era‟s indicating 
that the new government certainly paid more attention to forestry or at 
least the foresters knew what they were doing. The other reason is that 
because forest crops have a long gestation / maturity period their effects 
may not be known until long after a program is phased out in which case 
what the colonial government may have initiated came to fruition years 
later after the new government took office. Picking 1962 gives us the 
flexibility to assess previous efforts in relation to what followed.  
Fourth, having known what was inherited makes it easier to 
compare the department‟s performance before and after independence, 
both on its institutional capacity and performance outcomes, which in 
this case has allowed us to arrive at some reasonable conclusions. 
Furthermore, taking 1962 as the starting point also makes it possible to 
establish, right from the birth of the Zambian republic, a time-line of all 
                                                 
353
  I wish to point out though that the efficiency of the system was geared towards benefiting the colonial 
government and its white settler communities rather than the indigenous people who were largely 
exploited. However, this matter is beyond the scope of this study. For details see Walter Rodney, How 
Europe Underdeveloped Africa,1972, Chapter 5; Burdette, Zambia Between Two Worlds,1988. 
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policy initiatives the new government pursued that could have 
accelerated or destroyed the momentum built on forest management by 
the previous government. Because public policy drives developmental 
actions in any nation, using this lens helps us to locate under which 
period the Forest Department achieved the most compared to other 
policy periods; without overlooking the cumulative effects (positive or 
negative) that may have arisen from previous policy periods. In fact, this 
is where the challenge lies: to pin point how respective policy initiatives 
accelerated or impeded the Forestry Department‟s performance.  
 
Research Challenges 
No research undertaking is free from any problems and this one is 
no exception. And these problems are noted here as Some of the 
challenges encountered are briefly discussed below, starting with the 
desk research. Note that these should serve as caveats too. 
 
Desk Research 
Contrary to the general notion that using existing secondary data is an 
easier and faster way of conducting research than generating primary 
data, this researcher experienced just the opposite. Despite all prior 
preparations to establish contacts in various government bureaus that 
this researcher anticipated to work with, the desk research was not only 
time consuming but also the most frustrating part of the field research 
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simply because forestry statistics have not been documented in any 
systematic fashion. Of course the contacts in FD were extremely helpful; 
they provided as much information as was available.  
 
(a) Data Quality and Lack of Consistency  
Forestry data, especially on the extent of the forest estates, should be 
taken with a pinch of salt. This information has not been updated since 
1986 when the last forest inventory was undertaken, which too was not 
comprehensive since it covered only a few selected provinces.354  
 
First, there is the issue of inconsistency in their reporting. Sometimes 
the Forestry Department reports the extent of its estates in hectares and 
at other times in kilometer squares (Km2), and this may appear in one 
report. If one is not careful, such figures can be lifted as they are which 
can lead to serious misrepresentation. The format of reporting was 
another problem. Here too there is no consistence. For instance, between 
1970s and 1980s labor strength was broken down at all categories, a 
vital statistic for this study. But from the mid-1980s they stopped to do 
this, which makes it difficult to know the changes in the different 
categories. Considering that insufficient labor has been the department‟s 
main complaint, it was quite astonishing that this data is not available. 
This researcher had to use the provincial reports (within the same 
                                                 
354
 de Baker, et. al., Wood Energy Resource Survey, 1986. 
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annual reports) to re-classify labor according to the different categories. 
This also applied production figures from various types of forests, which 
the department no longer reports. Instead, the department‟s focus is on 
revenues where again it is not possible to know which products 
contributed what amounts. Certainly, there is need to revisit the 
reporting format, it must standardized. 
Secondly, there is the issue of discontinuity in reporting. 
Previously, provincial offices sent in monthly reports to the FD HQ, 
which made it easier to follow events in each province. In the absence of 
a departmental annual report, one could extract data from provincial 
reports. Currently, this practice has not been enforced vigorously. Some 
provinces submit their monthly reports, others do not, making it very 
difficult to know what is happening out there.  
Clearly, the FD is supposed to be the best source of its data, at 
least through its annual reports. Unfortunately, here too there is a lot of 
inconsistency; the department has not consistently produced its annual 
reports either. There are no annual reports for 1990-1994 and 2001-
2004. The data reported in this study under these years was accessed 
from provincial monthly reports (where available) and consultants‟ 
reports under the Provincial Forestry Action Programme (PFAP).  
Furthermore, since 1995 the format of the annual reports has 
become highly descriptive, with forestry revenues being the only 
prominent tables. As one officer put it, “madam we don‟t have the type of 
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data you want. …nobody cares about forest estates anymore. We only 
focus on revenues because that is the only item the Director of the 
Forestry is interested in.”355 The question then is: since data is not 
systematically captured on forest estates (e.g. the status of the forest 
stock, encroachment and deforestation rates in each province (preferably 
per district too), what information do the forest managers use to plan for 
their future activities? And how would they justify the department‟s 
existence to government and the public? Is it possible to convince 
policymakers for better funding levels in the absence of such figures? 
 Another constraint relates to inconsistency in reporting periods to 
which the data relates. Financial allocations from government are 
reported annually while funding from external financiers are in 3-5 year 
periods and longer, often overlapping. Why doesn‟t the department report 
annual releases from these sources too? I got the impression that such 
figures were merely lifted from project documents and had no 
resemblance to what was actually spent during the time in question. If a 
program is doing well (or badly), sometimes the financier can increase 
funding (or curtail) funding. It is important that the department shows 
exactly how much it received annually. That way one would be certain 
about what transpired.  
Regarding data from Ministry of Finance, here too there were 
problems. Because of budget constraints, Ministry of Finance rarely 
                                                 
355
 Personal communication, July 2005, from one forestry official who requested that the name not be 
revealed.  
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honors the approved budgets. What is “approved” rarely corresponded 
with “actual releases.” In most cases actual releases were lower that the 
former. Fortunately, Forestry Department had better information on this. 
But at times FD did not report supplementary funding it may have 
received during the year. Consequently, it became necessary to use 
audited reports from the Auditor General‟s Office356 rather than FD 
annual reports.  
 
(b) Lack of a Central Data Bank within the Department   
Compounding the problem on forestry data is the fact that even 
the department‟s own literature is not in one place. Since the relocation 
of its headquarters from Ndola to Lusaka in 1998, most of its documents 
are still at its former location in Ndola, piled up in its dysfunctional 
library. At the time of this study, none of the managers at FD HQ knew if 
a new library would be created in Lusaka, or if someone would be 
appointed to run the library in Ndola. From my observation, information 
management is evidently not a priority for FD.  
This being an information era, it is inconceivable that the 
department has no electronic database (or a website) to make its 
documents easily accessible. A few reports that are in soft copy (e.g. 
those produced under the Zambia Forestry Action Programme (ZFAP) 
and PFAP) are also only available from respective project offices, not even 
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 Accessed copies from Ministry of Finance. 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 160 
 
 
from the department‟s headquarters per se. An intra-net set-up would 
have made sharing the information easier. And better still this problem 
can easily be overcome through interagency collaboration. Since the FD 
cannot possibly afford to set up its own website, one way to reach a 
wider audience would have been to upload its reports via the Central 
Statistical Office (CSO) website. Unfortunately, this opportunity remains 
unexploited. Having to access data from various sources was not only 
time consuming but extremely tedious too.  
Finally, the National Archives357 bridged the gap – it became the 
best alternative. Other valuable sources were the University of Zambia 
and Ministry of Finance. Yet, if the department was well managed its 
data would be readily available because under normal circumstances 
information such as what this researcher was looking for would be 
captured in the department‟s annual reports, its research bulletins, 
occasional flyers (e.g. for extension purposes), or policy briefs (assuming 
forestry managers make use of their statistics to guide the policymakers). 
  
(c) Incomplete and Un-captured Data 
Another problem worth mentioning pertained to total lack of 
collaboration between FD and CSO, which is supposed to be a one-stop 
place for all national statistics. Yet, CSO hardly has any data on forestry. 
                                                 
357
  Serves as a depository for public documents: the National Archives receives a copy of all government 
publications, statutes, newspapers, etc. whenever these are published, including closed files from all 
government bureaus. 
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Currently, the only forestry data at CSO, which is equally scanty, is on 
exports from a few wood-processing companies whose operations are 
reported via the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA).358 CSO has no data on 
wood consumed locally; an activity supposed to be captured by the FD.  
According to one officer at CSO, “Forestry Department does not 
self-report its data as other departments do, such as Agriculture, Even 
when we ask for data from the Forestry Department no one responds to 
our requests. As a result, forestry keeps itself out of national statistics, 
and we (I mean CSO) can‟t be blamed for this blackout.”359 The officer 
further explained that due to limited financial resources CSO is also 
unable to get in the field to collect data from all sectors, and this has 
essentially kept forestry out of CSO reports.  
 
(d) Database Management and Staff Misplacement  
Another problem relates to the department‟s new structure (since 
1997), which has no provision for a planning unit, a section that was 
previously responsible for data collection and management. Currently, no 
one is responsible for data collection and documentation. It appears each 
section (the Extension or Research Branch) has to do its own data 
collection and management, an arrangement that simply looked 
unattainable. Apart from having a skeleton staff at FD HQ in each 
                                                 
358
  CSO captures this data as part of its larger mandate to document annual exports and imports and their 
value, and not necessarily out of interest to capture forestry data. 
359
  C. Muwele, CSO (personal communication, June 2005) 
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branch, none of the officers at FD headquarters are trained in data 
management, and no one was willing to do a job they have not been 
trained for. To compound this problem, trained personnel in forest data 
management have been misplaced to do forest extension work in the 
Provinces.   
As a temporary measure three experts in geographical information 
systems (GIS) and data management have been pulled from the 
provinces, where their positions exist in the new structure, to come and 
help with data management. But even these officers are not happy being 
away from family but more importantly their provincial heads need them 
too.   
By now, it must be clear to the reader that the biggest caveat 
concerns data quality. While every precaution was taken to collect good 
quality data, the researcher does not guarantee its quality. And if one is 
observant enough, most of these problems do not require huge sums of 
money to resolve them but only a little ingenuity from the forest 
managers, specifically at headquarters.360 Unfortunately, this too is 
completely lacking. Searching for data in different sources turned out to 
be a problem way bigger than envisioned.  Surely, FD can do better than 
this!  
I do realize that by now someone might be wondering why anyone 
should trust the findings from this study, given the problems just 
                                                 
360
 Though it applies mainly to the American situation, these colleagues in FD would benefit from Camaron 
J. Thomas‟ Managers, Part of the Problem? (Quorum Books: Westport, Connecticut), 1999 
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highlighted. First, although data quality is questionable, the reality is 
that this is the closest best there is, it is the best that could be found. 
Besides that, these problems actually re-affirm and reflect the strength of 
this investigation. This confirms the core argument of this study; that is, 
managerial [in]capacity accounts for most, if not all, of the department‟s 
failures. If these managers ever report for work, which we know they do – 
8 hours a day Monday to Friday (and sometimes weekends) – it is 
unbelievable that they can even fail to produce an annual report!  
 
Field Research 
In contrast with the desk research, the survey research was a 
blissful exercise, and definitely compensated for the frustrations 
encountered with the desk research. This project had a very good 
reception in the Forestry Department as well as from some of the major 
forestry financiers.361 In fact, the Chief Extension Officer was so thrilled 
with the study he not only agreed to officially inform the provincial heads 
about this study but also offered to send the questionnaires to all the 
provinces through the official channel and also collected them back 
using the same way.362  
 
                                                 
361
  The Finnish Embassy was particularly helpful. At the time of this study the Finnish Embassy had just 
commissioned a study to look at the economic potential of the forestry sector in Zambia, vis-à-vis towards 
poverty reduction. This researcher net-worked with the Finnish Embassy‟s team of consultants and 
benefited greatly from their preliminary findings. 
362
  I‟m highly indebted to Mr. Obote Shakachite, the Chief Extension Officer (at that time), for embracing 
this study in such a manner.  Mr Shakachite is currently the General Manager for ZAFFICO. 
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For full disclosure, the reader may wish to know that this 
researcher is a former employee of the Forestry Department and still has 
some colleagues working for the department. How much this contributed 
to the good reception is probably an obvious speculation.   
 
 Data Analysis and Inference 
The foregoing discussion and the preceding chapters have all tried 
to make a case for why this study is important. In particular, this 
chapter has tried to explain the research agenda, the choice and source 
of data and how it was collected, as well as how it has been analyzed.   
 
As alluded to earlier, making a case for cause and effect 
associations between institutional capacity and forest degradation does 
not imply that inadequate technical and administrative capacity are the 
only factors solely responsible for the poor state of forests. The argument 
I make is that it is the major one. Obvious, we cannot rule out the fact 
that other causal factors are at play at any given time which makes it 
impossible to fully account for all effects.363 As King, et. al. (1994) have 
extensively argued, this is the “fundamental problem of causal inference.  
...no matter how perfect the research design, no matter how much data 
we collect, …no matter how much experimental control we have, we will 
                                                 
363
  Gary King, et. al., Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton 
University Press), 1994:85-89; Little, 1991:159-160 
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never know a causal inference for certain.”364 This study is not spared 
from this reality either. The best any causal explanation does is to 
approximate causation from one factor at a time and only helps to 
explain part of the effect.365 However, one takes comfort in the fact that 
any good research should be able to identify the main underlying causes 
to a problem366 and be able to explain the links between cause and 
effect.367 This dissertation does just that.  
We start from the input side of the production process “listing the 
observable implications of our theory”368 – staff and finances – 
emphasizing the fact that no organization can operate without these two 
inputs. And since changes in performance are best observed over a 
period of time, and in this case while taking into consideration major 
policy changes, this study utilizes this tested technique which also 
makes it possible to compare before and after SAP (as one major policy 
the Zambian government implemented over the years). We take 1985 as 
the cutting point for before and after SAP, mainly as a gesture of staying 
within the ambit of political correctness.369   
Although this study utilizes a multi-method approach, it is 
somehow heavily oriented towards qualitative analysis. But as Gary King, 
                                                 
364
  King, et. al., 1994:79 
365
  King, et. al., 1994:79 
366
  King, et. al., 1994:4 
367
  Peter M. Nardi, Doing Survey Research: A Guide to Qualitative Methods, (Pearson Education Inc.: 
Boston), 2003:10-12  
368
 King, 1994:221 
369
 Although one would argue that SAP strictly started in 1973 when the first stabilization loan was 
accessed from the IMF, officially the Zambian government declare 1985 as the year when the SAP was 
adopted. Therefore, we choose to stay within the ambit of political correctness. 
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et. al. (1994) have argued, this must not be a source of concern because 
the authenticity of any research findings is not dependent on the 
approach used but on the competence of the researcher to observe, 
connect, explain and interpret the numerous dots and puzzles that the 
data presents.370 In other words, the superiority of a study findings does 
not lie in the research methodology and analytical approach adopted but 
rather in how well the findings are explained and, or interpreted. Both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches have strengths and flaws that 
sometimes reside not in the research design but simply in how the 
research question is framed. Aware of such shortcomings, that almost all 
research suffers from one form of weakness, it is befitting to acknowledge 
that this one is no exception. And the biggest caveat is on the data 
quality, in particular, on the state of the forest estates, which most likely 
do not reflect the reality on the ground. What FD has reported is far more 
than the area covered by gazetted forests. This study makes an 
adjustment, based on Provincial reports, and shows how this may have 
progressed. 
Since policy reform is a product of political maneuvers, 
consideration of the impact of policy elites is automatically part of the 
larger discussion. As policy architects, the influence of policy elites on 
forestry policy and subsequently on the department itself is quite 
obvious. Apart from controlling the forestry policy goals, policy elites also 
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  King, et.al., Designing social Inquiry, 1994  
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struggle to advance and protect their interests so much so that unless 
the department is supported by those groups that have the strongest 
influence in the policy arena chances of success with its programs would 
be next to none. Hence, the influence of policy elites on forestry policy 
and the industry in general is a real issue. Infrastructure and other 
technological resources that the department has been [un]able to tap into 
are also part of the larger discussion.  
 
Conclusion 
 To summarize, this analysis has been performed from two angles: 
the structural and functional capacity of the department. The structural 
portion (which I prefer to call the input side) of institutional capacity was 
measured in terms of the number and quality371 of forestry personnel 
staff and the annual outlays the department received for its programs. 
The functional aspect assessed the management practices, personnel 
knowledge about government policy (e.g. the SAP) and their role in 
implementing the same in the forestry sector.  
In the larger discussion, we reflect on the relationships between 
forest managers and policy makers as well as the role of policy elites. 
Since policies are usually broad statements of intent,372 the study tried 
to find out if forest managers planned together to break down such policy 
statements like the ones meant to pursue “product diversification” and 
                                                 
371
 Quality refers to their professional expertise and skills. 
372
 Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:xiii-xv; Grindle, 1980:6 
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“growth from own resources”373 into implementable targets.374 Did these 
forest managers understand what such policy statements entailed? How 
far down the bureaucratic ladder were these policy goals understood? 
And how much support or opposition did the department 
receive/confront, within and outside government, in the course of 
pursuing the structural reforms?   
 This information is important not only because it would highlight 
the degree to which forest managers „owned‟ the program (i.e. by being 
able to develop their own targets and objectives), but more importantly it 
would reflect the department‟s capacity to interpret government policy 
into simplified workable goals that are understood by staff at all levels of 
the department‟s structure.375 The ability to simplify broad policy 
statements into implementable goals does indicate availability of 
expertise on policy analysis, the ability to tailor a program to the local 
conditions and, a commitment to implement the program.376 A case in 
point is the success story about the industrial plantations, which later 
became a corporation. 
Finally, since it is almost impossible to account for all interactions 
among the different variables in any given analysis, likewise, I do not 
claim to have accounted for all possible interactions in this study either. 
                                                 
373
 GRZ, New Economic Recovery Programme: Fourth National Development Plan 1989-1993. Vol. I and 
II, 1989:29 
374
 Grindle, Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, 1980:6-7 
375
 Quick, “The Paradox of Popularity: “Ideological” Program Implementation in Zambia,” in: Merilee S. 
Grindle (ed.), 1980; Israel, Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance, 1987:38 
376
 Cornia, et. al., Adjustment with a Human Face, 1987:8; Israel, Institutional Development,1987:149-50 
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And this could be another source of weakness too. However, we should 
take comfort in the fact that every study is useful – either for 
contributing new knowledge and insights, raising questions to stimulate 
debate and further research, or simply providing some lessons on what 
pitfalls to avoid. My hope is that this study will be useful in all or some of 
these areas, particularly in raising interest for further debate and 
research. 
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Chapter 4   
 
Research Findings 
 
 
Taking the 1960s as a baseline for tracking how indigenous protected 
forests in Zambia have changed over time, the first thing one notices is that 
this has taken a full circle, from 5 million ha of forests in 1962 and back 
again to roughly the same figure (5.16 million ha.) in 2005.377 Notice that FD 
maintains that it has 7,103,099 ha as if no forest degradation is taking place 
anywhere. 
Initially, there is a period of rapid increase in forest estates (1962-
1983) from what seems to have been an ambitious expansion program. From 
5 million hectares of gazetted forests in 1962378 this area steadily increased 
to 7.6 million by 1983, the highest level attained (Figure 4.1), which also 
represents a 69.8% increase.379 In fact, it is not an overstatement to say the 
first 15 years since independence (1964-1979) truly exemplifies professional 
excellence in the Forestry Department.  
Sadly, thereafter, forest estates start to decline, at first gradually until 
1994 when the first biggest slump occurred in which the department lost 
(degazetted) 611,527 hectares, mainly for subsistence farming and human 
                                                 
377
  See Appendix 5 for details over this change. 
378
  FAO, Forest Trends, 1967:23 
379
  This calculation and the graph are based on data from FD, Annual Reports (1965 to 2005). 
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settlements.380 And this trend has continued to date, accelerated in 
particular by two more major slumps in 2000 and 2001 when the 
department again lost huge chunks of forests: 741,527 ha and 461,908 ha, 
respectively (Figure 4.1 and Appendix 4). In general, the loss of forest 
estates has been mainly due to illegal encroachments,381 whose roots can be 
traced to political economy factors, policy reforms, land tenure and 
ownership rights, population growth versus high unemployment dynamics, 
and political expedience. But over and above all this forest degradation has 
been permitted by a weak institutional capacity in FD, the inability to 
manage the internal and external challenges FD has faced. 
 
Figure 4.1: Protected Forest Areas in Zambia, 1962-2005.  
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  Davy Siame, “Forest Management under Drought Conditions,” in: IUCN, Proceedings of a Follow-up 
Workshop to the 1991-922 Drought Workshop, p.74  
381
 Davy Siame, “Forest Management under Drought Conditions,” 1997:74; Felix Njovu, et. al., Key Threats and 
Opportunities for Conservation of Biodiversity, (WWF-SARPRO), 2004:8, 29-35, 45-47 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 172 
 
 
According to FD‟s reports the extent of its forest estates is just slightly 
above 7.1 million ha., though in reality this has dropped to roughly 5.2 
million ha.382 as this study found out. Figure 4.2 shows the change in 
indigenous forests based on what FD reports and what this study found, 
while Table 4.1 shows how these estates are spread across the nation, based 
on FD‟s unadjusted data.383  
 
Figure 4.2: Change in PFAs in Zambia, 1962-2005. 
 
 
 
When viewed in terms of net gain and loss at 5-year intervals, here too 
the trend is quite distinct. Initially, there is a marked increase in net gain up 
until 1975. But this pattern suddenly changes to net losses starting from the 
1980s with the situation becoming worse at the advent of the 1990s and 
                                                 
382
  This figure takes into consideration all those heavily encroached forests which the Forestry Department still 
maintains in its books despite the fact that technically these forests do not exist anymore.  
383
  This table does not adjust for any land that has not legally degazetted though the department is aware of 
illegal encroachments all across the country. 
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continues all the way into the new millennium (Table 4.1 and Figure 
4.2).384 The question is how did this come about? And what are the major 
factors at play that caused or are sustaining this downward spiral both in 
the extent and quality of indigenous forests?  
 
Table 4.1: Protected Forest Areas by Location.385 
 
 
Province 
Gazetted Forests (Km2) a/ % of 
Total 
Land 
Area National Local Total 
Central 3,775 2,244 6,019 6.4% 
Copperbelt  5,136 488 5,624 17.9% 
Eastern 6,833 1,653 8,486 12.3% 
Luapula 2,125 2,271 4,396 6.9% 
Lusaka 4 420 424 1.9% 
Northern 8,016 3,089 11,105 7.5% 
North-Western 20,650 4,026 24,676 23.4% 
Southern 1,848 5,155 7,003 8.2% 
Western  3,059 2,991 6,050 4.8% 
TOTAL 51,446 22,337 73,783 9.8% 
 
a/
 1 Km
2
 = 1 hectare (ha); an hectare being 100 m x 100 m.    
 
Source: FAO, Zambia: Identification of Forestry Investment Projects, (FAO: Rome), 
1996. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
384
  Due to the various levels of jurisdictional authority on land ownership and the numerous players involved in 
negotiating for forest protection the process may take anywhere from one to five years before a forest is finally 
gazetted, whereas degazettion may take less than a year. See for instance, Forestry Department‟s Annual Reports 
for 1984 to 1986. 
385
  Based on FD‟s figures that have not adjusted for those forests which are severely encroached. 
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Table 4.2: Net Change in Forest Estates, 1960-2005.386 
 
Year PFAs (ha.) Net Change (ha) 
1960 4,800,000 0 
1965 5,236,200 436,200 
1970 5,800,000 563,800 
1975 7,160,000 1,360,000 
1980 7,600,000 -440,000 
1985 7,378,300 -221,700 
1990 7,375,500 -2,800 
1995 6,492,400 -883,100 
2000 6,363,600 -128,800 
2005 5,160,200 -1,203,400 
 
 
 
 
One plausible explanation lies in the Forestry Department‟s capacity 
(labor and financial outlays) to manage its forest estates, while the other 
                                                 
386
  Based on the adjusted figures from this study. 
 
Figure 4.3: Net Change in Forest Estates in Zambia, 1960-2005 
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involves the external factors that came into play. Together this has created a 
complex and conducive environment that has made agents of forest 
degradation to thrive. The discussion that follows shows how this happened 
and is being sustained, but also offers some possible solutions to this 
problem.  
 
Institutional Capacity as an Agent of Change 
To understand how forest degradation in Zambia is connected to FD‟s 
institutional capacity and why this has been a continuing phenomenon, we 
begin by observing changes in forest estates in relation to the two primary 
levels of capacities in the Forestry Department – labor and financial outlays – 
while holding the external factors constant. It is important to start with 
these two inputs because not only does labor and capital belong to the first 
layer of required factors of production but more importantly they are 
precisely the primary sources of capacity. No organization can become 
operational without these two inputs. Therefore, whether it is a public or 
private enterprise, availability and adequacy of labor and capital is 
important. The second reason is that FD‟s complaints have always been 
about inadequate field staff and finances as the two biggest setbacks 
constraining its efforts to effectively manage its forest estates. This study 
responds verify these complaints, as a research hypothesis. 
Except for some occasional peaks here and there, a quick look at the 
two sources of capacities reveals that both forestry personnel and funding 
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for forestry programs generally took a downward trend. A similar pattern is 
observed on the forest estates too, they decline in tandem with reductions in 
labor and funding (Figure 4.4). The changes in forest estates, following the 
reductions in forestry personnel and financial allocations, seem to suggest 
that these three factors are somehow connected. While correlation does not 
imply causality the trend is so distinct it is tempting one could easily 
conclude that a decline in capacity is contributing to the loss of forest 
estates. But a trend such as this one only establishes a direction of change, 
it does not tell the degree of impact and therefore it would be premature to 
rush to such a conclusion. Most likely there are other factors at play too, 
and I return to this later on in this Chapter.  
Obviously, the connection between human and financial resources and 
the loss of forest estates should not come as a surprise in the sense that as a 
field enterprise forestry relies heavily on the physical presence of field staff 
who have to map not only forest stock densities but also to license and 
monitor forest operations. In addition, they have to establish the rights and 
levels of access for resources extraction to promote sustainable use, all of 
which requires adequate financial support.  
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Figure 4.4: Change in PFAs, Forestry Personnel, and Financial Outlays to Forestry Dept. 
 
a) Protected Forest Areas, 1962-2005. 
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b) Change in Forestry Personnel, 1970-2005.
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c) GRZ Annual Allocations to FD, 1970-2005. 
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d) Capital Funds for Forestry Projects 1970 to 2005. 
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        1
 No data available on staff levels prior to 1970.  
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Therefore, a reduction in human and financial resources is likely to 
affect the quality of the forests, as it turned out in the Zambian case study. 
But to what degree did this contribute to the problem? I come back to 
discuss this later. For now let us take a closer look at these graphs to gain a 
better understanding on what is happening. 
A related matter to the above, but somehow at a different level, 
concerns financial injections from external sources387 invested in forestry. It 
is possible, if not plausible, to argue that this external financial assistance, 
which somehow increased over the years388 should have helped to cushion 
the shortfall after government reduced its support to forestry. Unfortunately, 
this argument cannot hold because such monies did not go into natural 
forest management, except for the financial assistance from Germany 
channeled through Gesellschaft Für Technisihe Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
whose assistance, for a change, was specifically for the Teak forests in 
Western Province.  
Therefore, although foreign financiers have strongly supported forestry 
development in Zambia, their emphasis has been in other areas not natural 
forests, and for this reason their efforts did not have much impact in natural 
forests. However, since the mid-1990s some organizations (e.g. the FAO, 
FINNIDA, and the EU) have financed a few area studies to understand the 
                                                 
387
  This includes bilateral and multilateral loans and grants from various sources, notably from the World Bank, 
FINNIDA, FAO, EU, IFAD, JICA, GTZ, Africare and others. For more details on this see Appendix 4 and 5. 
388
 For details on this see Appendix 4 
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problems associated with indigenous forest management in Zambia.389 Their 
recommendations can be summarized as falling into three themes: 1. 
Streamlining the department‟s operations to make it more efficient and 
effective, 2. Capacity building (focusing on technical knowledge) to support 
the first recommendation, and 3. Introducing joint forestry management 
(JFM), a concept that advocates for inclusion of other stakeholders as 
partners in forest management.  
Under the first theme, these recommendations include but not limited 
to: privatizing the department so it could be free of government interference; 
improving the department‟s revenue collection mechanism, one that would 
assign commercial concessioneers real responsibility for re-stocking or re-
planting the forests after their logging operations before moving to another 
area. Unfortunately, all of these sound recommendations continue to gather 
dust on the shelves mainly because they offer radical changes that threaten 
the current power base (and source of benefits), both within the department 
and the larger political arena. From my humble assessment of both the 
forestry law and the procedures that govern issuance of forest licenses, 
especially to commercial concessioneers, I do not envision the Forestry 
Department to follow through on these recommendations anytime soon 
because both forestry officials and politicians benefit from the current 
weaknesses in the laws and the chaotic procedures surrounding issuance of 
licenses all of which obstruct true transparency and accountability.   
                                                 
389
  See ZFAP and PFAP studies, and J.F.W. Fynn, Appraisal of Zambia’s Forest Sector Commercial Systems 
(Scanagri: Finland), March 2004 
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 As some scholars have noted, such behavior is common in public 
organizations, particularly if the policy required to be implemented is 
unpopular. Bureaucrats will do whatever is in their power to delay or simply 
ignore implementation of that particular policy.  And this fits what is playing 
out in the Forestry Department. The only difference is that not all forestry 
personnel support this delay, most would like those recommendations 
implemented. But the Director of Forestry is reluctant to move on with the 
recommendations, one of which is the creation of the Forestry Commission 
to phase out the FD, which essentially amounts to draining one‟s pond.  
 
Dependent vs. Independent Variables   
 Although the general trend suggests that the forest estates have moved 
in tandem with reductions in labor and financial outlays a closer look 
actually reveals some interesting contradictions, especially when viewed in 
the context of policy history, vis-à-vis bringing in certain policy landmarks 
such as before and after 1980s, when the Zambian government embraced 
the structural adjustment program (SAP), a World Bank/IMF sponsored 
economic policy meant to promote free market economic liberalism in the 
developing countries. SAP comes into play here because it stands out as a 
major landmark between the time when forests were well managed, the 
period before 1980s (i.e. before SAP), and the 1980s and beyond (after SAP) 
when everything fell apart as seen in the number of forests lost. Whether the 
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SAP is part of the factors contributing to forest degradation is a matter to be 
settled by findings from this study.  
In the 1960s (and earlier) the department had fewer and less qualified 
personnel (Table 5.2)  compared to early to mid-1980s and (Table 5.3)390 
where there is some improvement, a positive outcome of investments 
pursued under the national building policy soon after independence.  
 
Table 4.3: Staff Development, 10 Years after Independence.  
Staff 1964 1974 
Zambian Professionals None 1 5 
Zambians at Universities 2 19 
Foresters 2 (trained in Zambia) 2 97 
Forest Rangers 3 (trained in Zambia) 153 291 
Forest Estates   
Protected Forests Areas, indigenous (ha.) 5,400,000 6,500,000 
Percentage of national area 7.2% 9.4% 
Area surveyed for management plans (ha.)   
Exotic Plantations (ha.) 1,060 22,500 
 
1
 The department had 33 expatriate professionals at this time. 
2
 Diploma in Forestry (equiv. to Associate Degree)  
3
 Certificate in Forestry (2-year program) 
Source: Forest Department, Forestry in Zambia Since Independence -10 Years, 1975:8-9 
 
Out of the 33 professional staff391 available at independence (1964) all 
of them were expatriates from Canada, Finland and the UK.392 And the 
situation was not great in the junior categories too where the total number is 
                                                 
390
  Forest Department, Forestry in Zambia Since Independence -10 Years, 1975:8-9 
391
 Under the Forestry Department‟s staff classification system “professional” is loosely applied to cover all 
those with a 4-year college degree and above. For consistence, the same application is maintained in this study.  
392
 Forestry Department, Annual Report for 1964, (1965)  
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also below the 1970 levels (Table 4.3). But the situation quickly improved as 
Table 4.4 illustrates.  
 
The period prior to 1980s also stands out as a period of nation 
building in all aspects – socio-political and economic – and this occurred 
across sectors393 despite the political challenges at that time.394 In 
particular, forestry received special attention on the policy agenda due to its 
connection to the copper industry as a source of wood energy as well as for 
construction works in the mines. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say 
that forestry was regarded as twin industry to copper mining. As a source of 
wood energy, forests were perceived as sustaining the economic backbone of 
the nation and therefore had its status elevated on the political arena.  
In contrast, the 1980s and beyond can be summed up in one word, 
chaotic – nationally and worse in forestry circles. It is a period known for 
some very unpopular economic policy reforms such as the SAP, a policy that 
created more problems than the solutions. Politically, this was also a time 
when Zambians started to seriously question [again]395 the moral basis of 
being a one Party state, running on a government-controlled economy that 
continued to drive the nation further into debt, and therefore unable to 
                                                 
393
  Burdette, Zambia: Between Two Worlds, 1988; Richard Hall, Zambia, (Frederick A. Praeger Publishers: New 
York), 1967: Chapters 9 and 10. 
394
  Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South (Africana Publishing Corporation: 
New York), 1970 
 
395
 I say again because these changes were unpopular from the very beginning as evidenced by loss of life during 
demonstrations against the same. But the masses were finally subdued and forced to tolerate the situation by the 
strong hand of the state. 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 183 
 
 
adequately finance its programs. The impact of these policy shifts is also 
evident in forestry circles as the previous observations illustrate, which also 
implies that we could look beyond the FD to find some explanations for what 
is happening to the forest estates. For now these factors are held constant 
until the investigation on internal capacity in FD is exhausted.  
In terms of professional staff, the improvement that took place did not 
hold for a long time. Just after mid-1980s the number of professional staff 
suddenly went back to the 1960s levels, partly because most of those 
professionals joined ZAFFICO, while others left for greener pastures both 
within the country and abroad. 
Faced with salary ceilings and restrictions that did not allow 
expansion of the department‟s structure, which were part of the SAP 
prescriptions, most professional staff found these conditions a disincentive 
that did not recognize and reward their expertise and also restricted their 
upward mobility. Therefore, they left. And this is not surprising because as 
the literature on organizational behavior and personnel management points 
out,396 providing the right incentives is important for staff motivation and 
retention.  
                                                 
396
  There is a huge amount of literature on this topic. See for instance, Frederick Taylor, “Scientific 
Management,” in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) Classics of Public Administration, 1987; Luther Gulick, “Notes on the 
Theory of Organization,” in: Gulick and Urwick, (eds.), Papers on the Science of Administration, 1937:3-45; 
Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation, 1973; Gulick, 1937:3-13, 21-30; Rolf E. Rogers, 
Organization Theory, 1975:47-61 
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Table 4.4: Change in Forestry Personnel, 1970-2005. 
Year 
Forestry Department Personnel1 
Total Staff 
Professional Technical Field Admin 
1970 33 66 350 145 594 
1971 36 179 287 109 522 
1972 33 166 280 119 598 
1973 33 103 284 132 552 
1974 26 84 284 132 552 
1975 36 53 214 145 448 
1976 28 82 267 145 522 
1977 26 114 374 144 658 
1978 37 118 367 135 657 
1979 37 150 326 142 655 
1980 41 190 222 132 585 
1981 50 213 333 92 688 
1982 47 244 353 161 805 
1983 40 82 372 82 576 
1984 40 81 365 80 566 
1985 38 97 365 80 580 
1986 35 113 3132 63 3343 
1987 29 117 1410 58 1614 
1988 21 108 1303 55 1487 
1989 21 128 1303 55 1507 
1990 19 152 1288 55 1514 
1991 23 142 1273 62 1500 
1992 23 130 1249 62 1464 
1993 28 130 1247 54 1459 
1994 28 128 1188 50 1394 
1995 17 112 1120 64 1313 
1996 21 124 1064 63 1272 
1997 26 115 695 47 883 
1998 26 115 695 47 883 
1999 26 115 695 47 883 
2000 41 539 478 60 883 
2001 44 434 273 135 886 
2002 22 439 384 82 927 
2003 23 417 374 76 890 
2004 23 418 374 76 891 
2005 23 418 374 76 891 
1 No data available from 1962 (the baseline for this study) to 1969. 
Source: FD Annual Reports for 1970 to 2005 
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And all of these depend on a number of factors, one of which is the rewards 
system.397 When the right incentives are not made available, exit always 
becomes the only option. 
Therefore, what has been happening in the FD is nothing outside the 
expected. And because of such exits the number of professional staff 
dropped drastically, back to the 1960s level. In this respect, one can argue 
that the number of professional staff has generally remained almost at the 
same level, with just some modest increase in the 1980s and later between 
2000 and 2001. But, notice that at a time when the department had fewer 
and less qualified personnel (1960s to 1970s), ironically that is also the time 
when it performed very well as witnessed in the enormous expansion of its 
estates (Figure 4.4a).398 And its achievements extend to other areas too, 
namely forest research, extension and training, and the establishment of 
industrial and local supply plantations.399 Local supply plantations, a 
smaller scale of the industrial plantations, were established in all provinces 
to deviate dependence on indigenous forests.  
Its total labor strength between 1970 (the earliest time data is 
available) and 1979, when the highest level in forest expansion was 
achieved, was almost constant (Figure 4.4a and b). Also notice that the 
                                                 
397
  A. H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50 (July 1943), pp370-396 1943; 
Douglas M. McGregor, “The Human side of Enterprise,” in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) Classics of Public 
Administration, 1987; L. Urwick, “Organization as a Technical Problem,” in: William Sexton (ed.) Organization 
Theories, 1970; Andrew D. Szilagyi and Marc J. Wallace, Organizational Behavior and Performance, (Scott, 
Foresman and Company: Glenview, Il), 1987, 4
th
 Edition. Part 3 and 5 
398
 Appendix 5 
399
  Forest Department, Forestry in Zambia Since Independence -10 Years, 1975:8-9 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 186 
 
 
largest growth in forest estates (1972-1979) does not coincide with the 
increase in labor force; the former occurred at a time when the department 
still had a modest number of staff.  
What is even more interesting is the fact that as the staff-hecterage 
ratio declines, that is the time when forest degradation is increasing.  Yet at 
a time one member of staff had more forest hectares to “watch” over when 
the department did better (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5).  Convention wisdom 
would make us believe that with fewer hectares to manage per individual the 
department should have done better than it did when its staff certainly had 
more hectares to manage. 
In addition to these achievements, the department was able to plant 
over 60,000 ha of exotic plantations in the Copperbelt Province to provide 
wood to the copper mines. This project was such a success it was eventually 
incorporated as a state company called the Zambia Forestry and Forest 
Industries Corporation (ZAFFICO). To date ZAFFICO is the only and largest 
company dealing in plantation timber. Up until 2002 ZAFFICO also had 
sawmills, but these have been sold in response to the SAP privatization 
policy,400 a very unpopular reform policy that has sent a lot of people out of 
jobs thereby exacerbating pressure on the forests which became the only 
safety net for the unemployed. 
 
 
 
                                                 
400
 Zambia Privatization Agency, Privatization Status Report (Lusaka, Zambia), 30
th
 April, 2000  
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Table 4.5:  Forest Staff to Forest Estates Ratio, 1964-2005. 
 
Year Forest Estates 
(ha.) 
No. of Staff * Ha./Person 
1964 
      5,229,167     153          34,178  
1974 
      7,130,600     420          16,978  
1984 
      7,462,149     486          15,354  
1994       7,103,884  1,344           5,286  
2005       5,160,137     815           6,331  
 
* This number excludes administrative staff who are not directly involved in 
forest management activities. 
 
 
 
SAP aside, the achievements just alluded to are by no means meager; 
they signify the department‟s capacity not only to formulate and implement 
government policy but more importantly its ability to plan strategically and 
to achieve its objectives. Notice that all this happened at a time when its 
labor force was relatively low, not to mention the fact that even the annual 
allocation were far from being magnificent. Yet instead of sustaining this 
management style and the fiscal responsibility that accompanied it, 
somehow the department lost its performance momentum (measured in 
terms of the extent and quality of its forests).  
The point I‟m trying to make here is that forest loss occurred when 
there was an increase in personnel. Looking at the official statements (mostly 
as complaints) from the department, including the various studies it has 
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commissioned401 they all point at two factors contributing to forest loss: 1. 
inadequate labor force to undertake the necessary field activities, and 2. 
financial constraints to facilitate executing the department‟s plans. Yet as 
Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5 indicate this argument is now highly debatable. At 
a time when labor force increased, that‟s when forest loss has also noticeably 
increased. How do we explain these contradictions? Why did forest 
degradation402 accelerate at a time when the department‟s capacity had 
improved (as in number of personnel and their technical skills) and yet 
performance is going down?  
 
The best way to handle this is to look at each institutional capacity 
variable individually to see how each is contributing to forest degradation. 
Starting with labor, the figures indicate that the department generally had a 
lean structure in its formative years. Yet this is also a time it did very well in 
terms of increasing the size of its estates, including the way they were 
managed as evidenced by the degree of importance attached to undertaking 
forest surveys and preparation of management plans.  
 
 
 
                                                 
401
  See for instance, the work done by various consultants under ZFAP and ZFAP.  
402
  I use the word degradation here to signify a precursor situation in which a forest gets deforested such that it 
becomes necessary to give it up. Forests are never degazetted if they have not been abused, except under special 
circumstances. Usually when such a situation arises FD will bargain to exchange for another area. See for 
instance FD Annual Report 1975.  
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Figure 4.5: Forest Staff to Forest Estates Ratio, 1964-2005. 
 
 
Several things can be attributed to this but three stand out and 
deserve mention up front. First is that the department had established very 
good relationships with the local Chiefs403 (and their subjects) and was, 
therefore, able to tap into and ride on the local community‟s long established 
capacity and commitment to manage their forests. These informal 
partnerships with the local communities gave the department additional 
capacity at local level. And because part-time forest patrolmen were 
employed from the respective local communities, this created a sense of 
                                                 
403
 Under the nation‟s land tenure arrangements Chiefs own more land (Trust Land) than central government 
(State Land) and therefore all forest reservations in Trust Lands require the Chiefs‟ approval. Out of Zambia‟s 
total landmass, 57.7% (43.3 million ha) is Trust Land, followed by 36.2% (27.2 million ha) Reserve Land, and 
6% (4.5 million ha) as State Land. For more details on land ownership/tenure see: GRZ, Report of the Land 
Commission, Lusaka, August 1967; GRZ, Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970; 
M. P. Mvunga, The Colonial Foundations of Zambia’s Land Tenure System, (NecZam: Lusaka), 1980; M.C. 
Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in Ng‟andwe, A. (ed.), 
Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia, (Centre 
for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45; D.J. Siddle, "Colonial Land Rights," in: Hywel D. 
Davies (ed.), Zambia in Maps, University of London Press, Ltd, 1971:48-49.  
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security (and hope) for job prospects and this helped to solidify these 
partnerships. It was not unusual for the local communities to apprehend 
offenders, or even fight forest fires without calling in forestry personnel.404 
But all this has evaporated and replaced by anarchy. Local communities 
have become law unto themselves, as witnessed through illegal forest 
encroachments. With abolition of part-time positions for forest patrolmen, 
and the fact that all commercial sawmills are located in urban areas, local 
communities do not see any economic benefits accruing to them from their 
forests and therefore are up in arms to regain their property.405 They are 
demanding not only access to the forest resources but implicitly inclusion in 
the decision making process on what should be done to their land. And this 
situation is not peculiar to Zambia; it reflects a common response from 
indigenous people whenever their power base is threatened or harbor 
perceptions of being short-changed. Latin America provides a timely 
example.406  
Second, there is the issue of respect for the law. Prior to 1980s the 
public had great respect for the laws relating to forest conservation and 
utilization. Although forests are a public good, that could haven fallen prey 
to the tragedy of the commons syndrome, somehow this did not manifest as 
a problem. The public adhered to both the local and national laws and 
regulations on forests. But this moral fiber seems to have disintegrated 
                                                 
404
  Fynn, Appraisal of Zambia’s Forest Sector Commercial Systems, 2004:28 
405
  Fynn, 2004:28 
406
  Deborah J. Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the 
Post-Liberal Challenge, (Cambridge University Press), 2005. 
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starting around the mid to late 1980s when illegal forest encroachment 
suddenly reared its face, and has accelerated since then.407 In most cases 
local politicians encourage the practice who in return get votes from the 
public as a pay back for “fighting on their behalf” to get their land back from 
central govt. Although I might be walking on slippery ground here to suggest 
that this break down in morals that caused the public to invade the forests 
may have been due to the perceived political liberties that came at the dawn 
of a new era – i.e. transitioning from an authoritarian government into a 
democratic dispensation – I‟m inclined to think that this political change did 
have some effect. As the demand for a reverting to a democratic government 
system engulfed the country suddenly there was a sense of liberty and 
empowerment across the country, which to some meant having the freedom 
to do as they wanted, especially with anything owned by government e.g. 
public lands. Suffice to say, this speculation is open for debate or systematic 
research. Why was there better forest management under an authoritarian 
regime compared to a democratic government?  
Third, government‟s adoption of the SAP has had severe implications 
on forests and the nation‟s political economy in general. And since the SAP 
has been such a dominant as well as controversial policy it provides a good 
landmark for a before and after SAP analysis. It is dominant because it has 
been in force for over two decades and it is controversial in that no one likes 
it – the masses hate it and bureaucrats simply tolerate it – yet the powers 
                                                 
407
  Davy Siame, “Forest Resource Management and Drought”, in: IUCN, The Environmental Impact of the 
1991-1992 Drought on Zambia, 1997:73-73 
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that be have managed to keep it in play. In addition to the issues pointed out 
earlier, the other major problem that arose from the SAP, which directly 
affected the forests, relates to how the SAP contributed to increasing the 
unemployment rates and subsequently the poverty levels.  
For instance, privatization of state-owned companies and market 
liberalization led to company closures and increased competition for the local 
companies such that local companies pushed out of business, respectively. 
And when government, the biggest employer, also downsized this caused the 
unemployment rate to swell over night. With no other means of livelihood in 
sight, people flocked to the forests to mine whatever could be sold – timber, 
wood fuel (used directly or burned to make charcoal), building sand, 
grass,408 and a host of other forest products. In this respect forests became 
the only viable alternative for millions and because of the heightened influx 
this caused dire consequences on the forests.  
Although these effects have not been quantified yet, it is quite evident 
that joblessness has forced more people to embrace agriculture, which is a 
positive development if this transition can be harnessed. What is not good, 
from the forestry stand point is that this has increased pressure for 
degazettion of forests, especially those near the urban areas.409 Politically, 
this issue has become an octopus; both the public and politicians want to 
grab any forest claiming that more land is needed to accommodate those 
                                                 
408
  Very popular in the leisure/hospitality industry where it is used for roofing e.g. chalets and similar 
infrastructure to keep that traditional appeal in play.  
409
  Njovu, Felix; Pia Chuzu; and Catherine Nguvulu, Key Threats and Opportunities for the Conservation of 
Biodiversity in the Copperbelt Province, 2004. 
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who want to return back to the land, a policy that never gained any traction 
under the Kaunda administration. Thus, it is not uncommon to hear 
complaints about land shortage in some areas when in fact this is not the 
case. The truth is having gotten used to urban lifestyle, those who have lost 
jobs still want to stay as close to urban pleasures as possible. This is why 
land shortage is only concentrated near urban areas. 
Currency devaluation, one of the conditions of the SAP programs, 
eroded not only the local currency‟s purchasing power but worst of all it 
completely wiped out people‟s lifetime savings. With inflation rate changing 
from 0.02% in 1965, averaging between 0.05 to 0.06% in the 1970s and 
jumping to over 300% in the 1990s (before it come down to two figures in the 
new millennium), the Kwacha had become almost valueless. Currently, the 
exchange rate of the Kwacha to a US dollar stands at $1=ZMK3,148.00!410  
The sudden loss of jobs, just mentioned earlier, also made these 
former employees vulnerable. Employees who had not anticipated early 
“retirement” suddenly found themselves on the streets with no means of 
livelihood, and having lost their savings through currency devaluation, this 
stripped off any investment possibilities that the savings could have been 
put to. As a result, most “retirees” turned to the forests as their only source 
of livelihood. Hence, the impact of the SAP on the forests is quite multi-
faceted, and its contribution to forest degradation is indisputable. I discuss 
                                                 
410
 Daily updates on currency exchange rates are available at: http://www.xe.com/ucc/ . 
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the SAP dimension later on in Chapter 6, under the section dealing with 
external factors.  
The forest degradation problem can be approached from various 
angles. One is to look at what the department did [well] to stay on top of its 
challenges. The other is to try and understand other capacities, apart from 
the department‟s internal capacity. I return to this discussion later. For now 
let us look at how the department‟s internal capacity, labeled in terms of 
inadequate funding and forestry personnel.  
 
Institutional Structure and Organizational Reforms 
The other explanation for department‟s performance lies in its 
structure and the policy reforms. In particular, it is worth noting how the 
PSRP changed both the department‟s structure (Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7) 
and its mandate. There has been a titanic shift in the department‟s focus 
from forest management to forest extension, which as traditional foresters 
pointed out, has become the department‟s biggest weakness. As the 
department concentrates on forest extension, who will do forest 
management?  
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Figure 4.6: Forestry Department Organization Structure, before 1997. 
 
 
 
 
1
 The Industrial Plantation ceased to be part of FD in 1985 when it was transformed into a parastatal called the Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries Corporation 
(ZAFFICO) Limited. 
2
 Western Province had two Provincial Officers, one for the Teak Forests and the other for the rest of the Province. 
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Figure 4.7: Forestry Department Organization Structure, after 1997 (post PSRP). 
 
 
 
 
1
 Western Province now has one Provincial head who is responsible for both the Teak Forests and the other forest types in the Province.  
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As observed earlier, FD performed better when it had a lean 
structure than when the level of its personnel increased. This does not 
imply that a lean structure is the solution, but to pose a question, how 
did it do that?  
One explanation lies in the cordial relations that existed between 
FD and the Chiefs and their subjects. This is where FD‟s strength came 
from. There was, for instance, a deliberate policy to employ local people 
as part time or seasonal employees, which made the local communities 
to be part of the management team. 
But it can also be argued that credit belongs to the Head of 
Department who provided good leadership both within and outside the 
department, which made the department to rise to such national 
prominence. Also the team spirit that those managers cultivated among 
the six specialized divisions propelled the department to professional 
excellence. As the responses from the survey indicate, and also speaking 
from experience as a former employer of the Forestry, this researcher do 
attest to the fact that that kind of environment encouraged cross-
pollination of ideas among the managers which were then passed on down 
the ranks. 
Some of the challenges facing the department relates to changes in 
its organizational structure and mandate. Up until the 1980s, the 
department had six specialized divisions (Figure 4.6); later reduced to six 
in 1986 when the IPD was incorporated into a quasi-government company. 
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In 1997, the department underwent a major overhaul under the public 
service reform program (PSRP), which further reduced the number of 
divisions to two: namely, the research and extensions branch. While all 
research work was retained in the research division, the functions of the 
rest of the divisions were condensed into the extension branch.  
As various change management specialists and organization 
development experts have pointed out, change in and by itself can be a 
problem if not managed properly because it brings a host of insecurities 
about the future of the organization and even at individual level. How is 
the organization going to fair in its new outfit? Are the employees 
assured of job security? What will be the new focus? How does that fit 
into the old one?   
Although the 1997 restructuring exercise is considered to have 
upgraded staff salary scales, functionally FD lost out by changing from 
five specialist divisions to two branches. The idea of retaining the most 
qualified for the job was well conceived and, in fact, just reaffirmed 
government‟s long established standards on merit-based recruitment for 
the civil service. What seems to have gone wrong is how the restructuring 
was implemented. The process retained supervisors at the various levels 
of the hierarchy and eliminated positions for people who actually carried 
out the field jobs.  
In particular, the retrenchment of Forest Guards who were 
responsible for forest patrols and monitoring forest operations has been 
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the most damaging change the department ever made.411  Right now FD 
is only relying on the integrity of its clients to abide by the law. Yet, 
anyone familiar with the forestry business can guess what is actually 
happening, especially on timber extraction. 
Both the personal interviews and questionnaire responses from the 
forest managers who participated in this study re-affirmed that forests 
have become a free-for-all resource! General lawlessness, forest 
encroachment and illegal settlements in protected forests, over-
exploitation (and subsequently forest degradation) have all increased. 
Furthermore, the change of emphasis from forest management, the 
department‟s core function, to forest extension has been another blunder 
FD committed in the PSRP process. As a result, the department is not 
paying attention to the resource base any more. Its main focus in recent 
years has been revenue collection, not even forest extension. Yet when 
one looks at the department‟s expertise over 70% of its staff are trained 
in forest management not forest extension, which has always been 
considered a “support” service! What was the rationale for switching from 
forest management, its core business, to forest extension? Looking at its 
                                                 
411
  Apparently this problem is not confined to forestry alone as one senior official at Cabinet Office 
explained.  The Department of Agriculture is also in a similar situation. All classified daily employee 
positions were also phased out and this has caused havoc on monitoring entry and exit of agricultural 
materials to and from Zambia. The 2004-2005 out-break of the foot and mouth disease for which Zambia 
has incurred high losses both on cattle and on vaccines to contain the disease, not to mention lost business 
on beef export, is a good example of the impact of retrenching the Caught-on-Guard personnel in the Dept 
of Agriculture. Management Development Division (MDD) is in the process of approving reinstatement of 
lower rank positions that were phased out in the Department of Agriculture (personal communication, 
August 2005). 
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professional expertise, is the department going to be effective doing what 
the majority of its personnel are not trained for?  
Connected to these structural and operational changes there has 
been a loss of more experienced personnel who were laid off and this has 
wiped out the institutional memory creating a knowledge vacuum that 
has resulted in corporate Alzheimer. 
Already signs of these weaknesses are quite glaring. Despite the 
preference to concentrate on forest extension, right now there are no 
projects to this effect, not even a radio talk show! Having put forest 
management in the back seat, the department has literally been choking 
itself. And the impact of this change is evident from loss of and the 
general quality of its estates, mainly due to illegal settlements but also 
from unsupervised over-logging. With hindsight, it appears the 
department did not anticipate these problems.   
In an effort to address over-logging the Ministry of Tourism, 
Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR) temporarily suspended 
issuing forest licenses to foreign-owned timber companies as part of a 
larger strategy to reduce over-extraction, especially for exports. 
Environment Deputy Minister, Nedson Nzowa announced that, 
“…because of poor logistical support to the Forestry Department (FD) it 
was difficult to patrol the forests and monitor the scale of extraction. 
…We are now only giving licenses to indigenous people. .…if the forests 
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get destroyed, it will be us to blame.”412 Surely, is this a solution? From a 
policy maker?! If the indigenous people destroy the forests, does that 
make the act right?  
There is no need to penalize private investors who are supposed to 
propel forestry into another economically viable sector. Actions such as 
the license suspension send insecurity signals to investors. FD needs to 
conduct a serious self-assessment of what it needs to do. Considering the 
numerous studies that FD and its parent Ministry (MTENR) have 
commissioned over the years e.g. through the National Environmental 
Action Programme (NEAP), the Zambia Forest Action Programme (ZFAP), 
including the ongoing Provincial Forest Action Programme (PFAP), one 
would expect FD and MTENR to be well aware of the factors accelerating 
forest over-exploitation and environmental degradation in Zambia.413 It is 
therefore disappointing that despite all these studies, all of which have 
repeatedly pointed to the same issues,414 the FD and Ministry still appear 
not to know how to resolve this problem! Suffice to say, forest 
degradation is widespread both in open forests and protected forest 
                                                 
412
  The Post Newspaper, Govt Suspends Issuance of Forest Licenses to Foreigners, January 09, 2006. 
http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=5003 
413
  For more details on these issues see MENR, 1994; MENR,1999: Vol. I, II and III; and Chapter 5 and 6 
of this dissertation.   
414
 These issues include, but not limited to: a weak institutional capacity in FD to monitor and supervise 
forest operations; high unemployment rate; policy conflicts between agriculture policy and forestry policy 
and; absence of statistics on real value of forests and its contribution to national economy; poor perception 
of forestry by policy makers; and traditional beliefs that see forests as a free resource for all. See: MENR, 
1994; MENR, 1999: Vol. I, II and III; and most recently, Njovu, et. al., Key Threats and Opportunities for 
Conservation of Biodiversity, (WWF-SARPO), 2004:29-35, 45-47.      
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areas.415 Furthermore, it seems the future does not promise anything 
better if FD‟s institutional capacity is not improved.416 
 
Forestry Personnel and Annual Allocations 
Looking at the status of forestry personnel and finances, two 
contrasting scenarios arise (Figure 5.5. and 5.6). With respect to labor 
force, the scenario is mixed across the four categories. On average the 
professional and administrative (support) staff declined after the SAP, 
whereas technical and field staff increased, and quite substantially for 
the latter (Figure 5.5.). A word of caution is appropriate here. While the 
field staff shows a substantial increase, in reality this is no longer the 
case because the positions for part-time forest patrolmen, that added 
over two thousand people to the field staff category, were abolished a 
year after being in existence, which means that the department went 
back to relying on its former labor capacity. With respect to financial 
outlays, the general situation is one of complete withdraw; it is as though 
the department was being closed (Figure 4.8). How did this come about? 
 
 
 
                                                 
415
  The various studies undertaken by MENR, National Environmental Action Programme, 1994; and 
under PFAP; ZFAP, 1998 all point to the same issues.  
416
 J F W Fynn, Appraisal of Zambia’s Forest Sector Commercial Systems. MENR, Lusaka, 
Zambia.2004:11-12 
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As noted earlier, most of these problems can be explained in terms 
of the SAP impacts. Apart from the problems mentioned earlier, the SAP 
package also forced government to freeze salary increments for civil 
servants as part of the larger objective on fiscal responsibility. This 
became a disincentive and caused some foresters to leave for greener 
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pastures, thus setting in motion a brain drain with its attendant 
consequences on the department‟s institutional capacity.  
Another relates to the public sector reform program (PSRP), 
basically an extension of the SAP, through which the actual government 
downsizing was implemented and the FD was the first department to 
undergo that surgery. Tie these two together (effects from SAP and PSRP) 
and a perfect stage is set for loss of institutional memory as this study 
has just found out (Figure 4.10). The department hired more younger 
people with less experience against a few who had more experience. The 
implications here are quite obvious.  
Clearly, the loss of institutional memory left the new hires in a 
position of having to learn on their feet. If what is happening with the 
forest estates is anything to go by, the retrenchment of older experienced 
managers was definitely not a prudent strategy.  
Also another feature arising from PSRP is that the bulk of the 
department‟s managers are young Turks: 17% are 20-29 years of age; 
48% (30-39 years) and only 12% are above 50 years old (Figure 4.11). 
This is good in terms of expecting a longer service from these young 
employees. However, it has its down side – inexperience – and its cost is 
being seen in the quality of forest estates. Also because the PSRP process 
was so sudden417 these young Turks (some of whom are non-foresters) 
                                                 
417
  According to one government official at Cabinet Office, speaking on condition of anonymity, the World 
Bank gave the Zambia government an ultimatum to cut its size to a level where government‟s wage bill did 
not exceed 8.9% of National GDP. Specifically, government was told to abolish all classified daily 
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suddenly found themselves in leadership positions but with no one to 
mentor them. 
 
Figure 4.10: Forest Managers’ Years of Service.418  
 
 
Now these new managers are learning on the job and trying to find 
their feet. How bad is the situation? 42% of the managers surveyed don‟t 
know if the department has any work plans; 40% have no idea who 
develops the work plans, if any exist; and 51% are not involved in any 
planning sessions. In other words, almost half the department‟s 
managers may not even know what a work plan is, let alone how to 
develop one! This is a serious weakness which speaks to the very core of 
policy/program implementation. In the absence of work plans, what road 
                                                                                                                                                 
employee (CDE) positions, considered non-essential. 24,000 CDEs were removed from the payroll and 
later some professionals too. Personal communication, August 2005 
418
  Refers to the survey respondent‟s working life in the Forestry Department, which works out to be from 
1980 to 2005 based on the longest (25 years) serving employees.  
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map do these managers have as their guide? What goals are they 
working towards?  
 
 
 
As van de Walle reminds us, because state capacity is a sum of its 
bureaus, it is this type of poor organizational power and “weak 
administrative capabilities” that keep most African nations in a state of 
permanent crisis.419 van de Walle further points out that “top 
technocrats may be very competent and well trained, but ....with very 
little data gathering, planning, and policy analysis capabilities”420 this 
ultimately translates into poor performance.  
 
                                                 
419
  Va de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 2001:55 
420
  Va de Walle, 2001:55 
Figure 4.11:  Age Distribution of Respondents, 
Years 
20-29 
30-39 
>50 
40-49 
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 The sudden implementation of PSRP and its implications are not 
only felt in forestry but other bureaus have experienced similar 
problems. As one government official from Cabinet Office explained, the 
unplanned nature of PSRP not only reduced government‟s capacity to 
function normally but it has been a costly undertaking.  
 
“we were under so much pressure to cut down the civil service that 
our only choice was to meet their deadline or risk having no capital 
injection. …Sadly, the repercussions have been so bad, and I regret 
to say contrary to reducing government expenditure, as these 
reforms were supposed to do, government has not saved a penny 
from staff retrenchments. Instead, this exercise has cost us way 
beyond the projected savings from retrenchments.” 421 
 
Drawing on one incidence from the Department of Agriculture the 
official further explained how the loss of capacity in Department of 
Agriculture (DoA), translated into an economic melt-down for the 
farmers. As per instructions from the World Bank, government laid off all 
classified daily employees (CDEs) and general workers. As a result, the 
DoA had no “first responders” – workers that did the field inspections, 
e.g. monitoring on-farm activities. In addition, the DoA had also laid off 
the staff that dealt with phyto-sanitary certification of agricultural 
products at ports of entry. Consequently, national borders became 
porous, and people could bring in anything from anywhere. In the 
                                                 
421
  Director, MDD – personal communication, August 2005. 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 208 
 
 
meantime, subsistence and small-scale farmers who are normally 
dependent on government, especially for livestock services, had no one to 
help them carry out preventive measures. Therefore, when the foot-and-
mouth disease broke out in Southern Province, which quickly spread to 
other parts of the country, government had no capacity to response to 
the problem because, as the government official explained: 
“We had just let go of the people that would have prevented the 
problem in the first place! We were in panic mode! In order to bring 
the situation under control, we rehired the retrenched staff as 
consultants, which meant paying them slightly more than their 
previous government salaries. Then more chemicals were needed to 
contain the disease. And since this had to be expedited shipping, it 
cost much more than usual. …But worst of all the national cost 
came from loss of livestock and business, both locally and 
international. Domestic consumers stopped eating beef, while 
countries that imported beef from Zambia also put a trade 
embargo on Zambian beef. The situation was simply devastating to 
livestock farmers and government too. For close to a year Zambia 
did not export any beef!  …Put together all these costs were far 
beyond the wage bill that was supposedly “saved” through 
retrenchments! …government ended up incurring unnecessary 
costs way beyond what should have been saved! .…To say the 
least, this exercise just taught us another good lesson on the ugly 
face of SAP, PSRP422 or whatever name people call it…”423 
 
 
                                                 
422
  The actual exercise of government restructuring was implemented as a Public Service Reform Program 
(PSRP); a condition under SAP.  
423
  Director, MDD – personal communication, August 2005. 
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This official further explained that other departments have 
encountered similar problems too and their costs have not even been 
quantified yet.  For instance, the health sector was suffering from the 
worst ever brain drain as medical doctors have left the public service for 
greener pastures abroad, and this impact was having reverberations 
across the nation. The only difference was that unlike in the agriculture 
department where positions were eliminated, in the health sector the 
positions are available, but no doctors to fill them. The out flow of nurses 
to other countries is creating a similar problem. Contemplating over the 
abolished positions for gauge-readers in the Department of Energy and 
Water Development, the officer simply said, “we are keeping our fingers 
crossed that we do not end up with another catastrophic situation on the 
hydro-power stations. That would simply be disastrous!”424   
 
While reform is good, sometimes it can be destructive. The SAP 
certainly falls in this category, not only indirectly but also directly. For a 
long time government employees had lived under the veil of fear not 
knowing when their bureau would be restructured and whether or not 
they would be retained. This job insecurity did a lot of harm. An insecure 
worker is usually very unproductive too. Working under a management 
style that does not give them an avenue to speak out has been overly 
frustrating. Some of them confessed that they just report for work and 
                                                 
424
  Courtesy of personal interviews –  information provided on condition of anonymity, August 2005. 
M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 210 
 
 
hardly do anything. The current environment does not encourage cross-
pollination of ideas and a team spirit or accommodate dissenting views. 
Instead, a culture of clientelism and cronyism425 has captured the 
department and is slowly but surely establishing itself as new standard. 
Those with no “connections” are at peril.  
  
According to the survey findings, although „management meetings‟ 
are sometimes held, the Director wields such powers that there is no 
collective decision making yet asks for collective responsibility from the 
management team. In most cases, the director makes unilateral 
decisions affecting the general workforce, often flouting the existing 
regulations. At the time of this fieldwork there was an administrative 
inquiry why some middle manager‟s positions had more than one office 
holder beyond what the establishment provides for. Apparently, the 
director had „swapped‟ some officers (demoted and appointed new ones) 
for positions way beyond the jurisdictional powers of the director‟s office.  
When new appointees demanded their pay raises commensurate 
with their “promotions” Cabinet Office raised an issue wanting to know 
who had promoted them since that fell under Cabinet Office‟s purview 
and not the director! According to the regulations for those positions, the 
director could only recommend a course of action and it is up to Cabinet 
Office to accept or reject it. 
                                                 
425
  For details on this issue see an exposition by Krisdankorn Klinkesorn, Clientelism and Instability: The 
Case of the Thai Highway Police, (University of Missouri-St Louis), Ph.D. Dissertation, December 2004. 
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Table 4.6: Summary of the Survey Coverage 
 
 No. of 
Respondents 
% of Total 
Respondents 
Gender 
  
Male 69 85 
Female 12 15 
Management level   
Senior 14 17 
Middle 25 31 
Junior 42 52 
 
Age Group (years) 
  
20-29  14 17 
30-39  39 48 
40-49 19 23 
>50  10 12 
Years of Service in FD   
<5 30 37 
5-15 31 38 
16-25 9 11 
>25 11 14 
 
Current Location (FD Section)
 a
 
  
Forest Management 27 33 
Forest Extension 70
b
 75 
Forest Research 5 6 
Forest Products Research 2 2 
Other 4 7 
 
Field of Specialization 
a
 
  
Forest Management 26 32 
Forest Extension 19 23 
Forestry Research 9 11 
GIS & Remote Sensing 2 2 
Natural Resource Management 3 4 
Agroforestry 2 2 
Apiculture  5 6 
Agric. Extension 7 9 
Human Resource Management 4 5 
Don’t know 7 9 
 
a
  Some people did not answer this question, hence the number is less than total 
respondents. 
b
  Includes 7 people who indicated Beekeeping, which is no longer a separate unit. 
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Personal relationships (and mainly the lack of it) between the 
Director and other managers has clouded the department‟s performance. 
Often good ideas have not been used because the working environment 
does not permit it.  
On the other hand, those in good standing with the director are 
favored in training, performance evaluations and other fringe benefits. 
This oppression of talent is manifesting itself in poor performance, but 
also challenges the status quo that actually the department does not lack 
the capacity to deliver; capacity is available but subdued. According to 
the respondents, it is unlikely that the department can improve its 
performance in its present form. It needs a major surgery to energize into 
action the under-utilized technical capacity. Maybe the long-awaited 
transformation of the department into a Forest Commission will bring in 
new people and fresh ideas that would ultimately invigorate everyone 
again.426 
 
Administrative Practices and Inter-Agency Relations 
Finally, there are also issues relating to the internal administrative 
dynamics within the bureau itself, starting with the organizational 
structure and extending to personnel relations and their involvement in 
                                                 
426
  The Forestry Commission was supposed to have come into being in 1999. But the Forestry Director has 
not authorized it by failure to prepare a one page Statutory Instrument to activate the law that would bring 
the FC into being. 
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the routine operations of the department.427 Of course the multi-
dimensional character of the Forest Department‟s mandate creates 
conflicts with various stakeholders who also may have jurisdictional 
powers over some portions of the forests. For instance, forests as 
habitats for wildlife and by extension their role in supporting eco-tourism 
have always sustained a „sweet-sour‟ relationship between FD and the 
Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), formerly the Wildlife Department, in 
the sense that although FD has the overall mandate over the forest 
resources across the nation, foresters cannot exercise this mandate in 
the National Parks and Game Management Areas (GMAs) except by 
invitation by ZAWA. Where some portions of the National Parks and 
GMAs overlap with the FD‟s estates, still the FD cannot exercise its 
mandate in those forests; wildlife conservation takes priority.  
This jurisdictional overlap and separation puts the FD in a very 
awkward position because FD is supposed to oversee activities related to 
forest resource extraction from all forests in the country be it in 
protected or open forests. Yet its authority is not absolute: it is restricted 
in some ways. And of course when other [primary] land users‟ demands 
for agriculture, human settlements, industrial development, etc. and the 
wider social issues come into play, e.g. population growth (which induces 
demand for more land) this complicates the department‟s job even 
further. This is because for the most part such demands are directed at 
                                                 
427
 Andrew D. Szilagyi and Marc J. Wallace, Organizational Behavior and Performance, (Scott, Foresman 
and Company: Glenview, Il), 1987, 4
th
 Edition. Part 3 and 5. 
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the department‟s estates. Hence, FD has to deal with these challenges as 
they arise both administratively and politically. And this requires good 
managerial skills. 
 
Forest Management and Jurisdictional Boundaries 
Although FD‟s mandate extends to all indigenous forests (protected 
or open forests),428 excluding private property, in reality its real authority 
and accountability only applies to the protected forest areas (PFAs) where 
the department does the actual forest management activities and is 
therefore directly accountable for what happens to these forests.  
 
Protected forest areas (PFAs) serve different roles: for production or 
protection purposes or as wildlife habitats. Production forests serve as 
reservoirs of forest biodiversity for the present and future generations 
and as a source of government revenue. Protection forests provide 
protective roles such as protection of water catchment areas, act as 
reservoirs for endangered animal and plant species, buffers to soil 
erosion, etc. No extraction activities are allowed in protective forests. On 
the other hand, National Parks (NPs) and Game Management Areas 
(GMAs) exist as for wildlife conservation, which is the nation‟s backbone 
for eco-tourism. No logging operations are allowed in these areas either. 
                                                 
428
 The Forest Act of 1973  
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The Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), a quasi-government body created 
in 1997, oversees the management of NPs and GMAs.  
The department‟s accountability for the open forests, national 
parks and game reserves is indirect because those areas fall under other 
jurisdictions, namely the Chiefs and the Zambia Wildlife Authority 
(ZAWA), respectively. The only accountability FD has over those areas is 
only to ensure that any forest products extracted for commercial use (i.e. 
any forest produce intended for sale) is licensed regardless of the source, 
except for game hunting which is ZAWA‟s responsibility. In other words, 
nothing goes to the market place without a license. 
As might be expected, these jurisdictional arrangements have 
created some problems, one of them being inter-agency rivalry. For 
instance, because wildlife conservation is under another agency, FD has 
no powers over these forests except by invitation from ZAWA. And where 
the boundaries overlap between FD‟s estates and ZAWA‟s national parks 
(Figure 1.1), the Wildlife Act supersedes the Forest Act (forest 
conservation). In other words, ZAWA takes an upper hand over FD. 
Hence, instead of collaborative work between FD and ZAWA inter-agency 
rivalry has been common. Worse still, these battles become even more 
pronounced at budget time where ZAWA tends to be favored against FD, 
but the FD has always insisted that the its mandate is more important 
because wildlife conservation (i.e. ZAWA‟s existence) depends on its work. 
Without healthy forests (as wildlife habitats) there would be no wildlife.  
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Functionally, the superiority of the Wildlife Act over the Forest Act 
is meant to protect foresters from being at risk working in National 
Parks. Also because tourism brings in more money than does forestry 
(whose data capture leaves much to be desired), that gives ZAWA a hedge 
over FD. But from an operational stand point FD has a point but because 
its argument is framed as a contest, it has not found many serious 
supporters. As Deborah Stone (1997) advises political battles are fought 
with and over words. People read different things in someone‟s words.  
“People fight with ideas as well as about them. The different sides 
in a conflict create different portrayals of the battle – who is 
affected, how they are affected, and what is at stake. Political fights 
are conducted with money, with rules, with votes and with favors, 
….but they are conducted above all with words and ideas.”429 
 
Because policy formulation involves multiple players, how an issue 
is framed and portrayed430 can either make it shine or be shunned. 
Deborah further highlights the fact that policy debates are a contest 
when she says, 
“Every idea about policy draws boundaries. It tells what or who is 
included or excluded in a category. These boundaries are more 
than intellectual – they define people in and out of a conflict or 
place them on different sides. In politics, the representation of 
issues is strategically designed to attract support to one‟s side, to 
                                                 
429
 Stone, The Policy Paradox,1997:34 
430
  See for instance, Rochefort and Cobb (eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition, 1994 
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forge some alliances and break others. Ideas and alliances are 
intimately connected.”431 
 
Thus, creating allies not enemies in the policy arena is a skill every 
bureaucrat, assuming the role of a policy entrepreneur, should learn and 
employ. Sadly, the current management team in FD is oblivious to these 
realities.  
At times there have been suggestions for a merger between FD and 
ZAWA but these efforts have always fallen apart. My speculation is that 
because ZAWA has better conditions of service and is well funded, it 
wants to keep its turf. On the other hand keeping the status quo also 
helps the central government to keep its expenditure low; a merger would 
mean “upgrading” the conditions for FD employees too! Besides, even the 
politicians that oversee these entities also want to keep their jobs – a 
merger would send one of them off the rail. 
The point I‟m trying to make is that a merger between FD and 
ZAWA would definitely be good: it would bring synergy and enhance 
positive interdependence between the two agencies that are doing the 
same business: biodiversity conservation. Since FD would benefit more 
from this merger (by improved conditions of service and annual 
allocations) the department should refrain from complaining and casting 
its work as being superior over ZAWA to adopting a conciliatory position; 
one that promotes cooperation rather that competition because the 
                                                 
431
  Stone, 1997:34 
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cooperation creates alliances and alliances are more enduring.432 And 
this is important because how an issue is framed can either deepen or 
solve a conflict.433 For this reason, it would be prudent for FD to reframe 
its concerns as one in which FD is advocating for pulling the expertise 
under one house. Otherwise, maintaining the current posture will only 
deepen the social conflict between FD and ZAWA, although inter-agency 
rivalry is still possible even under one roof. The only difference is it will 
be easier to reach some common ground when operating under one 
jurisdiction. As some scholars have pointed out, words and language do 
matter and they matter most in the polis where different interpretations 
get assigned to them.434 
Because the Forestry Department is only directly responsible for its 
estates and indirectly for all other areas, this raises several 
complications. One is that the department is not held accountable to 
what happens in the open forests and GMAs where the Chiefs and ZAWA 
have jurisdictional mandate, respectively. Yet, because forest 
management is known to be a Forest Department‟s outfit, whenever any 
forest is in bad shape, FD gets the blame not the other entities. And this 
has contributed to the department‟s poor image where again the 
                                                 
432
  Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making  (WW Norton & Company: New 
York), 1997:26    
433
 David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, “ Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective”, in Rochefort 
and Cobb (eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition (University Press of Kansas), 1994:5 
434
 Rochefort and Cobb, 1994:5, 8-9; Stone, Policy Paradox, 1997 
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department has not done a good job educating the public on the 
limitations of its coverage and powers.   
For example, under the Forest Act No. 39 of 1973, local 
communities are exempted from paying for forest products harvested 
from open forests that are intended for home use (subsistence 
consumption). As can be expected, this is another area where the ground 
is extremely slippery because the FD is basically at the mercy if its 
clients: it relies on their integrity and sincerity.  
These user rights bring various complications. First, it is not easy 
to know if the product came from an open forest or a PFA. Second, 
monitoring that forest products collected for home use are not used for 
profit-making is a tall order; a challenge FD has faced over its lifetime. 
People who know this legal provision have [ab]used it only to evade 
paying but the product has in most cases ended up on the markets. As a 
former employee of the FD under the Forest Extension Division, what 
this researcher observed was that people would collect the product in 
relatively small quantities that would pass for home consumption and 
stockpile them until sufficient quantities have accumulated. Thereafter, 
an individual would either go to FD offices to get a conveyor‟s license, 
which permits them to sell the products or the product could be sold to a 
middle person who has to get the license to resale the products. Either 
way, there is loss of revenues at the first level.  
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From a management point of view, the exemption for subsistence 
consumption has been one of the largest loopholes on access to 
indigenous forests. It is not easy to distinguish between what is being 
collected for sale or for home use, other than relying on the individual‟s 
integrity. In an era where everyone wants to maximize profits, any 
loophole is exploited to its limits and this is one of them. For a 
department so low on field staff, and whose operations are geared 
towards policing its estates, it has increasingly become a tall order to 
police and monitor resource users taking advantage of this legal 
provision, in addition to any other activities. Tie this to high 
unemployment rates, which have pushed more people to rely on the 
forests, the result is that forests have become more or less a free 
resource, but more importantly the extraction for subsistence 
consumption must have increased and therefore is a factor worth looking 
at in relation to forest degradation.  
 
International Treaties and Conventions – Multiple Players 
So far this discussion has been confined to the local arena. But in 
the larger scheme of things international treaties need a special mention 
as they bring a different set of conditions and obligations. Although it is 
not mandatory to sign onto these treaties countries get compelled to 
belong to some groups because this makes it easier to be “heard” in the 
international area. As a member to some of the treaties on forestry or 
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biodiversity conservation in general, the Zambian government is under 
obligation to uphold the prescriptions under those treaties.  
Not only does membership to these conventions bring multiple 
obligations but this also opens a country up to multiple players. Locally 
this further complicates the multi-layered jurisdictional powers too. For 
instance, although FD is the sole manager of Zambia‟s forest resources, 
there are also various government institutions whose mandates impact 
forest management.435 Each of these entities has its interests, and 
jurisdictional boundaries to protect and, most importantly, an agenda to 
pursue. To put it mildly, since FD‟s mandate overlaps over all the areas 
that these other agencies deal with, it requires that the department 
works collaboratively with these entities. But creating operational 
harmony not only at home (national) but also at international levels 
where each of these agencies have different conventions and treaties they 
have signed on is not an easy endeavor. Sometimes inter-agency conflict 
arises, as pointed out earlier. 
In the same vein lack of specification of responsibility has 
sometimes led to intra-agency rivalry. After the civil service reforms, a 
new outfit has been the creation of planning departments in all 
ministries to coordinate all planning activities and provide policy advice 
                                                 
435
 These include the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) – a regulatory body on the environment; the 
Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) – in charge of wildlife conservation; and National Heritage 
Conservation Commission (NHCC) – which is responsible for preservation of monuments and sites of 
historical importance; and colleges that provide the necessary human resource e.g. the Zambia Forest 
College (ZFC), and the Copperbelt University School of Natural Resources- both of which produce 
graduates in forestry. In addition, various nongovernmental organizations are also involved. For further 
information, refer to MENR, National Environmental Action Programme (NEAP), 1994. 
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for informed decision-making. In the case of the Ministry of Environment 
where the FD belongs the Planning and Information Department, under 
the MTENR, has assumed this role as a policy coordinator. However, 
because FD still wants to maintain some level of independence, tensions 
between the two departments over who should do what are fairly 
common. Sometimes these battles are over the boundaries of power while 
others are on policy strategies to deal with certain problems. And this 
takes us into statutory arena. 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis  
Up until now we have relied on observing the direction of change in 
the forest estates and the two measures of institutional capacity (Figure 
4.4), and based on these trends we have been able to make certain 
inferences. However, as noted earlier, these trends cannot tell the actual 
causal relationships or specific impacts arising from each of these 
sources of capacity. Establishing the direction of change is a good thing 
but getting to know the degree of influence that the independent 
variables are exerting on the dependent variable is even better. Knowing 
the degree of impact from each of these factors is very important because 
that could be extremely useful in devising appropriate interventions to 
solve the problem. Therefore, until we know the degree of impact arising 
from each of these factors: that is, how they are contribution to the 
current problem, it would be premature to draw any final conclusion(s) 
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from these observations. To do this I now turn to the issue of causal 
effect, namely, how are the two sources of capacity contributing to forest 
degradation? And which one of these has a larger impact?  
As discussed earlier (especially in Chapter 3), the department‟s 
capacity is primarily being assessed in terms of its human capital and 
financial outlays. Human capital has been broken down to three 
categories (professional, technical and field staff) while the financial 
status is divided into two - operational and capital outlays. Together this 
gives us five independent variables for our model, which are then 
subjected to a time series multiple regression analysis to further 
understand their interactions. 
The regression analysis reveals some interesting results; some 
obvious others not quite so intuitive. Out of the five predictors, only two 
are statistically significant – professional and technical staff – the two 
groups where senior and middle managers are drawn from (Table 4.5). 
This result runs counter to official statements that have culminated into 
a long-held conviction that forest degradation is primarily a problem 
caused by insufficient funding and inadequate field staff to work the 
ground. Given the results just obtained, the question then is: why are 
financial resources and field staff not as important as traditional wisdom 
has portrayed them to be? How do we explain the fact that, in fact, 
managerial capacity is actually the problem?  
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According to this model, financial resources have no effect on the 
dependent variable. Instead, managerial capacity turns out to be the 
culprit. This is a very interesting revelation in the sense that for a long 
time the department has argued and continues to point to poor funding 
as insufficient field staff as its biggest obstacles hindering effective 
execution of its programs and by extension contributes to forest loss and 
degradation.  
 
Table 4.7: Impact of IC predictors on Protected Forest Estates. 
 
 
Predictors 
Protected Forest Areas 
Coefficient 
[se] 
(t-Score) 
Operational Outlays -.0001 
[.0001] 
(-1.01) 
Capital Outlays -.0000 
[.0001] 
(-0.27) 
Professional Staff .0440 
[.0111] 
(3.97)* 
Technical Staff -0043 
[.0007] 
(-6.07)* 
Field Staff .0002 
[.0001] 
(1.48) 
Constant 6.19 
[.4315] 
(14.34) 
 
R
2
 
Adj R-squared 
Prob > F 
No. of Observations 
 
0.67 
0.61 
0.0000 
36 
 
* Significant at 95% confidence interval 
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This study has generated some interesting findings that clearly 
render FD‟s argument open for debate. But considering the modeling 
limitations of this study, it is recommended that these findings be taken 
as preliminary pointers to be verified through a more sophisticated 
quantitative analysis.  
The t-scores for the annual outlays and field staff are not 
statistically significant and neither are their coefficients. In other words, 
field staff and the level of funding to the department are not the biggest 
problems causing forest degradation. Rather forest managers are, 
represented by the professional and technical groups where senior and 
middle managers are appointed from, respectively.  
From an administrative and management point of view this should 
not come as a surprise in the sense that managers set the tone and 
expected standards on what is achievable. Since managers are in charge 
of planning, organizing, directing and coordinating the functions of their 
respective sections means that they have a huge influence on what can 
and cannot be achieved. In this context, this finding simply validates the 
theories on good management practices.436 Therefore, rather than 
putting the blame on field staff we can agree that forest degradation 
arises from ineffective managerial capacity. In particular, senior forest 
managers have not provided the necessary guidance both to the middle 
                                                 
436
 See for instance, Gortner, Administration in the Public Sector (1977); Weber, The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization, (1947); Herbert Simon, et. al., Public Administration, (1950); Herbert Simon, 
Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Process in Administrative Organizations, (1957b). 
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managers and the field staff. As this study has also confirmed people in 
the lower ranks are completely ignorant about what they are supposed to 
do and teamwork is certainly lacking.  
Managers at all levels responded that they do not participate in 
any form of planning (51%), an activity that is supposed to bring them 
together to chart the way forward at least annually. Also over half of the 
managers acknowledged that they do not know if the department has 
any strategic plans (58%) and goals (51%) to work towards. When asked 
differently if at least they knew what their role was in working towards 
those strategic goals, again the majority (46%) were only aware 
sometimes, 22% had completely no idea and only 32% said they always 
knew what their role was (Table 5.8).  
This above revelation certainly does not reflect a good management 
style, and neither does it convey a sense of managerial competence. 
Leadership matters, but none of what is happening is anywhere near to 
indicate this.437  Managers ought to translate their formal authority into 
effective influence by providing the necessary guidance down the lower 
ranks. The management style in use suggests this might no be possible 
to do: there is hardly any planning is taking place, and when it is done 
the majority of the managers are not involved in the planning process. As 
a result they do not have even the most basic tool – a work plan – to 
guide their annual activities.  
                                                 
437
  Lawrence E. Lynn Jr., Public Management as Art, Science and Profession, (Chatham House Publishers, 
Inc.: NJ), 1996:69-88 
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Table 4.8: Management Practices – Responses from the Field. 
 
Question 
Response  % of 
Total 
Does the Forestry Department have a strategic plan? 
Yes 42 
No 58 
Does the FD set strategic goals? 
Yes 62 
No 36 
Do you know the department‟s strategic goals? 
Yes 44 
No 56 
Are you aware of your role in achieving the department‟s 
strategic goals? 
Always 32 
Sometimes 46 
Never 22 
Does the department have Annual Work Plans? 
Yes 51 
No 6 
Don’t know 43 
Are you involved in developing FD‟s Work Plans? 
Always 13 
Sometimes 36 
Never 51 
Does the department evaluate its performance? 
Yes 43 
No 26 
Don’t know 31 
Are you involved in evaluating the department‟s 
performance? 
Always 10 
Sometimes 19 
Never  72 
 
 
For instance, almost half of the managers do not have work plans. 
51% of them acknowledged that the department has work plans while 
the other half (49%) do not know. If the majority of managers, who are 
supposed to provide guidance on government policy implementation, do 
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not know what they are supposed to work towards how can anyone 
expect the junior staff to work out miracles in the field? 
What can be expected is exactly what is taking place right now: 
lawlessness and institutional breakdown. Therefore, it is not surprising 
to see what is happening to the forests. In the absence of managerial 
competence and guidance it is unrealistic to hold junior staff responsible 
for the poor performance.  
In this case, senior and middle managers are an important layer of 
capacity and should therefore be strengthened. Their impact on the 
forest estates has been found to be statistically significant. For instance, 
an increase by one professional staffer would increase the forest estates 
by 0.044 ha. Likewise a reduction in technical staff would result in losing 
0.0043 ha. What this means is that although all the positions are filled, 
as per current structure, these managers are not enough or are lacking 
in managerial skills to effectively supervise the lower levels. As a result, 
their presence and influence in the wider community is lacking. With 
such a lean structure one way these managers could strengthen the 
department‟s capacity is to establish partnerships with the local 
communities to help with forest management, as was the arrangement 
before. The absence of these partnerships might explain why forests have 
become free for all.  
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While this analysis has helped to isolate managerial capacity as a 
problem, the model only explains 61.07% of variation, suggesting that 
there are other factors at play that needs to be looked at. These internal 
factors (human and financial resources) do not tell the whole story.  For 
this reason, the external environment, which may include but is not 
limited to land tenure and ownership arrangements, political economy 
dimensions, the legal environment, and of course the political aspects, 
may provide an answer. I return to these issues later. For now let us look 
at the problem of additive effects. 
Considering that changes that occur in one year could potentially 
have cumulative effects in another year or years after, an autocorrelation 
test was performed to check for this problem. The results indicate no 
sign of autocorrelation; there is no distinct pattern of either increase or 
decrease (Figure 4.12).  
Another test, a regression on error, also ruled out this problem. 
The model confirmed that the relationship between error this year (e) and 
error from last year (elag) is not significant. The p=0.078 is higher than 
the 0.05 threshold and t =1.82 is also less than 2.  
In terms of correlation between the independent variables and their 
effect on the dependent variable, a multi-collinearity model also predicted 
that there is no problem. All values turned out to be less than 4, the 
threshold level (Table 5.9).  
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Figure 4.12: Annual Cumulative Effects. 
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Table 4.9: Multi-Collinearity Test 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Capital Funds
1/
 1.41 0.707109 
Field Officers 1.41 0.710547 
Annual Operational Outlays 1.40 0.712492 
Professional Staff 1.25 0.799798 
Technical Staff 1.17 0.852542 
Mean VIF 1.33  
 
1/
 May or may not be released annually. 
 
 
 
These are all very interesting results because intuitively one would 
expect to find the presence of autocorrelation among independent 
variables, which in this case are assumed to depend on each other to 
achieve a common goal. But these results indicate the opposite. In a way 
this confirms earlier observations from the regression analysis that each 
of these variables has the potential to contribute to forest degradation 
with or without any interference from other factors. From a policy 
interventionist point of view, this is good because it makes it possible 
and easier to deal with one aspect at a time and see if that intervention 
yields the desired goals. 
Although these results flout the entrenched beliefs in FD that hold 
field staff as a group directly responsible for program implementation, or 
at least have a stronger influence on what happens in the field than their 
superiors, it is reasonable to appreciate this line of reasoning because 
strictly speaking these are the officers who do the actual policy 
implementation, which by implication also means their degree of 
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involvement dictates program success or failure. In this context, their 
failure to prevent any activities that lead to forest degradation, (even as 
unexpected outcome), naturally speaks to their inability to do their job – 
whether this is due to inadequate numbers or a question of technical and 
other skills. 
 However, what this traditional reasoning overlooks is the fact that 
field officers are as [in]effective as their superiors are. Their performance 
depends on and reflects the managerial guidance (instructions and other 
forms of support) they receive from their supervisors. And this is where 
blame shifts from them to their superiors. It is the managers who develop 
the plans of action, source funding and other resources, including 
appointment of staff for various activities. In other words, managers 
dictate what is to be done, when, why and by whom.  
Therefore, it makes sense that forest degradation is a problem tied 
to senior and middle managers because in reality this is the first layer of 
human capacity. Not only do these managers interpret and break down 
government policy into achievable objectives (or at least are supposed 
to!), they actually set the [strategic] agenda and are responsible for how 
other resources are organized and utilized to achieve those policy goals. 
Therefore, when managerial capacity is weak or lacking, as this case 
study seems to suggest, it is not unusual to experience performance 
problems, the kind this analysis has just identified. In terms of policy 
intervention, what this means is that increasing the number of field staff 
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and the level of funding will not necessarily solve the problems FD is 
facing until the managerial problem is addressed.  
These results raise a very interesting observation and an important 
lesson, one that the international development community may wish to 
pay close attention to. In general, when the development community 
talks about capacity building in most cases that means having to provide 
some form of training to improve the technical skills of the target group.  
To many people, capacity building has become synonymous to technical 
training. Yet, as this case study has demonstrated, technical skills may 
not always be the problem. For instance, all the forest officers in 
managerial positions have more than the minimum professional 
qualifications needed to be appointed to those positions, an indication 
that in this case technical knowledge on forest management is not the 
problem. What is lacking are managerial skills, which are quite different 
from the technical knowledge in forestry.  
As a lesson, what this means is that increasing the number of field 
staff (i.e. taking FD‟s argument at its face value) or for that matter 
sending these forestry managers for further training to increase their 
technical skills in forestry would be a waste of such resources. Such 
interventions would not solve the problem at hand as it would be 
addressing the wrong place altogether. As this study has shown start 
with assessment of existing capacities to find out where the problem 
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resides before any intervention on capacity building is recommended and 
implemented.  
The other weakness FD suffers from is lack of visionary leadership 
and a head of department that is simply politically disconnected. As a 
management team, senior forest managers have lamentably failed to 
keep reinventing and reinvigorating the department so it can respond to 
the changing circumstances and capture the opportunities that have 
come with such changes. This is an area previous managers were really 
good at. Not only did they connect the department to the President‟s 
office, but they also were highly creative in designing programs that 
appealed to the public at different levels which encouraged their 
participation in forestry activities. These included but not limited to 
educational, civic and social clubs, radio and TV programs, corporate 
promotional programs, etc. The most famous were the radio, TV and 
corporate promotional programs438 where people were enticed to 
participate because there was always something to be won. But also 
some of these programs conveyed the information about forestry in a 
comical way. So they offered a lot of fun. 
The other issue relates to the global dimensions about forest 
conservation. The fact that Zambia is a signatory to so many 
international conventions and treaties dealing with biodiversity 
                                                 
438
  One such popular programs was the Forestry “Kambeba” Radio program that aired every Saturday 
morning, strategically placed at a time slot when most people were not in hurry compared to the typical 
Monday through Friday routines. 
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conservation, a genuine response to global interest and demands for 
forest conservation and environmental management, gives FD unlimited 
opportunities to still craft and maintain a reasonable, if not, respectable 
prominence in the national policy arena. The growth of the 
environmental movement, starting with the 1972 Stockholm Conference 
on Human Environment to the Earth Summit through to the present UN 
millennium goals targets are all open avenues through which FD can and 
should use to market itself to attract government attention. 
Government‟s commitment to embrace international obligations on 
themes such as sustainable development, forest conservation, integrated 
natural resource management, biodiversity conservation or climate 
change, areas where FD has no major rival, are open doors that FD can 
and should exploit. Yet, all these openings or opportunities remain 
untapped.  
The point being made here is that organizations are like living 
organisms, they perform well when they are kept dynamic e.g. by change 
of mission, or constant injection of new ideas and doing things 
differently.439 Although their (Donald Kettle and others, 1996) focus is 
the American Federal government, their menu for building “a government 
that works” is quite applicable to other organizations too.440 The Director 
of Forestry has yet to learn how to play this game and win. Being 
                                                 
439
 See, Donald Kettle, Patricia Ingraham, et.al., Civil Service Reform: Making Government that Works 
(Brookings Institution Press), 1996; Patricia Ingraham, Government Performance: Why Management 
Matters (Johns Hopkins Press), 2003:15 
440
 Kettl, et. al., 1996:4 
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politically savvy will definitely be a required virtue. Fortunately, one can 
easily learn from what previous heads of the department did to keep he 
department securely connected to the political power house, right in the 
President‟s office.441 Not only did FD manage to have the Republican 
President officiate at most of these annual events, as in 1988 when the 
President Kaunda was again the Guest of Honor for the National Tree 
Planting Day (December 15th),442 but they were also able to tap into the 
authority of his office to involve the general public as well as the 
corporate community. To illustrate this point I‟m tempted to lift a lengthy 
text.  
“In response to the concern by H.E. the President at the rate of 
deforestation, the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister issued instructions to 
ZIMCO and two other Ministries to carry out the following: 
a) ZIMCO to plant the same number as there were people in 
Zambia. During the year alone ZIMCO was expected to plant 2.4 
million trees. 
b) Ministries of Higher Education and General Education and 
Culture, to ensure that in future each child planted a tree. 
 
Within the same year, H.E. the President issued another directive 
that the Copperbelt Province should plant at least two million trees 
during the year.”443 
 
                                                 
441
  Check out FD Annual Reports for 1965 to 1988. In particular, refer to FD Annual Report for 1988 to 
see  how close the President‟s Office was to FD.   
442
  FD, Annual Report for 1988, p.1 
443
  FD Annual Report for 1988, p.22 
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Because of the enormous amount of work and cost involved in 
raising such a large quantity of seedlings the department used the 
political machinery to involve all sections of society. In addition, the 
program was adjusted as follows: 
 
a) “Each Primary and Secondary School to plant at least one 
hundred trees each 
b) Each institution of Higher Learning to plant at least five 
hundred trees each. 
c) ZIMCO to provide K50,000 for fuelwood plantation at Kamaila 
and a further K50,000 for distribution of seedlings to planting 
sites throughout the country.”444 
 
 
Clearly, these efforts demonstrate not only the creativity but more 
importantly how politically savvy previous forest managers were. Against 
the backdrop of a modest budget, the department was able to tap into 
the parastatal coffers to implement programs it would have not been able 
to execute. Working around government‟s rigid rules, these managers 
were able to create their own “flexibility” in doing government work. They 
valued “performance” over “protection” and “adaptation” over 
“compliance”.445 
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  FD Annual Report for 1988, p.23 
445
  Kettl e.t.al. Civil Service Reform, 1996:23 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that while 
FD‟s long held belief that insufficient field staff and poor funding have 
been two of its biggest obstacles to effective forest management may have 
some threads of truth, the real problem lies with managerial capacity 
and not the general work force. I have demonstrated that the department 
operated quite effectively on a lean structure and modest budget mainly 
because its managers recognized the strength of the social capital that 
existed outside the FD.  For as long as the department was collaborating 
with the larger society, especially the Chiefs and politicians, its strength 
was secured. When these relations were broken so did the department‟s 
strength, it simply evaporated. What lessons does this bring to the table? 
First is that, no organization operates in a vacuum. The strength of 
any organization also lies in the network of its collaborators, clients, etc. 
Second, when assessing an organization‟s performance be weary to run 
to conclusions before doing an in depth assessment of its institutional 
capacity. It is quite possible to arrive at wrong conclusions as FD 
managers did in this case study. Trends (as in the direction of change of 
some parameters) may not tell the whole story. It is important to 
establish the degree of impact each variable has on the dependent 
variable. This would help in targeting the intervention appropriately. 
Third, considering that FD does not own the land set aside as PFAs but 
only assumes a “care taker‟s” role, alienating the Chiefs (and their 
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subjects) from being part of the management team, and acting as if the 
department the absolute owner is among some of the worst blunders 
forest managers committed over the years. The department needs the 
blessings of the property owner to succeed in whatever it intends to do. It 
is ironic to see the state (represented by FD) wanting to assume and 
maintain absolute in an era when all roads are headed towards 
democratization – the idea of decentralization and the devolution of 
power to the people. While government is usually in a privileged position 
to exercise its authority and power over its territory, it is unrealistic to 
ignore the fact that government legitimacy and good governance are only 
possible when people are involved and feel part of a system.  
And finally, the disconnection from the political power house 
cannot be over-emphasized. Administration and governance, defined here 
as the “general exercise of authority,”446 go hand in hand. And because 
politics shapes public policy, maintaining close relations to the policy 
makers and, in this case, recognizing the local Chiefs‟ role in all this 
should come as a natural response to forest managers. In the larger 
context, there are also “global and local arrangements, formal structures, 
informal norms and practices and spontaneous and intentional systems 
of control” that impact public administration and need to be equally 
recognized.447 Thus, when these political dimensions are overlooked, 
                                                 
446
  Patricia Ingraham and Laurence E. Lynn (eds.), The Art of Governance: Analyzing Management and 
Administration (Georgetown University Press: Washington, D.C.), 2004:4 
447
  Ingraham and Lynn (eds.), The Art of Governance, 2004:4 
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“ownership” by citizens and “control” by government bureaucrats will 
always become sources of controversy. The solution to all is obvious – let 
the people in.  
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Chapter 5  
 
Forest Management Issues in Zambia 
 
 
External Factors 
 
Up until this point our discussion has concentrated on 
understanding the internal aspects of institutional capacity and how 
these have contributed to forest degradation. In this chapter it is 
appropriate that we turn our attention to the larger environment to see 
how external factors may have contributed to forest degradation i.e. their 
possible corresponding impact on forest degradation in conjunction with 
or independent of the internal capacity dimensions.  
Recall that the regression analysis explained only 67% of the 
variation, suggesting that there are other factors contributing to forest 
loss. These factors have been identified as relating to the political 
economy, population growth, policy reforms, land tenure and 
jurisdictional boundaries, and political expedience. These issues were 
indirectly referred to (and sometimes briefly discussed) in the foregoing 
chapters. However, for purposes of clarity, they deserve further treatment 
and this is what this Chapter tries to do.  
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Political Economy dynamics 
Zambia‟s over-dependence on copper as its main export commodity 
has been its largest weakness, but in forestry terms this can be 
construed as having been FD‟s biggest strength in the sense that forestry 
gained its prominence on the national agenda mostly because of its 
connection to the copper mines as a source of wood for energy and 
construction works. Because of this marriage between the copper 
economy and forestry it was impossible to ignore forestry. Thus, forestry 
was perceived as a twin pillar in the national economy.  
Copper dependence (which accounts for 90% of national 
earnings)448 is a weakness because any price change in copper or the 
production quotas has always sent Zambia‟s economy crawling on its 
knees, with unprecedented ripple effects in all other sectors that depend 
on copper revenues for their existence. Copper being the largest national 
income source, it is not an overstatement to say that support to forestry 
programs suffered partly due to a decline in revenues from copper  and 
partly because of Zambia‟s involvement in the political liberation 
movement in the region, a political campaign that deviated local 
resources to regional obligations. These developments, which by the way 
coincided with (or some would say), accelerated Zambia‟s entry into a 
structural adjustment program, became a source of weakness locally by 
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  CSO, Zambia in Figures, 2000; Living Conditions, 2004  
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reducing financial support to the national programs vis-à-vis, forestry. 
How did this play out?  
When copper prices plunged on the world market in early to mid 
1970s, which incidentally coincided with the oil crisis, government 
revenues followed in tandem. This meant a reduced national income 
(revenues) to be shared among the different agencies. With a country in a 
state of emergency (politically and militarily), naturally priority was given 
to national security; the idea that the government should be ready and 
able to contain any attack from the neighboring regimes that were in a 
state of conflict with respective liberation movements that were 
demanding and fighting for political freedom for their people. Because 
Zambia hosted some of these freedom fighters, there was no room for 
pretense that the country could not be attacked. As matter of fact 
Zambia was hit several times by South Africa and Zimbabwe to force it to 
withdraw its support to the freedom fighters from these nations. But 
Zambia never did. Instead, the government even decided to introduce a 
20 months mandatory military training for Grade 12 school leavers, 
called the National Service Military and Agricultural Training program. 
Trainees from National Service were anticipated to act as a buffer to the 
regular army. While the program was meant to enhance national 
security, it certainly drew some resources away from other sectors such 
as forestry.   
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In response to the dwindling copper revenues, government was 
forced to look at alternative means to cushion the short fall, that is, the 
development of forestry, agriculture and tourism industries as part of a 
broad policy on “product diversification” away from copper dependence 
and “export oriented growth.”449 Important as this policy was, and even 
though the Zambian government went almost immediately into full gear 
to promote this alternative policy, I would say this realization came 
rather a little too late. At this time government revenues to support this 
policy initiative were clearly lacking. As a result, this policy did not fully 
take off. What one sees are bandage interventions that only deepened 
dependence on donor funds.  
As one retired forestry official explained, government support to 
forestry started to decline from early 1980s.  But by the end of that 
decade the situation had become so bad the department was basically 
sustained by donor funds. Donor support accounted for almost 50% of 
the budget.450 These budgetary constrained also compelled government to 
cancel employing part-time and seasonal forestry workers. And since 
most of these workers were employed from the local communities, this 
development blew off the only jobs available to these people. Add this to 
the idea that over the years FD had systematically moved from 
community involvement to forest policing, mostly relying on the part-time 
                                                 
449
  GRZ, New Economic Recovery Programme – Fourth National Development Plan1989-1993. Vol. I and 
II, Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP), 1989:9-10; Economic Report – 1977 to 2000, Lusaka 
450
  Aaron Sugar Banda, Retired Deputy CCF (former Chief Forest Extension Officer), personal 
communication, 2007. See also Appendix 4 and 5. 
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local employees, the abolition of such positions created a huge vacuum. 
Worse still there was a deep sense of resentment in those communities 
who felt let down by their government. And this crack has never been 
mended to date.  
And of course the department has not been insulated from political 
decisions that government made at national level. As is evident that 
politicians, in any government, play a significant role in charting the 
direction of the nation whether this is in advanced democracies 
(capitalists like the USA, UK Japan or Germany and others) or emerging 
ones. Zambia‟s participation in the liberation struggle in the southern 
African region definitely came with a human, infrastructure and financial 
cost. Of particular concern here is the financial drain. Funding that was 
meant for domestic use was used to counter unfriendly regimes and 
support the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. Like many other national programs at that 
moment, most forestry activities suffered too. In addition to this, the 
adherence to the IMF conditions that Zambia should pay 5% of its GDP 
for external debt meant that little money was left for internal programs.  
Although the department was highly successful with other 
programs (e.g. in research, forest extension and the industrial 
plantations project) the „divorce‟ between forestry and copper mining 
brought new challenges on board. When forestry lost its privileged 
position on the national political grid, this meant less political attention 
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than was accorded earlier when the agency (or the sector as a whole) was 
perceived as holding the national economy. Following the decline in 
revenues and coupled with increased demand on its estates due to 
population growth, suddenly the department could not cope with the new 
reality. I return to the population issue later. For now let‟s look at the 
policy choices and their effects. 
 
Policy Reforms 
In my introductory remarks to this Chapter, I alluded to the fact 
forestry was once a high profile sector because the forest managers at the 
time were politically savvy. Not only did they develop and maintain close 
ties with the upper echelon of the political power house, but they were 
also able to convince the policy makers on the importance of forestry in 
the national economy, in particular its relationship with the copper 
industry as a source of wood energy. In addition, forestry was also 
portrayed as a very important partner in the manufacturing, 
construction, communication, and transportation industries, and of 
course not forgetting its strategic position as a common man‟s safety net 
from the cradle to the grave! In short, forest managers of the day 
marketed forestry to the politicians in such a way that whichever angle of 
the economy those policy makers looked at, they saw forestry as a twin 
pillar in the industrial development process of the nation. This made the 
 M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 247 
 
 
politicians to appreciate the department‟s role and supported its 
programs accordingly.   
I have also alluded to some of the policy choices that the Zambian 
government embraced over different time slots, two of which have special 
relevance to this study are Zambia‟s involvement (as a frontline state) in 
the liberation movements of the Southern African region. The other and 
most dominant economic policy choice, which has ran its course for over 
three decades since 1980s has been the structural adjustment program 
(SAP). As mentioned earlier, for all the good intentions that SAP 
envisioned to deliver, the program delivered none. Instead, the program 
created mayhem, directly but mostly indirectly for the forestry sector.  
The first and possibly the biggest blow to FD came when the 
copper mines switched from wood energy to electricity451 and coal. When 
this happened, somehow forestry lost its economic recognition and 
became just another sector. However, despite this change timber is still 
widely used for support work in all the mines.452 Therefore, forestry is 
just as important as it has always been. In fact, its role in the other 
sectors has remained the same. Unfortunately, subsequent heads of the 
department have not been able continue highlighting these connections 
and to restore the department‟s image and prominence to earlier times. 
                                                 
451
  They switched to electricity because it was cheaper and more reliable. At that time Zambia had surplus 
electric power. The scenario has changed now. Since the Fall of 2007, Zambia is experiencing a short of 
electric power such that load shading has become a common practice. Priority is given to the industries, 
copper mines being among the privileged group. 
452
  Dennis Musaba, Geologist for Kalulushi & Chibuluma Copper Mines, personal communication 2007 
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The question is why? Various challenges have played a role but most, if 
not all, of them loop back to lack of managerial capacity and creativity. 
First, the policy reforms induced by the structural adjustment 
program (SAP) had a disastrous impact on the forest resources in the 
sense that SAP introduced and accelerated a reduction in government 
structure and its changes spending behavior. These reductions in the 
department‟s labor force and financial support ultimately affected its 
operational capacity too. I discuss these issues in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.  
Second, as mentioned earlier, the decay in the cordial relationships 
that previously existed between FD and the Chiefs (and by extension 
their subjects) ultimate eroded FD‟s strength in regard to forest 
management. Unfortunately, FD has done little to rectify the situation. 
Since mid-1990s FD has seriously contemplated the introduction of 
community-based joint forest management (JFM),453 a concept that 
encourages local community involvement in forest management, as part 
of a larger strategy aimed at devolution of power to the local 
communities. However, because government had systematically 
dismantled and destroyed the local structures through which these 
communities organized themselves to manage their forests, the JFM 
concept has not generated much enthusiasm. The proposal to implement 
JFM has been on paper since 2000 and the department has not prepared 
a Statutory Instrument to give the JFM concept a legal backing.  
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  See: National Forestry Policy of 1998:15 
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As Lynch and Alcorn (1994) point out, this Zambian scenario 
clearly confirms their argument that historically states have been known 
to alienate local communities from the decision making table. States 
ignore customary property rights and “assume the rights over the forests, 
particularly for revenue generation,” including the right to decide who 
can and when to harvest the resource, payment of loyalties, and rights to 
all non-timber products.454 These tendencies do not help in building 
healthy relations between government agencies and the communities. As 
a result, communities may take the law in their own hands, as the 
Zambian case illustrates on forest encroachment.  
While the motive for JFM looks genuine on the surface the 
problems underneath are quite mammoth. First, JFM suffers from lack of 
a legal backing and therefore it is hard to envision how it is going to 
operate, let alone motivate the public to embrace it. Second, this strategy 
resembles a cut and run initiative as government only intends to give 
technical support and leave the communities to do the rest. There is a 
feeling that it is unrealistic to expect the communities to manage their 
forests without giving them a „proper‟ head start.  
These concerns are real and cut across nations and continents. 
Community-based forest resource management has been tried in various 
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countries with varying degrees of success and failure.455 This is because 
“public land or other public resources belong to no one in particular but 
to everyone in general.” And this “ambiguous official status acts as a 
magnet that pulls” various resource users – charcoal burners, loggers, 
landless farmers, etc. – on-to public forest lands.456  Hence, to participate 
in community-based conservation initiatives, communities want to be 
assured of security of tenure, access, and ownership rights; benefit 
sharing; and the existence of legal recourse mechanisms.457 None of these 
conditions have been provided yet in the Zambian case.  
The proposed JFM is unlikely to be a solution in and by itself. 
Much more needs to be done before FD can wash its hands on forest 
management. Without a legal backing JFM is non-functional.458 Possibly 
when the long-awaited Forestry Commission is formed it may push for 
revision of forest law and policy.  
One strategy (within the SAP ambit) that deserves special mention 
here is the product diversification policy I mentioned earlier which 
encouraged more private investors to enter into forestry. Under this 
policy forestry equipment, which qualified under the agricultural 
grouping, was exempt from import tax and customs duty. This 
exemption, coupled with the increase in demand for indigenous timber in 
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 Various scholars have written on this topic. See for instance, David Western, et al., (eds.), Natural 
Connections, 1994  
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  National Forestry Policy 1998:20-24 
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South Africa and some Asian countries, attracted more companies to 
engage in forest business. Thus, natural forests became a center of 
activity. But instead of being a positive development, unfortunately this 
turned on its heels, and became a run away train. Due to inadequate 
capacity of the FD to monitor that influx of saw-millers, the forests 
simply became a target of over-exploitation, requiring more and better 
management strategies and skills. In the absence of forestry personnel to 
monitor all these activities, FD has continued to rely on the integrity of 
its clients.  
As with the abolition of part-time and seasonal workers 
employment, again local communities found themselves on losing side. 
Due to absence of supporting infrastructure (electric power, good roads, 
and communication facilities) near the forests, commercial saw millers 
set up their plants in urban areas and subcontracted their operations to 
several pit sawyers who produced timber cants, which were later 
reprocessed at mills in town. For those engaged in processing indigenous 
timber, 63.7% are pit-sawyers and only 36% are commercial sawmills.459  
Pit-sawyers typically belong to the cottage industry, and employ no more 
than five people. The point I‟m trying to make is that these arrangements 
in which commercial millers are in town and pit-sawyers are in the rural 
areas completely defeats government‟s intentions of wanting to create 
jobs in the rural areas because bigger plants employ more people. Also 
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  Makano Rosemary, The Effect of Structural Adjustment Program on Forest Management in Zambia, 
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one can‟t even start to compare job conditions and benefits between the 
two! Commercial sawmills will certainly offer more decent conditions. 
Notice here that nowhere in its official statements / complaints has FD 
ever raised the absence of infrastructure to support commercial activities 
in rural areas as a constraint to the development of forest industries. Yet, 
this is an issue that urgently requires government‟s attention if the 
sector is to become a viable source of employment in the rural areas and 
possibly beyond. If this is not a sign of managerial incompetence, then 
what else can it be?  
Other weaknesses relate to the conditions governing timber 
concession licenses. The forest regulation stipulates the minimum 
volume or number of trees that a concessionaire (or pit-sawyer) should 
extract per year (supposed to be monitored monthly) instead of the 
maximum. This prescription not only gave an opportunity but clearly 
encouraged the licensee to over-exploit the forests. In other words, FD 
put up a perfect recipe for deforestation.  Since FD doesn‟t have a 
corresponding capacity to monitor these operations, the forests have 
been open for abuse.  Therefore, rather than placing a blame card on 
central government for its market liberalization policy, espoused under 
the SAP, forestry managers should shallow their share of the blame by 
being so naïve and generous in their concession licenses. They literally 
opened up these forests for over-exploitation.  
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Forest Fees versus Free Access 
Loosely connected to user rights is the moral issue of government‟s 
responsibility and obligation to do what is right in the public interest. 
The forest fees exemption for subsistence use was conceived from this 
moral standing, including the low pricing of forest products. The FD has 
raised its concerns over the fee exemption citing the complications it 
brings in their line of duty: that it is very difficult, in most cases, to 
distinguish between those accessing the forest resources for home 
consumption and for commercial use. FD‟s argument on how government 
loses revenues in this manner has not convinced lawmakers to strike out 
the provision. Instead, lawmakers have always voted against it arguing 
that forests are nature‟s provision that has generously been handed over 
from generation to generation, and therefore people should have free 
access to the resources their ancestors have tirelessly worked to 
preserve. Since the local people have preserved these forests from time 
immemorial, lawmakers find it reasonable to allow free access for 
subsistence consumption as a pay back for the local people‟s labor.  
Obviously, for anyone who follows political debates these 
arguments should ring a familiar cord. All politics being local (and in 
most cases also personal), the last thing any elected official would do is 
to go against representing the interests of their constituents, even though 
such a move might be in the national interest. Because politics is all 
about pleasing your local constituent first, which protects one‟s votes 
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and guarantees re-election, so far no members of parliament have been 
bold enough to support burning their fingers on an issue such as this 
one. Protecting their votes is a game politicians know best, and this 
loophole gives them a great platform to show that they have kept their 
word to keep the interests of their constituents guaranteed. In any case 
such loopholes not only benefit the common person but more so these 
same people who make the laws.  
Because of the central position forests occupy in supplying the 
essentials for a regular person‟s daily survival, especially in rural areas, 
and coupled with the entrenched perceptions of forests being a free gift 
from nature it is most likely that eliminating free access for home use 
will remain an uphill battle in Parliament.  
While both the free access and low prices are good for the 
consumer, what this has done is to encourage over-exploitation of the 
forest resources. And the fact that these forests are considered as 
common property, where in this case the invisible hand of the manager is 
not even present, the tragedy of the commons has taken over. Hence, in 
the absence of meaningful oversight from the department, this had 
resulted in forest over-exploitation, which had now led to forest 
degradation.  
On the commercial side, particularly with regard to timber 
extraction, there is also another bad loophole in the forest regulations. 
The license specifies the minimum quantity a licensee should process per 
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year and not the maximum. Yet even though the department has 
absolute powers and is entirely at liberty to make changes to its 
regulations any time it sees fit, this provision is still on the books to date. 
Therefore, when the department complains about over-exploitation, one 
wonders who should be blamed for that: is it the resource user or the 
department itself which has not changed its regulations? People (as 
individuals or groups) always look for avenues to maximize their profits 
and utility motives. The current arrangement of free access for 
subsistence consumption provides a perfect situation to achieve all that!  
 
Land Tenure and Jurisdiction 
At independence in 1964, Zambia inherited two types of land 
tenure systems based on the English Law. One system was that of formal 
title registration, administered under the Crown Land, which later 
became State Land. The other was the customary law that applied to the 
Native Reserves, Native Trust Land and Barotseland (now called Western 
Province). In terms of land distribution, Trust Land covers the largest 
portion. Out of Zambia‟s total landmass, 57.7% (43.3 million ha) is Trust 
Land, 36.2% (27.2 million ha) Reserve land, and 6% (4.5 million ha) is 
State land, 460 which is mainly found along the line of rail (Figure 5.1).  
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 M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in 
Ng‟andwe, A. (ed.), Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third 
Republic of Zambia, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45 
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Land tenure defines ownership and access rights, including a 
system of management. In Zambia, land ownership is segmented 
between central and local government, who together own 6%, and the 
traditional rulers who control 94% of the land (Figure 5.1).   
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of Land by Land Tenure System, Zambia.  
 
Source: D.J. Siddle, “Colonial Land Rights” in: Hywel D. Davies (ed.), Zambia in Maps, 1971:49 
 
Generally speaking the Zambian way of life is pretty much a 
communal affair,461 and nowhere is this more pronounced than in land 
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tenure arrangements. The Chiefs own the bulk of the land which they 
distribute to their subjects depending on need. Families “own” the land 
in perpetuity, provided they do not leave such lands unutilized for a long 
time, at which time the Chief resumes ownership rights, or other 
members of that community may go to the Chief to request such land to 
be assigned to them.  
Thus, in the Chiefs‟ areas, land ownership is not a complicated 
process.  A person simply goes to the local Chief to get a piece of land 
and that becomes family property that would be passed on from one 
generation to another as long as one maintains presence in that area. In 
communities that rear livestock such as in Central, Eastern, Southern 
and Western Provinces, it is not uncommon for the Chiefs to set aside 
communal grazing lands. Yet, despite this communal ownership 
arrangement, land has generally been well managed and hardly suffered 
from the so called „tragedy of the commons’. This is because land has 
always been considered a community heritage to be worked in such a 
way that it provides for both the present and future generations. Also the 
political philosophy of humanism,462 espoused by the Kaunda 
administration, further entrenched these values.  
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  In all its stripes and shapes, humanism was a disguised form of socialism; very much geared towards to 
common property ownership and creating a classless society. Whether this is good or bad is another 
question beyond the scope of this study. For details, refer to Kenneth Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and Its 
Implementation, Part I (Lusaka, 1967); Humanism in Zambia: A Guide to its Implementation, Part II 
(Lusaka, 1974). 
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The issue of who has jurisdiction over what land has briefly been 
dealt with. In this section I want to highlight how land tenure and 
ownership rights (rather than administrative or stewardship powers per 
se) influence the “assigned” powers of a manager such as those of the 
FD. By land tenure I mean the formal and informal laws/rules that 
assign access rights to land – for use and or ownership. It includes not 
only the relationships between people and land but also the social 
relationships between people. Why should land tenure be part of this 
discussion? What relevance does it have here?  
As I pointed out earlier, this issue is important even in a study 
such as this one which is dealing with institutional capacity because 
those with tenure rights will usually have more power over the property 
in question and this gives them a certain social status in comparison 
with those without those rights. What this means is that “tenure 
determines who can (and can‟t) do what with the property in question 
and under which circumstances they can (and can‟t) do it.” 463 Therefore, 
knowing who has control over what land, how the FD gets the land for 
reservations, and the different policies that deal with land issues, etc. 
makes it easier to appreciate the challenges as well as the opportunities 
available to Forestry Department. This is especially important in view of 
the fact that FD does not own any land (as in buying it), but gets if free 
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from respective landowners (e.g. the traditional Chiefs or central 
government) on the understanding that such lands are going to be 
managed on behalf of the people for a specific purpose, e.g. protection of 
a water catchment area. In other words, the land is on “loan” to the FD. 
These institutionalized land ownership arrangements cannot be ignored 
and will not go away anytime soon, especially that they are protected 
under the law.464 In fact, this is part of the reason why local communities 
are able to assert themselves as they do because that land essentially 
belongs to them and all they are doing is to exercise their rights hoping 
to get back their land. Land tenure, ownership and access rights are 
issues where various policy battles have been waged. A brief history will 
be appropriate here. 
Crown land (apparently the most fertile land) was reserved for 
white settlers who were also permitted to hold freehold or leasehold title, 
while native land was for the native Africans.465 To protect the natives 
from losing their land, the British colonial government did not allow non-
natives or charitable organizations to own land in Native and Trust lands 
for more than 5 years and 33 years, respectively. Since the natives did 
not go into commercial farming at the rate and scale the white settlers 
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did, this somehow explains why more land are found in trust lands, and 
by extension forest estates too. However, since independence, 
government has made several modifications to the statutes governing 
land ownership, both during the First (1964-73) and Second (1973-1991) 
Republics under the UNIP government, led by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda as 
well as under President Frederick Chiluba‟s government.  
Since title to land was not permitted in customary lands and 
neither could that land be sold, this essentially meant land in these 
areas were valueless. The natives wanted this and other sections of the 
law that were perceived to hinder development in their areas changed.  
The first of these „solutions‟ came out of a 1967 Land Commission, 
which among other things, recommended that land had value and, 
therefore, can be bought or rented regardless of where it is located to 
secure one‟s right to use it.466 Title to land should also be given to those 
people on customary land so they too could have secure rights to land. 
Finally, the Commission vested all land in the Republican President, to 
be held in trust for the Zambian people.467  
Sadly, the 1967 Land Commission Report was not made available 
to the public so the Commission‟s recommendations were not formally 
accepted or rejected. Instead, government conveniently only popularized 
the clause that vested all land in the President. Other recommendations 
such as the one that gave value to land were tactfully ignored until 1991 
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when the MMD government inscribed it into law. Thus, concerns on land 
laws continued, especially the need to redistribute to Zambians land held 
by absentee landlords on State land.  
Later, after the 1969 referendum, The Lands Acquisition Act of 
1970 was passed and authorized land redistribution. Government could 
buy such lands in cash or in kind by giving the affected landlord an 
alternative piece of land.468 This Act gave the President so much power he 
could “compulsorily acquire any property of any description.”469   
In pursuit of his humanist philosophy, a disguised form of 
socialism, President Kaunda argued against sale of land pointing out 
that since land is never bought under the African tradition, it must 
remain the property of the state.470 And this stance was further 
consolidated under the UNIP administration where all existing free hold 
titles were converted to leasehold titles of up to 99 years and that 
government would monitor and facilitate land acquisition only in the 
“national interest.” To that effect all land was vested in the President, to 
be held in trust on behalf of the Zambian people.471 In a way, it is 
possible to speculate that this is what led government to conserve as 
much land in customary lands areas as possible, as exemplified in the 
number of forest estates found in these areas.472  
                                                 
468
 GRZ, Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970:6-7 
469
  GRZ, Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970:4 
470
  K.D. Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and the Guide to its Implementation, Part I, (Zambia Information 
Services: Lusaka), 1968  
471
  UNIP, National Policies for the Next Decade, (Zambia Information Services: Lusaka), 1973:36-37 
472
  See FD Annual Report for 1988:3-4. 
 M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 262 
 
 
After toying with several options between permitting titles to land 
in Chiefs‟ areas (customary lands) and getting some portions of State 
Land to redistribute to the people in areas where land shortage became a 
problem (e.g. in Southern Province), these initiatives were allowed after 
many years of negotiations.473 But the proposal to introduce a land tax 
payable by all land users including peasants was rejected by the UNIP 
government.474  
Of all the changes that have occurred over the years, the most 
monumental came in 1991 when finally land had value; land could now 
be sold whether or not there was permanent infrastructures on it.475 In 
particular, the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in 
the Third Republic of Zambia also recommended that land be re-classified 
into two categories: State land and Customary land rather than the 
previous four; and that landowners on State land would have a 99 years 
lease with automatic renewal, while those in Customary land would be 
granted specific durations based on the purpose for which the land is 
needed.476   
                                                 
473
  GRZ, Land Conversion of Titles Act, 1975:6; GRZ, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Matters in the Southern Province, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1982:18; GRZ, Procedure on Land 
Alienation: Land Circular No. 1, (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources: Lusaka) 1985a:3 
474
 GRZ, Government Paper No. 2 of 1985: Summary of the Main Recommendations and Government 
Reactions on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters in the Southern Province, 
(Government Printer: Lusaka), 1985b:16-17 
475
  MMD, Movement for Multi-party Democracy Manifesto 1991-1996, (MMD Campaign Committee: 
Lusaka), 1991:7 
476
  A. Ng‟andwe (ed.), “Resolutions of the Conference,” in: Report of the National Conference on Land 
Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia, July 19-23 (The University of Zambia: Center 
for Continuing Education, Lusaka), 1993:203. 
 M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 263 
 
 
While the afore mentioned land reforms opened up customary 
lands to attract investment, the restriction to 99 years lease title fails to 
take into consideration the long maturity period of forestry crops. In this 
respect, land laws in Zambia do not encourage private forest ownership 
because renewal of title to land is not guaranteed after the 99 years 
lease. Consequently, the country attracts forest extraction instead of 
long-term investment; whereby investors would be keen to establish or 
manage their own forest estates as is the case, for instance, in 
Scandinavian and other western countries. 
A few things deserve special mention. First, the Chiefs have more 
land than central government, and these lands are communally owned 
and still administered under customary laws of inheritance. The Chiefs 
decide who can or cannot be given land, and what may or may not be 
done in their areas. And this has been their power base. But this tenure 
system also raises several concerns: how secure are communal property 
rights? Do (or what type of) tenure incentives exist to promote 
sustainable management of the land resources? How equitable are the 
redistribution arrangements? When a person or group of people occupy a 
piece of land without the Chief‟s permission are they squatters or do 
their tenure rights come into play since they belong to that community? 
At what point does free access become a problem for another person in a 
communally owned land? As Lynch and Alcorn have argued with respect 
to community-based conservation efforts, these questions can be 
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addressed by assessing the state‟s performance (in this case represented 
by FD) and the existing relationships between the Chiefs and 
government.477  
As Powell and DiMaggio (1991) explain, institutionalized 
arrangements tend to have long staying power, are easily reproduced and 
people often do not even look at other alternatives because they regard 
the prevailing arrangements as sufficiently appropriate.478 This is so true 
in the Zambian situation where communal land ownership and tenure 
arrangements have remained unchanged for so many years despite the 
bashings from pro-capitalist and free market lovers who advocate 
otherwise.  
However, given what is happening now, it should not come as a 
surprise to conceptualize the problem of forest degradation as a product 
of the tragedy of the commons precisely because that is what it looks like 
now, though not in the sense of the people maximizing utility from the 
same piece of land but in the sense of individuals (or a group of families) 
competing to [illegally] allocate themselves a piece of land that they 
aspire to own before others get it. Somehow it resembles what happened 
during the scramble for Africa, except this time the “sharing” is at local 
level, with central government being perceived as an intruder, a common 
enemy. The phenomenon is more pronounced for forests near 
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metropolitan areas than it is in the rural areas, which again underscores 
the fact that people still have more respect for the Chiefs‟ authority than 
they do for central government. In other words, traditional “state” has 
more staying power than the contemporary state, rather than vice versa. 
Part of these reactions arise from an underlying frustration due 
government‟s failure to deliver on its promises of creating jobs through 
forestry, and partly because of the collapse of the economy that sent 
thousands of unemployed people on the streets. Consequently, people 
have invaded the forests as the only way they can claim them back. But 
speaking from experience, I strongly believe that it is unlikely that these 
lands will be in bad shape once they become private property.  
For the unemployed masses, forests provided the easiest avenue 
where one could extract some form of livelihood without having to worry 
about any financial investment. For instance, all one needs is an axe and 
the energy to stroll into the nearest forest to get some wood (or make 
charcoal) for sale. And sometimes, no equipment is needed – just a 
basket would do, and someone would come back with a host of products 
to sell – mushrooms, fruits, vegetables, etc. Those who are skilled enough 
can also trap unsuspecting wildlife using ropes crafted from tree barks!  
Getting back to the tragedy of the commons, I envision this to be a 
temporary phenomenon, meant only to force government to give up those 
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forests as has happened before.479 Of course the people who are illegally 
taking over some or parts of the forests are motivated by utility and 
opportunity cost motives to the extent that this would lead to eventual 
land ownership. Everyone is trying to maximize his or her utility from 
forests, which ultimately is leading to forest over-exploitation. The fact 
that the forest manager, FD, is perpetually absent made these communal 
lands vulnerable. In the absence of a manager to provide some 
leadership and control over these estates due to labor and financial 
constraints (as the department claims), this opened up the forests to 
unrestricted accesses.  
Since people did not see anyone to be directly responsible for these 
forests, and armed with the knowledge that these forests have been 
common property from time immemorial, the natural tendency is for 
anyone to claim ownership. Hence, these forests became open to 
unrestricted access. Consequently, there is no control over what should 
be extracted, when or how much. At first people went in only to help 
themselves to the forest products, exercising their access and usufruct 
rights. Later they realized they can actually establish their ownership 
rights too, the best way they know how: to settle there. Bear in mind that 
even when land is communal the owner/manager (the Chief) regulates 
access and ownership. With FD having abrogated its responsibilities as a 
                                                 
479
  Davy Siame, “Forest Resource Management and Drought”, in: IUCN, The Environmental Impact of the 
1991-1992 Drought on Zambia, 1997:73-74; Felix Njovu, et. al., Key Threats and Opportunities for the 
Conservation of Biodiversity, 2004 
 M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 267 
 
 
manager of PFAs, the local Chiefs could do nothing as they were tied up 
in the contractual arrangement that released such lands to FD. As a 
result, this created a managerial vacuum, one which the people have 
exploited to their advantage. Ironically, the Chiefs never blame 
government as having failed them. Instead, they always point to 
population growth as the reason why their subjects have been invading 
the forests.  
The other dimension relates to the changes in the land laws. Up 
until 1991 land in Zambia had no value: it could not be sold on its own 
regardless of whether it was in State land or customary lands. Even on 
State Land where land ownership through title deeds was permitted land 
could not be sold on its own unless there was some form of permanent 
infrastructure480 (e.g. buildings) on it. And because formal title to land 
was not allowed in customary lands (Trust Land and Reserve Land) that 
fell under the Chiefs‟ jurisdictions this not only reinforced the idea that 
land was valueless and therefore useless but also promoted land 
ownership insecurity.  
Of course the whole idea was to keep land as a communal 
property, to be accessed through the Chiefs‟ permission, and it worked 
fairly well. As a result, there was no motivation to own land individually.  
But all this changed in 1991 when land gained value under the new law. 
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People can now have title to land in customary lands (up to 99 years 
renewable leases), although such land can only be accessed through the 
Chiefs‟ approval.  
These developments have ignited a huge surge for individual 
property ownership. Thus, forest encroachment can be explained in 
terms of individuals wanting to be early birds to catch the best worms.  
Because land can now be sold in its own right, provided one has title to it 
(which is also now allowed in Chiefs areas provided the Chief consents to 
that), this has spurred a new wave of entrepreneurship geared towards 
accumulating land as an asset that can be sold later. Ironically, as far as 
forest encroachment is concerned, this is only happening in the PFAs, 
the land perceived as belonging to government, and not in open forests 
still under the Chiefs‟ jurisdiction.  
What does this tell us? Simply that people still have respect for the 
Chiefs‟ authority and appreciate that such lands are for their future 
inheritance. On the other hand, because FD has become an „absentee 
landlord‟ its estates have rendered themselves fallible to occupation by 
anyone. And all this speaks to the idea of lack of managerial skills. At its 
current level of capacity, it is unlikely that FD would be able to provide 
the kind of penetration required to instill that sense of its presence. It is 
this weak penetration that has, for the most part, led to the current 
problems. And penetration here does not in any suggest unilateralism 
but the adoption of arrangements that promote and rely on inclusion of 
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other key players to get things done. At the end of the day the big 
question is always, how useful was that government intervention for the 
intended target group?  
A good yardstick is to assess government interventions against 
their benefits to society. In other words, how far has the state penetrated 
society to solve the problems it was supposed to address? But if the state 
fails or unevenly penetrates society, “local enclaves” may arise to provide 
expression of “private” identities.481 The public has taken over the forest 
estates precisely because its government has failed them. For instance, 
there are no jobs created in the rural areas where the resource is 
situated. Instead, even the few job opportunities that have been created 
by the timber companies are located in urban areas where these 
companies have set up camp.  
What can be learned from all this? First, the department lost touch 
with real world. Whereas the previous arrangement permitted 
involvement of the Chiefs and their subjects in forest management, 
which included the recognition of group rights and access to these 
resources, FD management decided to take a unilateral approach in 
which it exerted itself as the only authority, ignoring the fact that Chiefs 
still remained the real authority since land never really changes hands to 
become the department‟s property. Forest department cannot sell the 
land is manages. Therefore, what the forestry managers ought to do is to 
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tap into the Chiefs‟ authority by re-activating previous relations it had 
with these Chiefs. This is a model that has worked on wildlife 
management.482 It is hard to find any reason why it would not work in a 
related field like forestry.  
The issue at stake here is how can FD remobilize this social 
capital? And what expectations do these communities have about their 
government? Although people are known to be driven by short-term self-
interests, given the right incentives and conditions, collective interests 
and action is likely to replace individual self-interests.483 After all 
communities are always sustained through collective action.  
As observed earlier, it is clear from available evidence that FD‟s 
capacity on forest management has not resided in the number of its staff, 
their technical know-how nor the amount of funds at its disposal – 
though this is genuinely helpful. Rather its biggest asset has always been 
the unfettered cooperation that the department received from the Chiefs 
and their subjects. The moment the local communities withdrew from 
that partnership, all hell broke loose, and the effect of this withdrawal is 
evident everywhere. What lessons does this case study provide?   
First, under a communal land tenure/ownership arrangement 
such as the one in Zambia, the bureaucracy clearly has no total control 
over the land resources. The Chiefs, as custodians of their community‟s 
property, have an upper hand. Therefore, community cooperation is 
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needed [again] if any meaningful improvement on forest management is 
to be achieved. Reintroducing and strengthening these ties is the best 
way forward.  
Thus, government‟s proposal to introduce joint forest management 
(JFM)484 that would include the local people in forest management, and 
currently being tried through some community-based natural resource 
management programs (CBNRMP), is certainly a welcome gesture. 
However, this too is not likely to yield any positive outcomes if 
government is seen as trying to wash its hands by passing on the forest 
management responsibility to the local communities after the forests 
have been destroyed. What the people need is genuine leadership and 
government commitment to show that this will be a cooperative 
undertaking between government and the people. And of course local 
communities are interested in seeing tangible benefits accrue to them. 
Communities want and must regain security of tenure and access for 
them to feel comfortable to participate in such programs.  
JFM is being viewed in certain circles as government‟s acceptance 
of failure to manage the forest resources. Thus, if not handled properly, 
government‟s withdrawal via CBNRMP as part of a power devolution 
strategy may create a leadership vacuum, which may hurt rather than 
benefit the very people it wants to empower. Devolution of power through 
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CBNRMP should be done gradually to prevent the rich and powerful from 
taking advantage of the situation.  
 
At a time when poverty and health are of primary concern to a 
common person, it will be folly for government to institute measures that 
overlook these important obligations. This includes signing up blindly up 
for some international treaties that have minimal impact on the local 
communities just some organizations are willing to finance some so 
called capacity building / community empowerment initiatives. Unless 
such commitments translate into some tangible benefits to the local 
communities it will be a long shot to win the cooperation of the local 
people.  
Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that Chiefs have more 
control over how land is utilized than the contemporary state, a feature 
that arises from the formation of the classic versus the modern state. In 
our case study, the modern state draws its power and legitimacy from 
the classical state (spread across the different Chiefdoms) which is quite 
strong. It would not be surprising if a similar situation obtains in other 
African states whose formation shares similar characteristics with the 
contemporary state called Zambia. The issue that arises here is that this 
power layering of “states” within a state can become a source of 
weakness or conflict. May be this could explain why modern African 
states continue on the path of underdevelopment because strictly 
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speaking the contemporary state does not seem to have total control over 
its land. This is another area development practitioners should pay 
attention to, the first being why it is important to assess IC before 
implementing any interventions. 
 
Population Growth 
Zambia‟s population has changed substantially from 3.4 million 
(1964)485 to 11.7 million (2007),486 and with it has come corresponding 
challenges and opportunities. For instance, population growth has meant 
increased demand for agricultural land and human settlements. Also the 
need for wood energy, timber and other land use activities has moved in 
the same direction. These pressures have challenged FD‟s capacity to 
deal with them trying to keep its forest estates intact. But with a 
department that has been acting as an absentee landlord, the pressure 
for its forests has exceeded its capacity. As a result most of its forests 
have been compromised.   
The conflict between having land for human settlements and 
keeping it for biodiversity conservation is one that the department has 
not handled very well in recent years mainly because FD has estranged 
the local people from being partners in forest conservation. But as Anna 
Lawrence has pointed out, foresters should adapt to changing social 
expectations by adopting new ways of managing: sharing knowledge and 
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responsibilities on forest management, not only among themselves but 
more importantly with resource users. In other words, forest managers 
should re-adopt approaches in which they see resource users as partners 
rather than as a problem, or a group whose only responsibility is to 
extract the forest resources.  
I say re-adopt because these partnerships were previously in 
existence, not only in forestry but also for fisheries and water 
management. Chiefs had their own systems and gave specific 
responsibilities to their subjects e.g. on forestry, fisheries, and water 
management. And nowhere was this as elaborate as in Barotseland 
(Western Province), among the Lozi. But the system broke down (or at 
least was weakened) when FD took over the forests. A similar situation 
also occurred in Luapula Province over the fishery resources.487 
In business circles, population growth is always looked at as a 
positive development – that is to say a potential market worth nurturing. 
So why is it a problem to FD?  Isn‟t this a potential market for forest 
products too? It defeats my reasoning why FD does not look at 
population growth in this context. In any case the wealth of any nation 
starts with its people, the human capital! What makes a difference for 
population being a problem or an asset is how it is harnessed. And China 
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offers an excellent example in this respect! Strictly speaking, as a sector 
supposed to create job opportunities, population growth should be 
treated as an asset, both as a source of labor and as a market. FD is 
supposed to device strategies that harness the opportunity that comes 
with this growth rather than seeing it as a problem. Until foresters come 
to this realization, people will forever be a problem rather than an asset.  
In fact, even though population is orchestrated as problematic, 
strictly speaking this is happening on a localized scale, with forests near 
urban areas being at greater risk.488 It is a problem that local politicians 
tend to exploit for political expedience – to convey to central government 
the idea that due to population increase more land is needed both for 
human settlements and agricultural purposes. Yet underlying this 
supposedly noble purpose is their agenda of political appeasement to 
their constituents. With a population density at 13 people per square 
kilometer (with Lusaka, the capital city, and the most densely populated 
town standing at 64 people per square kilometer),489 Zambia is still 
nowhere near to having a problem of land shortage. I come back to these 
dimension when I discuss political expedience.  
 
Political Expedience 
Land in Zambia conveys both a sense of identity and of power. 
Land is distributed according to ethno-linguistic lines, and ownership 
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fallows this pattern. By virtue of belonging to a particular ethno-
linguistic group (identify), one can own land through natural inheritance. 
As a nation that is predominantly agrarian (over 80% of the population in 
Zambia depend on subsistence farming for their livelihoods), land has 
been and continues to be a wealth generating avenue. As a result, it 
remains the “most valued form of property” to a common person.490 It is a 
resource that has permanence many other resources don‟t have, at least 
one can own it in perpetuity as long as one maintain ties to a particular 
ethno-linguistic group. 
Land is also a symbol of power in that those closer to the Chiefs 
(and in the case of State Land those with the power of the pen) have more 
influence over who owns the land and for what purposes. For a long time 
land has also provided political power too. Local politicians, usually 
claiming to speak on behalf of the people, tend to derive and drive their 
personal agendas based on how they are going to deal with land issues in 
their constituencies – either in terms of creating jobs or as advocates for 
getting back the protected forest areas from central government to cater 
for the local needs. In most cases the latter has resonated with the 
people and subsequently has secured votes for such politicians. 
Consequently, when they take office, such politicians have not been 
helpful in forest management.  
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In order to preserve their legislative status, mainly for political 
expedience, some local politicians have encouraged their constituencies 
to illegally access the forest resources or simply settle in the protected 
forests. Either way, this has led to forest degradation. Secondly, 
politicians have offered little support for forest reforms in the country, a 
position I construe as being content with the status quo. These 
politicians prefer maintaining the current loopholes in the law because 
they benefit from that. Initially people had respect for the law. But since 
embracing democratic politics, some Members of Parliament have 
encouraged people in their constituents to access the forest resources 
freely, defending the practice as one of the benefits of freedom. In their 
view, the classification of forests as government property means that this 
was public property, which meant that people could do as they pleased 
anytime. Obviously, the idea of having a manager in charge of that 
resource is completely ignored. 
Thus, what we see here is identity politics at play, which is also 
confirming the idea that institutions matter.491 They matter because 
institutions (as organizations or rules) both provide an avenue for 
expressing one‟s concerns, which in this case are manifested in tactics of 
fighting to retrieve what these communities rightfully perceive as their 
property.  But the means adopted are counter-productive both for the 
respective communities or the nation. 
                                                 
491
 Deborah Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America, 2005:5-8 
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On another level, it can also be argued that because the Zambian 
societies are so communally oriented an individual hardly exists. Local 
communities (including their elected officials) do not see themselves in 
individual terms but always as part of a community, although I should 
add that this is slowly changing in urban areas where ethno-linguistic 
lines have become blurred.  
However, from the stand point of identity politics, members of 
parliament (as policy makers) are unlikely to stand alongside with the 
Forestry Department on public policy unless they are convinced that the 
department‟s interventions are going to bring benefits to their community 
not only to a selected few, as most public interventions tend to be based 
on a trickle down effects. What this means is that both the public and 
their members of parliament (MPs) are unlikely to debate issues from an 
objective position other than from a regional or communal, and usually, 
a normative position. Such orientations leave the FD in the cold because 
MPs will always lean towards protecting their constituent interests. 
Therefore, it may be an uphill climb to reach common ground. And this 
is where forest managers need to exercise their political skills by finding 
allies in the political arena long before the department submits any 
policy reforms. Support from the respective local communities and their 
elected officials, is what will ensure sound forest management. It is the 
single most capacity FD can count on if it has to succeed in its mission.  
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As Ingraham, et. al. (2003) point out public managers have 
multiple roles and operate at different levels, two main ones being the 
bureaucratic and the political levels. Achieving a balance between the 
two is a skill every public manager looking for success of their 
organization has to learn.492 Sadly, the department is critically hand-
capped in this area. Compared to the previous administrators, the 
current Director of Forestry does not even have anything resembling a 
strategy. During and before B.O.M. Chiyabwe‟s time as head of the 
department (i.e. 1986 and earlier), the department had a lot of extension 
programs designed to draw the attention of policy makers and the public 
at large to forestry. Currently, despite the department‟s focus having 
shifted towards provision of extension services, there‟s hardly any 
extension program in place! How ironic! Given that the department has 
not developed any strategy to achieve its primary mandate, what does 
that tell us about its managers?  If this is not a managerial problem, 
what is it?  
For example, the department doesn‟t have to finance all its 
programs. With a bit of creativity the department could solve some, if not 
all, of the so-called problems being faced. Some extension services (e.g. 
radio and TV programs) can be self-financing if these managers could tap 
into the corporate world who can underwrite these extension programs 
for the benefit of both parties. No one in the department even thinks on 
                                                 
492
  Patricia Ingraham, et. al., Government Performance: Why Management Matters, (The Johns Hopkins 
University Press), 2003. 
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these lines! It was apparent during the personal interviews with some of 
the senior and middle managers that they all think within the box: 
government is supposed to finance all their programs. But in light of 
limited resources, creating public-private partnerships is not an option 
but the only way the department should go. 
Another aspect worth mentioning here, which also drew away the 
national resources to other activities relates to Zambia‟s involvement in 
the liberation movements in the region. Whether this was a good thing to 
do or not is beside the point. The fact is that Zambia‟s involvement in 
regional politics, especially to the degree this was pursued, undeniably 
deviated a good portion of the national resources that could have gone 
into building capacity in respective agencies. In hindsight, though the 
sacrifice was too costly to the Zambian people, the country did the right 
thing to host and create the necessary leadership that brought political 
harmony to the region. Except for the Angolan case and recent political 
instability in Zimbabwe, for the most part Southern Africa has been 
relatively peaceful and stable – certainly a plus for the Kaunda 
administration that pursued that unpopular policy at the time.  
But how do these relate to the problem of deforestation? The 
diversion of resources to fund liberation movements deprived the local 
agencies of needed funds for development. However, despite these 
difficult times those managers were so creative they developed bilateral 
relationships and accessed grants that were used for research, training, 
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and development of other forestry and forest-based activities. In addition 
to the industrial plantation project, the department established some of 
the best research plots and genetic materials for indigenous and 
plantation forests. 
Several things come into play here: there is visionary leadership 
from head of department and unwavering creativity among managers 
who were also able to communicate effectively to the lower ranks on what 
needed to be done. They developed a strong team spirit that kept 
everyone well informed. Also there is the issue of incentives offered 
primarily through staff development but also other benefits such as 
personal to holder vehicles,493 free accommodation and water494 that were 
part of the conditions of service. All these things point to management 
style and managerial skills. Certainly, there is a lack of vision and 
leadership qualities at Director‟s level. The head of the department is not 
providing the necessary leadership that would set the department in the 
right direction. For instance, communication is so bad for the most part 
the staff do not know what they are supposed to be doing. Organizational 
goals are not clearly spelled out and neither are staff roles properly 
explained to help them know how they fit into the larger picture.  
 
                                                 
493
  This applied only to senior managers but middle and junior managers who were in charge of a forest 
station or section also informally enjoyed similar privileges. 
494
  Government provided free institutional housing to all forestry personnel. Except those who lived in 
town (under local municipal jurisdiction) government also absorbed the bill for water, telephone and 
transportation for the personnel who lived in forest stations.  
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For instance, 62% of the managers surveyed in this study think 
that FD has strategic goals. But 58% don‟t know what those strategic 
goals are! This is amazing!  How can the department achieve anything if 
its managers don‟t know what they are supposed to work towards? When 
it comes to developing the annual work plans, again a gloomy picture 
emerges. Over half (51%) of the managers said they are not involved in 
developing the department‟s work plans, 42% don‟t know if FD has any 
work plans, and 40% don‟t even know who develops these work plans, if 
there are any at all! 
In terms of program implementation i.e. knowing what role these 
managers are supposed to play in pursuing the department‟s mission or 
goals, only 32% of the forest managers (all levels) knew their role, while 
22% hardly knew anything at all. The majority (46%) only knew 
sometimes, and it is hard to tell how often they knew. Overall, 89% 
confirmed that FD has problems implementing its plans because these 
managers have no idea what they are supposed to do.  
This is clearly a serious problem. If the managers who are 
supposed to guide others are as ignorant regarding the department‟s 
goals and their role in pursing the same as this study just revealed, how 
will the rest of the staff know? Because of this information black out 
there is a deep sense of frustration across the ranks to an extent where 
most forest managers are just waiting for the creation of the Forestry 
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Commission so they could get their separation benefits and take early 
retirement.  
 
Refugees, Forests and National Security  
Zambia has been one of the most stable and peaceful nation in the 
southern African region a feature that has made the country a safe 
haven for people displayed from political conflicts in neighboring 
countries, including those from Central and East Africa. It is therefore 
befitting to highlight the important role the Zambian government has 
played in accommodating refugees, and the impact this has had on 
forests as well as the national budget which has to be shared to cater for 
refugee too.  
The influx of refugees into Zambia has been a constant occurrence 
dating back to early 1960s when the first freedom fighter groups engaged 
their governments into political and military campaigns. Since that time, 
even as a young nation, Zambia has continued to host refugees not only 
from its neighbors495 but even from countries further north in East and 
Central Africa.496 For instance, in 2005 Zambia hosted over 260,000 
refugees, the highest number in the whole world. By 2007 this figure had 
dropped to 197,539, which excludes “42,250 Congolese refugees (and 
unspecified number from Angola) who were offered voluntary repatriation 
                                                 
495
  For instance, refugees came from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
496
  This includes refugees from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Congo, Congo DR (formerly Zaire), Sudan, Rwanda, 
Burundi and Uganda.  
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in November 2006”.497 If previous experience is anything to go by, most of 
these people are likely to return possibly in the next two years. The 
current refugee population of 197,539 includes: 90,000 from unspecified 
neighboring countries (2006); 42,565 (Angola), 60,874 (Congo DR), and 
4,100 (Rwanda) (2007).498 But what relevance do refugees have to the 
subject at hand? Two dimensions they bring to the table: their impact on 
forests and issues related to national security.  
As a land locked country surrounded by eight neighbors, securing 
its borders, most of which have corridors of forests is an issue not only 
left to the national security wings, but one in which foresters also play an 
active role. The latter are usually the ones who notice whether there are 
movements of people from other countries, who then alert the security 
wings to take appropriate action. Therefore, when there is a lack of 
presence in monitoring these forests (whether by the foresters or local 
communities), this compromises national security. 
Second, the influx of refugees into means that government has to 
find places where to settle these people to give them a decent shot at life, 
even though it may not be the same level where they came from. In most 
cases this means getting some pieces of land where to build refugee 
camps. As can be expected the natural choice is to get from government 
lands, although there are cases where Chiefs have been asked to donate 
part of their land. Also these camps provide basic infrastructure such 
                                                 
497
  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html. Accessed: June 10, 2008. 
498
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html. ibid. 
 M a k a n o ,  R o s e m a r y ,  2 0 0 8 ,  U M S L  P a g e  | 285 
 
 
that the facilities do not include the luxuries of modern life style. 
Refugees are predominantly forest-dependent for their energy needs. 
Therefore, depending on how long these would stay in an area, extensive 
damage often occurs to the nearby forests. In this respect, refugees do 
contribute to deforestation.  
 
The Value of the Forests in Poverty Alleviation 
It would be unreasonable if this discussion only shows what is 
causing forest degradation without putting a human face to the topic. By 
this I mean, so what if the forests are dwindling? Why should people care 
if forests are declining? What are wider implications? There are various 
reasons, and here is why.  
First, if well managed, forests contain the natural “capital” that 
can contribute magnificently to Zambia‟s economic development. This 
has been proved by the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway and 
Sweden) who, by the way, have been the major financiers of forestry 
programs in Zambia. In Finland, forestry alone contributed 5.6% to 
Finland‟s national GDP in 2006.499 Between 1982 and 2005 Scandinavian 
                                                 
499
 For details visit: 
http://www.forest.fi/smyforest/foresteng.nsf/allbyid/B870982E61D16328C22573D30026D674/$file/G028_
eng_08.pdf .  And for more documents and statistics refer to this website: 
http://www.forest.fi/smyforest/foresteng.nsf/allbyid/438DBC6361C9EB75C2256F34004154D8?Opendocu
ment#Graphics%3A . Accessed: May 28, 2008. 
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countries have given Zambia over US$331.7 million in bilateral grants for 
forestry programs.500  
As mentioned earlier, over 80% of the Zambian population is 
dependent on indigenous forests for agriculture, food, building materials, 
wood energy, and other forest products for sale, all of which cushion 
their subsistence living. And this situation applies to other countries too, 
especially in the Third World.501 As a bank of mostly renewable resources 
its potential to supply these could stay on in perpetuity. Thus, even as 
the world has set for itself the millennium goals, forests can certainly 
play an important role, especially in reducing poverty. 
Yet, even with such an indisputable reality, the link between 
forests and their role in poverty alleviation is clearly missing; at least the 
Zambian foresters have not highlighted this in a way that makes sense to 
policy makers. This is partly because of an over-stretched emphasis on 
timber, which leaves out a host of other useful products, and partly 
because a lot of the activity happens in the informal sector.  
The first problem relates to how forests are valued. Foresters only 
see timber in their forests; hardly pay any attention to other equally 
important products such fruits, herbal medicines, etc. It is inconceivable 
at this time in the history of forestry in Zambia that there are no 
monetary statistics (not even speculations) on the value of forests. Yet, 
                                                 
500
  The actual figure is US$331,719,309.00, based on information in Appendix 4.  See Appendix 4 for 
specific projects that have been financed by these three Scandinavian countries. 
501
 Edward B. Barbier, Natural Resources and Economic Development (Cambridge University Press: NY), 
2005. 
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forests serve as the only secure bank, especially for the rural areas. 
Forests make it possible for these folks at least to get some level of 
decent subsistence survival, stopping them from falling into abject 
poverty.   
Foresters must learn to quantify in monetary terms not only timber 
but also the other forest products, and show how these products could 
(and do) help alleviate poverty. For instance, indigenous forests are a 
great source of food and medicines, which by the way, are classified as 
minor forests products and there are statistics on them whether in value 
or quantity extracted. Yet, food is the most sought after commodity. And 
forests provide this all year ranging from mushrooms and vegetables to 
fruits and game meat (animals and birds). The way forests are valued in 
Zambia leaves much to be desired. These professionals count what does 
not count, at least to the common person, which includes this author. 
The wealth and value of these goes far beyond timber and it time this is 
reflected.   
The current boom in honey production that has clearly been 
enhanced by the beekeeping project under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Fisheries (MAFF) is a good testimony on how forests can 
alleviate poverty at household level without having to use “trickle down” 
calculations, as most foreign-propelled programs tend to emphasize. In 
fact, the ZMK12 billion loan (equiv. US$2.99 million) from the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) for beekeeping activities in North-Western and 
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Central Province underscores the importance of forests in alleviating 
poverty at household level.502 At least government is waking up to this 
realization that organic honey is a product that would be well received on 
the international market. If well coordinated this is an industry that can 
pull a lot of subsistent farmers out of poverty. And of course there are 
numerous other resources from the natural forests such as mushrooms 
and fruits, obtained free, but whose value runs in millions, or possibly 
billions, of dollars.  
One classical example is Amanita Zambia, a company that 
amassed its wealth exporting Amanita zambiana, an organic mushroom 
from Zambia‟s indigenous forests. The Masuku wine from the fruits of 
Uapaca tree species (Masuku) that was produced by Tip-top Company503 
in Kitwe, is another. The other example is the Sclerocarrya birrea 
(Marula)504 fruits that are used in the production of the Amarula cream 
(Figure 5.2). The Amarula cream, produced in South Africa, is exported 
worldwide but these fruits also come from Zambia‟s natural forests, the 
Marula trees.  
 
 
                                                 
502
  For details on this see the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, web article of May 22, 2007 at --
----. 
503
  Sadly, Tip-Top Company was closed in 1992 in exchange for a franchise from the Coca-cola Company. 
As can be expected the company‟s closure had a terrible effect on the peasants who used to supply the 
masuku fruits to Tip-Top Company. 
504
  As of now the Marula has defied domestication, it grows only in the wild and has been found useful for 
man and wildlife. For more information about the marula tree (Sclerocarrya birrea) see, 
http://www.amarula.co.za/za/learn/amarula_roots/ . 
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Figure 5.2: The Marula Fruits and the Amarula Cream (Liqueur). 
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Therefore, as we have seen before the inadequacy in capacity goes 
beyond numbers. The problem is lack of managerial skills; the leadership 
acumen, propelled by being visionary and pro-active rather than reactive, 
are important ingredients for effective management.505 The department 
lacks leadership that is supposed to shepherd the organization in a 
productive direction, one where its staff understand the department‟s 
goals and their role in achieving the same. It also lacks a shared vision. If 
any vision exists only the Director of Forestry knows it. 
For instance, according to the survey findings 88% of forestry 
managers surveyed think FD has a mission statement, but 38% of them 
do not even know what the department‟s mission statement is. With 
respect to planning, 62% think the department has a strategic plan, yet 
58% have no idea what the department‟s strategic goals are. And finally, 
51% said they are not involved in any form of planning, if any planning is 
done at all.  
From a management point of view, this is a perfect recipe for 
disaster because these are the managers who are supposed to lead 
others in their respective provinces and or sections, and yet have no idea 
about what they are supposed to do. Without any information to pass on 
to their junior staff, a lack of shared vision has permeated throughout 
the department creating a terrible sense of disillusionment and staff 
morale has dipped rock bottom. This tendency or preference for a top 
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 Ingraham, , et. al., Government Performance, 2003:3   
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down centralized decision-making style has unfortunately strangled the 
department. It will certainly require a visionary leader and a manager to 
bring the forestry staff back on board. For now we can only hope that 
this will not take forever before that change happens.  
 
Conclusion 
Picking up our discussion from Chapter 5 and continuing the argument 
in this Chapter, I have tried to further demonstrate that forest 
degradation is directly linked to FD‟s weak institutional capacity that has 
stronger roots in the internal than the external factors. Although some 
external factors are at play, they are the kind that can be contained if FD 
had good leadership.  As Chapter 5 has demonstrated the major 
weakness is not necessarily the inadequacy of field staff (as in quantity or 
the number), the problem lies in lack of managerial capacity – the 
inability to plan, organize, direct, supervise, coordinate, inspire and 
simply manage the personnel and other resources.506 Senior managers 
lack the managerial skills even to link the department to the larger world 
where it can tap into other people‟s capacities. Unlike previous managers 
who valued and tapped into the social capital that exists outside the FD 
(e.g. the Chiefs, in other government agencies, the corporate world and 
even the international community) sadly, the current management team 
is oblivious to this reality. Right now the department needs to implement 
                                                 
506
 See for instance, Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick (eds.), Papers on the Science of Administration, 
1937 
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a series of reforms to bring the department back on course: one of this is 
that the department should renew its relations with the local Chiefs. This 
is where the department‟s strength resides. And then it should work on 
bringing in new partners such as the corporate world. The department‟s 
success lies in working collaboratively with the larger community rather 
continuing to pursue a unilateralism type of management.  
External factors have had their own share of contribution too. But 
as our analysis shows this is a smaller portion (33%) compared to 67% 
that internal factors accounted for. Therefore, it is quite possible that if 
the internal problems are resolved, some of the external factors would be 
taken care of too. For instance, issues related to political expedience and 
population pressure can be easily handled if FD‟s capacity is improved.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities 
 
Throughout this discussion it has become more and more clear 
that contrary to FD‟s official position (which now qualifies as a 
popularized myth) that inadequate field staff and financial resources are 
largely responsible for the poor state of forests in Zambia, the results 
from this study show that this is not entirely true. Rather the problem 
lies with a different set of factors: the managers themselves. There is very 
little connection, if any, to the other two factors (financial and field staff) 
that the department has always orchestrated. The biggest handicap FD 
suffers from is managerial incompetence. The department lacks visionary 
leadership, one that would provide guidance to the lower ranks to steer 
them towards a common purpose. Indeed, this might come as a surprise 
to most forest officers and others who have come to the same conclusion 
as FD has done all these years. This is because their analyses have relied 
on simply observing the direction of change (the trends) without 
subjecting such observations to further statistical scrutiny, as this study 
did, to at least establish the degree of impact from various factors at 
play.  
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As this study had made it abundantly clear, organizations are 
created for a particular purpose. They have a life of their own as reflected 
in their mission, vision, objectives, strategies and goals.507 Yet as we have 
also seen, these are later shaped or modified by the preferences of the 
staff that get hired as well as the people outside who interact with that 
organization. And the strongest impact comes from an organization‟s 
managers who set the agenda on what should and will not be done. 
As various management and organizational theorists have argued, 
managerial capability is an essential input if an organization is to be 
effective in its mission.508 Availability of the factors of production is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for good performance. An 
organization may have all the factors of production but the lack of 
managerial skills to utilize these resources can render them meaningless. 
Yet even with meager resources good managers are able to explore other 
means and propel an organization to greater heights. And this is exactly 
what has transpired in FD over the years. With meager resources, but 
under good leadership, the department excelled so well it was a “star 
agency”. But under poor leadership, despite some improvements in the 
number and quality of personnel, the department recessed into a non-
performer and ceased to be a star kid on the block.  Needless to say 
                                                 
507
  Oliver Williams, 1991:327 
508
 See for instance, Herbert Simon, “Human Nature in Politics,” American Political Science Review, 
79:293-304. 
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unless the FD gets its act together in managerial leadership, no 
improvements can be expected elsewhere anytime soon.  
The challenge at hand is how can this capacity be developed? What 
level should be dealt with first? A repeat of the PSRP should be avoided. 
To this effect, the recommendations offered by David Frederickson and 
James Perry (1998), which addresses how to implement change,509 seems 
appropriate in this situation.  
The first step they recommend is “unfreezing,” which entails 
loosening long held “attitudes and self-perception of organizational 
actors.”510 In their view, one should avoid structural adjustments, as the 
major strategies for change, because these do not usually “engage the 
deeply ingrained images and perceptions” of the organization‟s culture.511 
Instead, Frederickson and Perry argue that the best tactics to institute 
organizational change are those that will ameliorate the “natural human 
desire to hold on to existing attitudes, perspectives and activities,” whose 
natural response is usually anxiety, feelings of loss of something familiar 
and predictable, uncertainty, and loss of identity.512 To institute and 
nurture organizational change for improved performance, Frederickson 
and Perry offer a series of recommendations, which can summarized as 
follows:  
                                                 
509
  David Frederickson and James Perry, “Overcoming Employee Resistance to Change,” in: Patricia W. 
Ingraham, et. al., Transforming Government, (Jossey-Bass Publishers), 1998:125-146 
510
  Frederickson and Perry, 1998:129 
511
  Frederickson and Perry, 1998:129-130 
512
  Frederickson and Perry, 1998:130 
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The first step is to reduce the resistance by teaching employees to 
let go. For instance, given the level of their technical and professional 
qualifications, forestry staff would rightfully claim that they are well 
trained and know their business. For this reason, it may not be easy for 
them to accept that they are incompetent – that they lack managerial 
skills. Therefore, the first challenge is insure that all employees are well 
informed so they understand how the proposed change would improve 
the status quo.  
The second strategy is to cultivate and get the support of career 
civil servants (and I add the politicians too). Political and administrative 
actors are both important ingredients. Both groups bring a different kind 
of durability to the reform effort which neither career bureaucrats nor 
elected officials can provide alone.  
Third, diffuse the concerns of those who would resist. Do not 
bypass resisters as this may just mobilize them into a stronger force. 
Ignoring resistance is not a good strategy; it may just delay or obstruct 
looking at other alterative options that resisters may offer.513  
In terms of nurturing change, again Frederickson and Perry 
recommend several strategies, one of which to involve all employees to 
participate and own the change process.514 Sometimes good ideas are fail 
to be adopted simply because the people supposed to be affected are not 
involved to own the process. This is where the SAP and PSRP both failed. 
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  Frederickson and Perry, 1998:130-134 
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  More strategies are offered from 134 
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And the current management style utilizes a similar approach whereby 
the Director of Forestry does not share information with the other 
managers such that one third of the forest managers have no clue 
regarding their role in working towards the department‟s strategic goals.   
Besides the above internal constraints, the external environment 
has also generated its own set of challenges and opportunities, most of 
which could be minimized or completely eliminated if the managerial 
capacity existed. Thus, the real challenge here is how to improve FD‟s 
managerial capacity, and I dare say, this should be the focus for anyone 
interested in improving the department‟s performance.  
Because capacity development is both an objective and an 
approach,515 linking capacities to performance outcomes is the best way 
to know if, in fact, those are the key capacities needed to create positive 
change. Therefore, whether capacity building is taken as an objective or 
an approach is immaterial. The real issue lies in determining what 
capacities are required to improve performance.  
The easiest and fasted way to improve FD‟s performance would be 
to overhaul the top so that a new leader can take over and must be given 
specific targets to achieve. Until FD managers learn to re-invent the way 
they do business by adjusting to changing circumstances, i.e. doing 
business differently and embracing new ways of doing things, the current 
situation will continue.   
                                                 
515
  Khalid Malik, “Capacity for Development,” in: Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., Capacity for Development: 
New Solutions to Old Problems, 2002:27. 
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CHALLENGES 
A closer look at the obstacles facing the Forestry Department 
indicates that the origins of the current challenges are self-inflicted, 
rooted in lack of administrative and managerial skills. The main 
challenges FD needs to pay attention to are captured below. 
 
Managerial Leadership 
As the findings elucidate, and without running the risk of being 
repetitive, the lack of managerial leadership to provide strategic direction 
to the workforce has led to various problems. The department has 
cultivated an ideal ground for a frustrated, disoriented and de-motivated 
labor force. Teamwork is clearly absent, and the management team has 
failed to harnesses the technical skills in its staff, which clearly is a 
waste of investment from previous years in human resource 
development.   
Poor planning, and mostly the lack of it, has led to the absence of 
forest management plans which are essential operational tools. 
Consequently this has hampered the work of the department. There is no 
guide as to what forestry personnel are supposed to work towards both 
in the short and long term. Although Nutt (1971) and other 
organizational theorists argue in favor of availability and adequacy of 
tangible productive resources (human, capital, technology and an 
enabling environment) as being necessary for the effective functioning of 
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an organization I would add that this equation is incomplete in the 
absence of managerial qualities. As we have discovered throughout this 
study, managerial capacity matters; it serves as the fuel and glue that 
drives and binds other factors of production to work in unison.  
Indeed, the effectiveness of an organization is measured by the 
quantity and quality of its output. Conversely, the caliber of the input 
determines the output, or to put it more plainly „the means justifies the 
end‟. Since the department‟s mission is to manage the forest resource, 
the quantity and the quality of the forest (as a final product) is a good 
measure of its performance. And this is where its managers have failed 
lamentably. 
 
Quality of Staff and Their Placement 
Closely related to the first challenge is the quality of staff. Numbers 
alone don‟t count much, quality, and in particular, quality of skills 
matters most. In terms of professional qualifications and experience 
(defined as years worked in forest operations), the department has higher 
qualified personnel compared to 1970s and earlier, a time when FD had 
less qualified staff but ironically a time when performance was also at its 
best.  
Looking at the current staff appointments, it is evident that the 
department has adequately trained staff to carry out its mandate. 
Although there is no one with a doctorate degree in forestry in the 
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department, those with master‟s degrees in their respective fields are 
adequately equipped to provide the necessary professional guidance 
needed. And the lower ranks are equally adequately qualified for their 
level. In fact, the spread and emphasis of professional specialization 
reflects the department‟s previous mandate, weighted heavily towards 
forest management (Figure 6.1). I say previous because since 1997 
restructuring the department‟s emphasis has shifted towards provision of 
extension services.  
 
Figure 6.1: Forest Managers‟ Field of Specialization. 
 
 
Currently, for each manager‟s position, the incumbent has a 
higher qualification than the minimum required.  In other words, FD has 
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personnel that is well schooled in their professional field but lack the 
skills to lead. It is this lack of managerial acumen, not technical 
competence, which is a problem. Consequently, the quality of output 
from these technical staff does not reflect their professional competence.  
A person who has mastered a set of skills or trade will have the 
ability to solve the problems and can be trusted to provide the right 
answer to those problems.516 In other words, a trained person can bring 
an enormous difference to an organization because of their technical 
knowledge on a matter. And of course what makes the different is how 
and whether one puts those skills to work. Looking at the curriculum for 
forestry training both local and abroad and for all levels of staff, the 
department has skills to provide technical expertise in forestry planning, 
management and research. What is needed is to harness these skills. In 
this case, therefore, the challenge is to find that leadership. For this 
reason, anybody wanting to improve FD‟s performance should not waste 
resources on improving technical knowledge per se but should focus on 
managerial and political skills, including the skills to analyze public 
policy.  
 
Misalignment of the Department’s Functions 
A comparison of the organizational structure of the Forestry 
Department before and after 1997 has helped us appreciate how the 
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department operated then and now. All along the primary function of the 
department has been forest protection and this mission and vision 
permeated throughout the organization down to the district level. The 
headquarters, home of the chief executive and departmental heads, took 
its rightful position as a policy guidance conduit to Provincial Heads and 
later to district offices. This arrangement was also duplicated in 
specialized divisions such as Forest Research, Beekeeping and the 
Industrial Plantations Divisions. Note that among these three specialized 
divisions only Beekeeping had district offices dotted around the country, 
the other two did not have much representation in the districts as the 
structure was more centralized. Forest research depended on Provincial 
and District Heads. 
With a shift of emphasis from forest management to forest 
extension so came another challenge. First, the majority of personnel 
spread out in the provinces are trained in forest management not forest 
extension. Second, because forest extension was a support field to other 
sections of the department training emphasis was placed on the other 
fields. Therefore, the biggest down side of this strategic realignment is 
that it has literally translated into staff misplacement. People are holding 
positions for which they are ill-trained. 
 Among the people surveyed, 47% had experience in forest 
management while only 26% did some forest extension work. In terms of 
training, 40% were trained in forest management, 20% in forest 
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extension and 10% in forest research. Such an imbalance in technical 
training and experience should not be ignored, people do well in what 
they have been trained for. In short, this may explain, to some extent, 
why the department is at a standstill.  
 
Table 6.1: Field of Specialization and Experience. 
 
Field of Specialization Response Rate (%) 
Forest Management 40 
Forest Extension 20 
Forest Research 10 
Apiculture (Beekeeping) 6 
Agricultural Extension 8 
Agro-forestry 2 
Natural Resource Management 3 
Human Resource Management 5 
Other 6 
  
Field Experience  
Forest Management 47 
Forest Extension 26 
Forest Research 4 
Beekeeping 13 
Other 10 
 
 
Following the new National Forestry Policy of 2000, it is 
understandable that the realignment of the department‟s mission is 
geared towards embracing local communities through joint forest 
management (JFM) approaches. However, the way JFM is portrayed is 
not clear at all, even among forest managers themselves. For some it 
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means cultivating public-private partnerships to manage these forest 
resources. For others it means FD will be releasing its forest 
management responsibilities to the resource users and simply become a 
facilitator by providing extension services. This is already problematic. If 
the managers do not know what they will be implementing it raises 
concerns about its success. Probably the same dilemma exists on the 
other side that will be courted to enter into this arrangement. FD needs 
to spell out clearly what JFM will entail. As one scholar at the University 
of Zambia put it,  
“it‟s all well and good to advocate for and embrace joint forest 
management. But don‟t you think government is passing the back 
here? How can it surrender the forests to the local communities 
after destroying the structures and mechanisms through which 
these people managed those resources? ….The way I see it, it 
would be honorable for government to simply say we have failed 
please take over, rather than hide in fancy concepts like JFM.”517  
 
To a certain extent this pretty much sums up the general feeling 
even among forestry staff too who do not know what role they will play 
under JFM arrangements. Will it be hands off and let the people decide 
the fate of their forests? Or will FD still be in the driving seat but simply 
ask the people to participate? Currently, the law does not specify how 
this arrangement will work. It appears only time will tell.  
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Management Style and Strategic Planning 
Any organization, be it private, pubic or indeed not-for-profit needs 
a leader and a plan to achieve its objectives. Strategic planning is a pre-
requisite to organizational performance. It is so critical to the 
organization that its absence reflects the quality of management. Miller 
(1998) insists that organizational leadership (the soft issues) is the 
foundation on which successful institutions are built. He further argues 
that most employees would significantly improve productivity if they were 
better managed, and the result would not only be better financial 
performance but also would meet most of the items on the score-card.518  
Various management and organizational experts agree that a „high 
performance organization‟ does not happen by chance, but something 
that management makes a deliberate effort to design, one that will 
motivate people to produce results that will sustain the organization. The 
emphasis is on man-management or „intellectual capital‟. According to 
them characteristics of high performing organizations include: 
availability of strategic planning, vision, employee involvement in 
decision making processes and good compensation. Peter Drucker (1998) 
also agrees saying it is the responsibility of management to educate their 
subordinates about the goals and directions of the organization.519 Only 
then is it possible to cultivate team work and a sense of collective 
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  Alex Miller, Strategic Management (Irwin McGraw-Hill, New York; New York), 1998:23-24 
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  Peter Drucker, Managing Challenges for the 21
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 Century (Harper Collins, New York), 1998:20. 
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purpose.  Given what is going in our case study this is clearly an area of 
concern.  
The problem starts at excluding some managers as part of the 
management team. They are not involved in the core activities over which 
they bear total responsibility in terms of policy/program implementation. 
While one would expect that all the managers to be involved in planning 
and all technical staff to know about existence of the department‟s 
strategic plan since this is a document that they are supposed to 
implement in their respective sections, sadly most of the managers had 
no idea if such a document exists. For example, 58% of the managers 
surveyed don‟t know if the department has any plans; 51% said they are 
not involved in any form of planning, while 36% are involved sometimes. 
When asked differently about who develops the work plans? An 
interesting scenario unfolds: 5% think the Planning and Information 
Department (PID), a sister department to FD within the same Ministry, 
does this on behalf of FD, 10% thought the Director and the two Chiefs 
at FD headquarters (Forest Extension and Forest Research) do this job, 
36% think it is all the senior staff in the department (including personnel 
from the provinces), while an overwhelming 49% said they do not know! 
And as someone scribbled, “I don‟t know and I don‟t care”.520  
When asked whether FD had any work plans that field staff could 
use to guide their field operations, there was a 50-50 split between those 
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who knew and those who did not. But they were also quick to point out 
that these plans, if they exist, are not implemented at all due to various 
problems ranging from lack of resources to facilitate action to total 
ignorance among these forest managers. They have no idea about what 
they are supposed to do annually or in the long term.  
In forest management it is a standard practice to have a work plan. 
This is a document that details what needs to be done in each forest 
estate. The absence of work plans in FD is responsible for lack of 
coordination and by extension low morale in the workforce, now resulting 
in the unwillingness to enforce forestry code of conduct. Workers become 
motivated to implement a plan they know something about, especially 
one they have helped to develop. When staff participate in planning it 
gives them a sense of ownership of the process and the ensuring plans. 
Miller (1998) advices that lack of involvement by people close to the 
problem areas increases friction between executives and the rest of the 
people who are supposed to implement strategies to solve such 
problems.521 It is evident from our case study that because some 
managers in the FD are not involvement in planning, they lack the 
knowledge and experience in this critical area of management. As a 
result they don‟t understand the direction and aims of the department. 
Since they don‟t know where they are going, any road is leading 
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anywhere. This lack of strategic planning has provided a fertile ground 
for crisis management in the FD.   
With over 7.5 million hectares of PFAs522 to manage as FD claims, 
and given the different types of forests to be managed,523 forest planning 
is a tool that needs no further advocacy. Not only does alienating some 
managers in the planning process (who by the way are the policy 
implementers) demoralize them, it also creates a fertile ground for 
belligerence. And this is where good leadership comes in. The department 
needs to harness the technical capacities of its staff through 
participatory planning and through that provide visionary leadership. 
Good management and visionary leadership are so critical to any 
organization that if and when they are absent, one can expect organized 
chaos! Conversely, sound management practices yield high performance 
organizations.  
  For the most part, senior managers at FD headquarters have 
tended to be reactive in dealing with challenges and opportunities that 
have arisen. There is over-reliance on crisis management or damage 
control type of management. This kind of management style has not only 
robbed FD of its best chances to capture wide opportunities out here but 
has clearly made the department more reactive instead of being pro-
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active. Management style, as a part of organizational culture, is critical to 
the success of the organization. Employing best practices in 
management, whether in business, public or non-profit, is critical to the 
survival of an organization. Managers are supposed to develop key 
performance indicators (KPIs) to measure the direction the organization 
is going and to create and maintain management systems that will 
enhance performance. Furthermore, self-assessment through quarterly 
reviews and planning sessions, prompt and resolute decision-making, 
and ensuring that employees are adequately motivated are three 
important keys to management. It is unlikely that any leadership that 
does not provide these platforms will succeed in managing a successful 
organization.  
The important distinction for successful organizations is not 
sociological or economic in nature or context. Rather it is the leadership 
style that provides direction, creates structure and distributes power. 
Sadly, not a lot of organizations are blessed with this leadership acumen. 
Most organizations are over-managed and under led, which underscores 
the importance of good leadership. As noted earlier in Chapter 2, 
organizational performance will depend on the blend between 
administration, management and leadership. 
Arising from personal interviews, it appears the problem dates 
back to late 1980s and that the situation completely deteriorated in the 
1990s and beyond when there was a total collapse of participatory 
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planning. The staff point out that in spite of forestry being an outdoor 
activity, in comparison to previous administration, senior managers from 
mid 1980s to date, have largely been office-bound, rarely visiting the field 
offices to acquaint themselves with what was on the ground. Previous 
heads of the department (the Chief Conservator of Forests) believed in 
and cultivated teamwork across all sections of the department not only 
through participatory planning but regularly visited the provinces and 
specialized units to appreciate what they were doing and solve whatever 
problems they were encountering. This motivated the staff on the 
ground. But for the “new crop of administrators”, as they were referred 
to, they are reactive to operational problems, and only conduct field visits 
to „put out fires‟ or for personal financial gain – i.e. they undertake field 
trips for purposes of getting subsistence allowances. This obviously is a 
pathetic way of running the department and the staff in the field are 
least amused by it.  
To make matters worse, the Director has developed an affinity for 
clientelism and cronyism. For instance, there is a tendency of assigning 
junior officers (without their immediate supervisors‟ knowledge) the 
responsibilities supposed to be undertaken by senior officers, supposedly 
in exchange for some favors. Naturally, this has been causing friction 
between junior officers and their supervisors who cannot wait to exercise 
their powers over the former. And since junior officers cannot instruct 
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their supervisors what to do, whatever they have been assigned hardly 
gets done!  
In conclusion, any credible manager interested in positive and 
progressive results would agree that this is not the best management 
style! The question is: how can FD expect its officers to function 
effectively if: 1) they are not involved in the planning process? 2) They do 
not know what programs they are supposed to implement, let alone why? 
And 3) They do not receive feedback on their performance because even 
during the evaluation process these people are not included? This a 
challenge FD ought to address immediately. 
 
Decision Making Process and Staff Motivation 
The decision making process came out as being an exclusively 
closed door affair. According to the survey results, although 
„management meetings‟ are held occasionally, they are for window 
dressing only. The Director of Forestry wields so much power there is no 
collective decision making although collective responsibility is expected 
from the management team. In most cases, the Director makes unilateral 
decisions affecting the general workforce, usually outside the scope of the 
existing regulations and, without any consideration to the repercussions. 
This corruption of power (defined as the abuse of power for personal 
gain), which is meant to intimidate forestry personnel into submission to 
the Director‟s wishes, has set the department on a wrong part.  
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For instance, in recent years, staff transfers are so frequent – some 
people have moved twice in a year – there is hardly time to even start 
developing their strategies. Worse still some people are transferred to 
[better] places where they cannot function because their skills sets do 
not match the functions of that office. Forest employees are so de-
motivated they have no reason to work except wait for their pay checks. 
And yes, they can also see the benefits of favoritism and consequences of 
decent objective views. As a result, this has enhanced „boot licking,‟ and 
cronyism. Although not an accepted standard, this practice is well 
documented as a vehicle through which some people push their way up 
the professional career ladder. Because there is a perceived benefit 
accruing to both the junior officers being favored and the senior officer 
expecting a return favor, slowly the clientelism524 is becoming 
entrenched.   
As a person in a position of power, the Director is known to apply 
sanctions to those outside the circle and has withdrawn benefits from 
people with dissenting views; instituted unnecessary transfers, and only 
offers scholarships to cronies. Personal relationships or the lack of it 
between the Director and other managers has clouded the performance 
of the FD.  
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People are fearful of offering any constructive criticism because as 
long as the idea does not please the director it is construed as being 
personally against the incumbent. Hence, good ideas are not offered or 
have not been used for fear of retribution. In other words, the 
department actually does not lack the capacity to deliver, the capacity is 
available but it is latent. This oppression of talent has manifested itself in 
poor performance. On the other hand, those in good relationship with the 
Director have been favored for training, performance evaluation and 
other fringe benefits. But because such relationships are typically for 
manipulative reasons, the duration has normally been short term, which 
adds to the frustration when one falls out of favor and suffers the 
consequences. Unlike, in the case of the Thai Highway Police where the 
patron-client relationship last for a life time, the FD version is a revolving 
door system in which those fall from grace (with the Director) are almost 
immediately replaced by others.  
According to the respondents, the department cannot increase its 
performance in its present form. It requires a major surgery to re-
energize the motionless technical capacity. Maybe the long-awaited 
transformation of the department into a Forest Commission will bring in 
fresh blood and ideas that would invigorate the workforce once again! For 
now, poor leadership and personnel morale are two challenges the 
department must address.  
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Communication and Transport 
  In addition to lack of planning, communication and transportation 
infrastructure are a real challenge to the department. As an entity whose 
offices are represented in over 54 districts across the country, and most 
of them in very remote places the absence of communication facilities is 
not a matter that can simply be glossed over. If the department is slow in 
responding to certain issues, part of it is due to lack of communication 
facilities, which impede real time responses. But, notwithstanding this 
challenge, the executive has also created another layer of problem by not 
preserving the chain of command, the span of control and the channel of 
communication. As mentioned earlier because of patronage (favoritism 
and victimization) certain information, even of an operational nature is 
not shared with all the employees. It is not uncommon for the Director to 
by-pass the head of a section to directly assign junior officers duties 
typically supposed to be undertaken by their supervisors, thus 
undermining the authority of the latter. As a result, this has been 
creating friction between heads of sections or provinces and their juniors.  
In certain cases promotions and demotions have been done 
without following the right procedures. For instance, in some provinces 
there were two people for the position of a Provincial Extension Officer 
position instead of one that the organization structure allows. This arose 
because the Director appointed new people to those positions without 
Cabinet Office approval to do so. According to government regulations 
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only Cabinet Office has the mandate to promote or demote someone at 
that level. The Director can only recommend, which was not done. 
As if the communication challenge is not enough, FD also suffers 
from lack of transport. A quick survey revealed that on average there was 
one working vehicle per province, typically stationed at the provincial 
office.   
  As result, foresters are hardly in the field where their services are 
required, and therefore over de-forestation, irregular reporting about the 
activities in the forest under uncollected revenue. Although attributed to 
SAP, which facilitated reduction of government funding to the 
department, this problem is largely due to the lack of managerial 
capacity to anticipate the impact of such policies and failure to formulate 
mitigation strategies. How have other agencies excelled yet they also 
operated under the same environment? It was difficult to get a sense of 
why the department has not popularized motor cycles (and even bicycles) 
to enable its staff get out more often in the field. This is an area that 
requires further research.  
 
Revenue Collection Mechanism  
Seemingly as an offshoot of poor management, revenue collection 
is still an area of concern. Due to lack of physical presence in the field 
there been an increase in illegal logging, agricultural activities and 
settlements in natural forests. These un-supervised operations have not 
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only robbed the department of revenue, but also heightened corruption 
in the issuance of licenses. For instance, it has been estimated that the 
department is collecting no more than 20% of revenue, mainly because 
the department is relying on self-reporting by resource users.  
At a different level the problem also relates to the value attached to 
the forest resources. In particular, logging companies have taken 
advantage of poor management and pay a minimal fee to harvest timber 
in perpetuity. Even for high value timber like Teak (Mukusi) which 
fetches no less than $500 per cubic meter on the international market, 
the loggers buy for as low as $75 per cubic meter, representing only 15% 
of the value. As Fynn (2004)525 and others526 before then have 
recommended, revamping the revenue system and valuing the forest 
resources correctly is an issue that cannot be over-emphasized.  
 
The Public Sector Reform Program  
Organizations are created for a particular purpose: to produce and 
deliver goods or services to meet the expectations of their clients. In order 
to remain viable an organization needs to respond to the changing 
business needs of the enterprise and the environment in which it 
operates. Typically its structure would reflect areas of specialization and 
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implicitly the services to be provided.527 Prior to 1997 restructuring, FD‟s 
structure was built on this principle, and the inter-dependence of its 
various units called for cooperation and helped in capacity being built 
over time.  
In particular, staff rotation afforded the opportunity to gain 
experience and knowledge from other forest areas and operations of the 
department that has since been lost through restructuring. As Chandler 
explains, change needs to be well planned. “Strategic growth results from 
the awareness of opportunities and needs...” because a new structure 
“requires a new or at least a re-fashioned structure if the enlarged 
enterprise is to be operated efficiently.”528 Unless strategy shapes the 
structure inefficiency would be the end result. This is so true for FD‟s 
new structure which was not influenced by opportunities or strategy but 
by external forces that forced the government to adhere to SAP 
prescriptions.  
Government bureaus hardly had any control over the process of 
the PSRP. As one senior official at Cabinet Office put it, “Government 
restructuring is a process we had no control over because we had only 
one option: to do it. ….We were just told [by the World Bank] to reduce 
government size or face consequences of losing our privileges to access 
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their loans. ….with our national budget deeply dependent on World Bank 
loans, there was no other option but to abide.”529  
This development has created a few complications for Forestry 
Department. First, the department has suffered from an abrupt loss of 
institutional memory. The process dissipated the department‟s highly 
experienced and qualified staff who were given early retirement. Second, 
because of the abrupt manner in which the PSRP was implemented the 
inexperienced staff found themselves in a vacuum with no one to mentor 
them, having just suddenly lost the professional memory of the 
department.  
Also the atmosphere during the re-structuring of the department 
did not leave much time for operational transitioning. Animosity and 
frustration characterized those that were leaving while excitement, hope 
and fear engulfed those that remained. In the process, those retired had 
no motivation to hand-over operational briefs. For new hires from outside 
forestry circles, this was quite a daunting experience – they literally had 
to start from nowhere.  
As a first bureau to undergo this exercise, uncertainty and low 
morale bred disillusion. It was sad to see that sometimes “change is 
painful”530. There is a deep sense of frustration within the department 
arising from the fact that the department lost its best employees just 
because they had no political connections. In particular, some 
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respondents bemoaned the fact that the department was short-changed 
at director level where there were more and better qualified personnel 
than the incumbent. 
The proposal to transform FD into a new entity, the Forest 
Commission, has not only cast new strategic demands and operational 
issues for the department to consider, but at individual level this has re-
activated fears, anxiety and job insecurity. Again forestry employees have 
to go through the process of adjustment and healing. Whether well 
planned or not, organizational change gives rise to instability, upheaval 
and uncertainty. It brings about new bosses, and increases different 
stakes of office politics. “The redistribution of power shakes the informal 
organization. Anxiety warps individual behavior.”531  And this is exactly 
what is happening in FD. Although looking forward to the new 
organization, there is general discontentment that it is taking too long. 
Consequently, that is affecting their morale and professional 
development plans. Some think senior management is delaying the 
process for fear of losing jobs, control and power. But others are 
optimistic that the new organization will bring about professionalism, 
generate and allocate more resources to forest management, increase 
their capacity, improve communication, as well as reach out to other 
stakeholders.  
                                                 
531
 Nadler, Champions of Change, 1998:91 
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In change management, cosmetic changes rarely bring a major 
impact on an organization. For a full impact, it is necessary to address 
multiple related components of the organization. In the case of FD, 
changing the top management my not necessarily result in the „magic 
bullet‟ if the conditions of service, work culture, or even staff attitudes 
are not addressed.  
What is required, therefore, is a major surgery, an overhaul of the 
entire organization that will address the systems and work culture. 
Although Miller (1998) suggests that when senior management is 
dissatisfied with the present, they initiate change.532 In the case of FD, 
the desire for institutional change is stronger in middle management and 
lower positions, i.e. staff who are frustrated with the current 
management style and lack of resources to perform their duties. In terms 
of company politics, if such a change were to be granted, there is fertile 
ground for its success. Employees are ready for it, and may quite 
possibly embrace.  
The PSRP, the most recent organizational change experienced by 
forestry staff, lacked support at the micro level because it was initiated 
and implemented by the central government, not FD. As Miller (1998) 
points out even though initiators of organizational change may remain 
committed to it, the success of any change strategy remains with the 
handlers of implementation (the people that are involved in the day-to-
                                                 
532
  Miller, Strategic Management, 1998:317:322 
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day operations of the company).533 In this case, neither the handlers nor 
the politicians were committed to the new structure, and that is why that 
change created a frustrated labor force, manifested in their inertia. And 
due to lack of other resources, FD has office foresters instead of forest 
officers (being office bound instead of being in the field to supervise forest 
operations). Therefore, the challenge is: is FD ready for another make 
over? 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Although there is so much damage to the forests, not all is 
completely lost. There is a possibility to redeem this situation if the 
department can take a major surgery of realigning its management style 
rather than a band aid strategy. Power to administer the department 
must be shared across the ranks. It ought to diffuse away from the 
Director to give every employee a sense of belonging and responsibility 
both over the failures and successes of the department. Although public 
employees are rarely blamed and, or punished as individuals for failures 
of their organizations there is room to implement this through annual 
reviews that should monitor and identify each employee‟s contribution to 
the department‟s goals, and tie this to whether that employee deserves to 
receive the annual benefits. There are several opportunities for the 
department to get back on track.  
                                                 
533
 Miller, Strategic Management, 1998:317:322 
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1.0 Harness the existing but apparently inert technical capital in 
the department and make it productive.  
2.0 Develop private-public partnerships for forest management by 
having the private sector to underwrite certain programs. This 
has been done before and it worked fairly well. 
3.0 Institute necessary legal provisions that will support a 
pragmatic and vigorous implementation of JFM strategy.  
4.0 Commercialization of the department (e.g. into a Forest 
Commission) will provide accountability and increase 
performance. 
5.0 Tap into the international goodwill to help with other technical 
challenges such as forest inventory where the department has 
no financial capacity to undertake. 
6.0 The global interest in environmental management and bio-
diversity conservation is an opportunity the department 
should fully embrace and utilize. 
 
International Conventions and Treaties  
From a global perspective, the heightened interest and realization 
of the dangers associated with environmental damage,534 also helped to 
bring the importance of forests to the fore. The global debate initiated at 
                                                 
534
  Refer to the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden, June 20-26, 1972 
that helped push environmental concerns to the world arena.  An online Conference declaration can be 
accessed from UNEP at:  
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentID=97&ArticleID=1503  
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the 1972 Stockholm Conference that urged governments to manage the 
human environment in a manner that provides for the present without 
compromising benefits for future generations made the Zambian 
government pay special attention to not only forests but to natural 
resource conservation in general. The development of a National 
Conservation Strategy (NCS), which developed what is considered as the 
first broad-based policy on the environment, is a case in point. Prior to 
this there were only stand-alone sector policies. But the NCS 
promulgated a holistic view and in a way set the agenda for later 
collaborative works among sectors that deal with natural resources.  
However, this global commitment is one large opportunity that FD 
has not fully exploited. There is a lot that can be achieved in FD 
partnered with other local and international organizations committed to 
environmental management.  
International obligations found under various Treaties and 
Conventions to which the government of Zambia is a Party have generally 
helped in the country‟s conservation efforts. This is a positive 
development, one that needs to be strengthened. With financial help 
through some of these agreements (e.g. the Convention on Biodiversity 
Conservation, Climate Change, etc.), FD can undertake some activities 
that government may not have the capacity to finance. As the world has 
come to appreciate, environmental problems have no respect for national 
boundaries.  Therefore, FD should live up to its mandate of managing its 
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estates in a way that the present generation does not outstrip the 
benefits for the next. 
 
Laws and Regulations 
All the issues discussed above can be summed up under one 
heading: national statutes on forestry. One of the things the foregoing 
discussion has done is to highlight the fact that while much of the 
challenges the department faces are managerial in context, it also 
underscores the idea that simply making some changes to the prevailing 
statutes on forestry could help ameliorate most of the problems. But this 
is only possible if the forest managers are able to identify where the 
problems lie and to develop the strategies so that appropriate 
interventions could be implemented. And since law making is a political 
contest, these forest managers will require sound political skills and 
tenacity to attract supporters and build alliances across a broad 
spectrum of society. In its current disposition the department is far out 
of range. Foresters need to get out of the forests and start talking to the 
politicians.  
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
1.0 There is need to undertake a thorough human resource needs 
and skills mix assessment. As this research has found out not 
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every forester can be a good manager. A change at Director level 
is certainly inevitable. 
2.0 Developing short and long term strategies to chat a new course 
of action for the department must be a mandatory output 
requiring the participation of all managers, not just a select few. 
3.0 Revisit the licensing mechanisms to ensure revenue is captured 
in a transparency and accountable fashion.  
4.0 Design a benefit-sharing model with District Councils and local 
Chiefs so that these too share the benefit(s) of managing local 
forests. At the moment all revenue goes to central government. 
5.0 Harmonize the roles of other natural resources management 
entities like ZAWA, Departments of Energy, Agriculture and 
Lands to develop a comprehensive plan for the management of 
bio-diversity. 
6.0 Integrate forest-based industries in the national planning 
portfolio as an alternative avenue for job creation and source of 
livelihood. 
7.0 Develop specific strategies to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). In other words, interpret and relate 
the department‟s activities to the MDGs.  
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Conclusion 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates FD has indeed undergone 
some major metamorphosis – both in its structure and emphasis in its 
functions. The growth in its estates stands out as one area of success. 
But their decline also speaks volumes in how the department‟s 
leadership changed from professional excellence to mediocrity. Indeed, 
external factors such as policy shifts and population growth placed a 
different set of responsibility on the FD, both of which needed better 
equipped and visionary staff to deal with these challenges and translate 
them into opportunities. Sadly, the department is yet to find its feet and 
be as effective again.  
Forest [mis]management in Zambia is clearly having its toll on the 
local communities who are heavily dependent on these resources. 
Though no direct effects have been quantified, indirectly the connection 
between environmental damage, poverty, and disease and the resultant 
vicious circle of problems this yields and sustains is well understood. 
Therefore, when people try to migrate from these vices of land 
degradation, disease, and poverty, in search of better economic 
opportunities, usually that movement tends to create conflict over access 
rights in the new area(s).  
For instance, one of the underlying causes to the conflict in Darfur, 
Sudan is precisely land degradation, which made different ethnic groups 
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to start fighting over land that could sustain their livelihood.535 Zambia 
has a choice to avoid this from arising by taking care of its land now. 
And because environmental problems extend beyond national 
boundaries, any such problems could affect other people thousands of 
miles away. For instance, when conflict and possibly wars break out, the 
global community is drawn in and pays the price in one way or another. 
Worse still most of these effects will only be known long after the forests 
are gone. This is where our concern arises. What should be done to halt 
forest degradation in Zambian? The short answer is that there is need to 
build institutional capacity in FD, particularly managerial competence. 
As this study has shown, managerial capacity matters. And it matters for 
at least two reasons: first, it is what enforces the rules and second, it 
affects and influences the outcomes! 
 
 
                                                 
535
  For a detailed treatment of this issue, see Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Ghadiagala, Sudan: The Elusive Quest 
for Peace, (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO.), 2006.  
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Zambia National Forest Policy, 1965
536
 
 
1. To carry out in each district forest surveys to determine the forest 
resources for each district, the forest areas needed to be managed 
for land protection and for local and industrial supplies of forest 
produce, and the forest plantations which are needed, so that the 
forest estate required can be put under Government control. 
 
2. To carry out all necessary research work on the ecology, protection, 
management, and restocking of indigenous forest areas; on the 
establishment, protection and management of plantations and on 
the protective role of forests. 
 
3. To carry out all necessary research on the exploitation of indigenous 
and plantation timbers, on the properties, seasoning, saw-milling, 
preservation and working qualities of these timbers, and, in co-
operation with other interested organisations, to carry out necessary 
research and development work on timber engineering and on 
supplies for wood-based industries. 
 
4. To provide tree seed for the Republic‟s plantations by the 
establishment of seed stands and seed orchards, and by collection 
and purchase. 
 
5. To place under government control sufficient forest areas in each 
district to supply the forest produce required for people‟s homes, 
farms and local industries, and to provide for the proper 
management of these forest areas. 
                                                 
536
  This is an abbreviated version, and can be found in any Forestry Department Annual Report. 
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6. To place under government control land for forest plantations needed 
to provide forest produce for people‟s homes, farms and local 
industries in districts where indigenous forest areas are unable to 
meet local needs, and to establish and manage these plantations. 
 
7. To place under government control and to manage those forest areas 
needed to supply the Republic‟s industries with their requirements 
of timber and, where possible, to supply timber for export. 
 
8. To place under government control land for forest plantations needed 
to supply the Republic‟s industries with their requirements of 
timber, and to establish and manage these plantations. 
 
9. To make arrangements for the cutting and marketing of indigenous 
and plantation timber. 
 
10. To supply indigenous and plantation timber for industrial and local 
needs at an economic price. 
 
11. To place under government control, and to manage forest areas 
needed for protect the land against floods, erosion and desiccation 
and to maintain the flow of rivers. 
 
12. To integrate the Republic‟s forest areas and plantation in a wise 
system of land use, and to co-operate with other organisations in the 
development and protection of the Republic‟s natural resources. 
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13. To provide an extension service in bee-keeping and in the production 
of beeswax and honey based on research and development work on 
bee-keeping under Zambian conditions. 
 
14. To advise and encourage local authorities, interested organisations 
and private persons in the practice of sound forestry. 
 
15. To spread among the people of Zambia an understanding of forestry. 
 
16. To provide opportunities for technical training for those engaged in 
forest work. 
 
 
United National Independence Party Forestry Policy, 1974-1984.537 
 
In accordance with the policy of industrialization, the Party will work for 
self-sufficiency in timber and forestry products. To this end, the Party 
will: 
 
1. Take more effective measures in forest and fauna conservation by the 
reinforcement of the existing measures against indiscriminate 
cutting of trees and burning of forests; 
 
2. Take measures to control charcoal burning and the chitemene system; 
 
3. Encourage the replanting of new forests to meet Zambia‟s 
requirements of timber and forestry products, using labour intensive 
methods to the largest extent possible; and 
 
                                                 
537
  These UNIP policy statements were included for the first time in the Forestry Department Annual 
Report for 1976 as part of government policy on forestry (see FD, 1980:16). 
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4. Establish local industries for the manufacture and processing of 
timber and forestry products to increase employment for the local 
populations. 
 
 
Source: FD Annual Report, 1986  
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 1 
PERSONAL OPINION QUESTIONAIRE 
 
Part I:  Respondent’s Service History 
 
1. How long have you worked for the Forestry Department? 
  □  Less than 5 years  □  16-25 years 
 □  5-15years   □  Over 25 years 
  
2. Which sections of the department have you worked in and for how long?  
(Please check all that applies). 
 Forest Management         Period (in Years) 
 a)  Forestry Dept. Headquarters    __________________ 
 b)  Provincial HQ      __________________ 
 c)  Districts       __________________ 
 Forest Extension       __________________ 
 a)  Forestry Dept. Headquarters    __________________ 
 b)  Provincial HQ      __________________ 
 c)  Districts       __________________ 
 
 Forest Research       __________________ 
 a)  Forest Research Headquarters    __________________ 
 b)  Silviculture and Tree Genetics    __________________ 
 c)  Seed Store       __________________ 
 Forest Products Research 
 a)  Major Forest Products     __________________ 
 b)  Minor Forest Products     __________________ 
 c)  Utilization       __________________ 
 Beekeeping       __________________ 
 a)  Extension       __________________ 
 b)  Production       __________________ 
 Zambia Forestry College      __________________ 
 Other (Please Specify) ________________________ __________________ 
Questionnaire     APPENDIX  2 
 2 
3. What positions have you held since you joined the department? 
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
 
4. What is your current position?       _________________________________________ 
 
5. What are your current responsibilities? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Which division of the department are you working in now? 
 Forest Management   □ Forest Products Research 
 Extension    □ Beekeeping 
 Forest Research   □ Other (please specify) _________________ 
 
7.  How many people do you supervise; those that directly report to you?  
 1-5  
 6-15 
 16-30 
 Over 30 people 
 
8. What educational training level have you attained? (Check only the highest attained). 
 Ph.D. 
 M.Phil. 
 Master‟s Degree 
 Graduate Certificate 
 Bachelor‟s Degree 
 Forestry Diploma 
 Forestry Certificate 
 Other (Please specify)    ______________________________________________ 
 
9. What is your field of specialization?   ______________________________________ 
 
Questionnaire     APPENDIX  2 
CP 3 
10. Gender of Respondent? 
□  Male  □  Female 
 
11. Your age group (Please select one that applies). 
 Less than 20 years 
 20-29 years 
 30-39 years 
 40-49 years 
 50 and above 
 
Part II:  The Structural Adjustment Program. 
 
1. Do you know anything about the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
2. When was the SAP introduced in Zambia? 
 1973 
 1983 
 1985 
 Sometime in the 1990s 
 I don‟t know 
 
3. Why did the Zambian govt. decide to implement SAP? What was the program 
supposed to achieve?  (check only 3 that apply). 
 Deal with inflation problems. 
 Sell (privatize) parastatal companies. 
 Reduce size of government through employee lay offs. 
 Become more accountable on public finance management.   
 Develop other sectors in addition to copper mining.  
 Promote private investment in non-copper producing sectors. 
 Increase exports from agriculture, forestry, and tourism. 
 Liberalize the domestic market by removing govt. controls on trade and 
commerce. 
 Other (p/se specify)  _________________________________________________ 
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4. What are the three sectors the Zambian government selected as primary targets to 
implement the SAP?   
 Health 
 Education 
 Labor 
 Mining 
 Agriculture 
 Forestry 
 Tourism 
 Financial institutions (e.g. Bank of Zambia) 
 All of the above 
 Other (p/se specify)    ________________________________________________ 
5. Was the Forestry Department supposed to implement the SAP? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
 I don‟t know 
 
6. In your opinion, has Forestry Department implemented the SAP? 
 Yes 
 No 
 I don‟t know 
 
 
6.1   If yes, how has the department implemented the SAP?  
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
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6.2 If “no”, why do you think so?  
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Does the department have plans/strategies to implement the SAP? 
□ Yes   
□  No   
□  I don‟t know 
 
7.1 If yes, what goals / outcomes are these plans supposed to achieve? (list as many as 
you know). 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
 
7.2 If no, why do you think so? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8. What is the status on the department‟s achievement of the SAP goals you just 
mentioned in your previous response?  (list all that you mentioned). 
 
 Goal       Status (please check one) 
_______________________________________________  □  fully achieved 
         □  partially achieved 
         □  not achieved 
         □  not implemented 
 
_______________________________________________  □  fully achieved 
         □  partially achieved 
         □  not achieved 
         □  not implemented 
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_______________________________________________  □  fully achieved 
         □  partially achieved 
         □  not achieved 
         □  not implemented 
 
_______________________________________________  □  fully achieved 
         □  partially achieved 
         □  not achieved 
         □  not implemented 
 
_______________________________________________  □  fully achieved 
         □  partially achieved 
         □  not achieved 
         □  not implemented 
 
_______________________________________________  □  fully achieved 
         □  partially achieved 
         □  not achieved 
         □  not implemented 
_______________________________________________  □  fully achieved 
         □  partially achieved 
         □  not achieved 
         □  not implemented 
 
9.1 When you compare the department‟s performance before and during the SAP, 
how did the department perform before the structural adjustment period? 
 Better 
 Worse 
 No difference 
 I don‟t know 
 
Why do you think so?   
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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9.2 How has the department performed during the structural adjustment period? 
 
 Better 
 Worse 
 No difference 
 I don‟t know 
 
Why do you think so?   
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Is there anything that should be done to improve the situation? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 I don‟t know 
 
11.  What exactly should be done to improve the department‟s performance? 
 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
12. How is the status of the forest resources now compared to the period before the 
SAP?   
 
 Better 
 Worse (degraded and over-exploited) 
 About the same (no difference) 
 I don‟t know 
 
(Please explain why you think so). 
 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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13.1  How were the working relationships between the department and forest resource 
users before the SAP?  
 Better 
 Worse 
 No difference 
 I don‟t know 
 
(Explain why you think so). 
 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
13.2 How are the working relationships now between the department and forest resource 
users after the SAP?   
 Better 
 Worse 
 No difference 
 I don‟t know 
 
(Explain why you think so). 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Which groups are involved in developing the Forestry Policy in Zambia? 
 Timber producers 
 Local communities living around the forests 
 Traditional leaders (Chiefs) 
 Government bureaucrats 
 Politicians 
 NGOs dealing with environmental issues 
 Charcoal producers 
 Beekeepers 
 Other (p/se specify)  _________________________________________________ 
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15. Starting with “1” as the most influential group, rank the groups you just identified in 
the previous question to indicate their influence on forestry policy. 
 
 Timber producers 
 Local communities living around the forests 
 Traditional leaders (Chiefs) 
 Government bureaucrats 
 Politicians 
 NGOs dealing with environmental issues 
 Charcoal producers 
 Beekeepers 
 Other (p/se specify)  ___________________________________________ 
 
16.1  How were the working relationships between the department and the policy makers 
before SAP?   
□ Very Good   
□  Fair    
□  No difference 
□  Poor   
□  I don‟t know   
 
Why you think so? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16.2 How were the working relationships between the department and the policy makers 
after SAP?   
□ Very Good   
□  Fair     
□  No difference  
□  Poor  
□  I don‟t know   
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 Why you think so? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
17. Comparing the time before and after SAP, would you say the department now has:  
□  more resources 
□  fewer resources  
□  about the same 
□  I don‟t know 
  
 
(Please list the resources you have in 
mind). 
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
18. Does the station where you are working now have enough of these resources? 
□ Yes   
□  No   
□  I don‟t know 
 
19.1 Which of these resources do you think the department needs more of in order to 
improve its performance? 
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
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19.2 Which resources do you think the department should reduce in order to improve its 
performance? 
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
 
20.  Do forestry staff carry out their field operations as scheduled all year round? 
□ Yes   
□  No   
□  Not sure    
□  I don‟t know 
 
(Give reasons for your response). 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. In comparison with agriculture and tourism sectors, what would you say about the 
support that Forestry Dept. receives from policy makers and politicians for having its 
programs financed? 
 Always receives 1
st
 priority). 
 Always receives lowest priority). 
 Falls somewhere in between. 
 I don‟t know 
 
 
Part III: Administrative Practices 
 
1. Does the Forestry Department have a mission statement? 
 Yes  □  No  □  I don‟t know 
(If you checked “No” or “I don‟t know,” skip the next question). 
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2. What is the department‟s mission statement? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________ 
3. Does the department set strategic goals? 
□ Yes   
□  No   
□  I don‟t know 
 
4.  What are the department‟s current strategic goals? (List as many as you know). 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Has the department developed the plans to achieve its strategic goals? 
□ Yes  □  No  □  I don‟t know 
 
6. How often does the department develop these plan(s)?  
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 Quarterly 
 Every Six Months 
 Yearly 
 Other (Please specify). _______________________________________________ 
 
7.  Does the department have such plan(s) now? 
□ Yes  □  No  □  I don‟t know 
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8. Which people are involved in developing the department‟s goals and plan(s) to 
achieve its strategic goals? 
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
 
9. Are you involved in the process of developing the department‟s plans and setting 
its goals? 
□ Always   
□  Sometimes    
□  Never  
 
10. How would you rate the process of developing the department‟s plans? 
 Very useful 
 Useful  
 Somehow useful 
 Not useful (waste of time) 
 
11.  Do you know what the department‟s strategic goals are? 
□ Yes   
□  No   
 
12.  Are you aware of your role in achieving the department‟s strategic goals? 
□ Always   
□  Sometimes    
□  Never  
 
13.  Has the department implemented its plans? 
□ Yes   
□  No   
□  I don‟t know 
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13.1 If yes, how? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
13.2  If not, please explain why. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
14.1 Does the department experience any problems implementing its plans? 
□ Yes   
□  No   
□  I don‟t know 
 
14.2 If yes, what are these problems? (list as many as you know). 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
15. How do these problems affect the department‟s performance? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Do you know of any other means that help the department to implement its plans 
and achieve its goals?  
□ Yes   
□  No   
□  I don‟t know 
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16.1 If yes, what are they? 
 
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________ 
 
 
17. Does the department measure / evaluate its performance? 
□ Yes   
□  No   
□  I don‟t know 
 
18. Approximately how often does the department evaluate/measure its performance? 
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 Quarterly 
 Every Six Months 
 Yearly 
 Other (Please specify). _______________________________________________ 
 
19. How does the department evaluate its performance?  
□ Employs consultants to do the work   
□ Convenes meetings for Heads of Divisions 
□ Planning Unit analyzes reports from the Divisions    
□ I don‟t know 
 
20. Are you involved in the process of measuring/evaluating the department‟s 
performance? 
□ Always   
□  Sometimes   
□  Never 
 
21. Does this process need improvement or should it be left as it is? 
□  Need improvement  
□  Leave it as it is  
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□  Scrap it off  
 
22. In your opinion, how can the evaluation process be improved? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
23.  Please write any general comments you may have. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The End. 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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Mr. Obote Shakachite   Chief Extension Officer 
Forestry Department HQ 
(now the Managing Director for ZAFFICO) 
 
Dr. Kenneth Nkhowani  Director 
Natural Resources Dept, MTENR  
 
Mr. Davy Siame   Chief Planner 
Natural Resources Dept, MTENR 
 
Mr. Thomson Musonda  Principal Planner 
     Planning & Information Dept, MTENR 
 
Ms. Chiseche M. Mutale  Chief Planner 
Planning & Information Dept, MTENR 
 
Mr. Lubinda Aongola   Director 
Planning & Information Dept, MTENR 
 
Mr. Jack Mukosha   GIS Specialist 
Forestry Department, NW Province 
     (Temporarily working at FD HQ) 
 
Ms. Elizabeth Ndhlovu  Forest Sector Advisor 
The Finnish Embassy, Lusaka 
 
Ms. Wilma  Viljamaa  Senior Counsellor 
The Finnish Embassy, Lusaka 
 
Mr. Moses Chakanga   Forest Management Specialist, Namibia 
(on short-term consultancy with the Finnish 
Embassy, Lusaka) 
 
Mr. Jose S. Simuyi   Head of Budget Information Systems 
Ministry of Finance & National Planning 
 
Ms. Veronica Mwiiche  Director 
     MDD, Cabinet Office, Lusaka 
 
Mr. Bernard J. Kampansa  Public Policy Specialist   
     PAC, Cabinet Office, Lusaka  
 
Ms. Rilla Hansali   Assistant Director 
     Technical Services, Cabinet Office, Lusaka 
 
Mr. Benjamin Bota   Acting Director 
     Recruitment & Placements, Cabinet Office 
 
Ms. Zeles Zulu   Director 
     Dept. of Local Government Administration  
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Mr. Maxwell Phiri   Coordinator, PFAP 
     Forestry Dept., Lusaka 
 
Mr. Aaron Sugar Banda  Forestry Extension Specialist  
     [Retired] Chief Extension Officer, Ndola 
 
Mr. D.M. Tombo   Principal Extension Officer 
FD, Northern Province 
 
Mr. Kenneth Kambeu   Principal Extension Officer 
FD, Lusaka Province 
 
Mr. B.M. Chomba   Principal Extension Officer 
FD, Central Province 
 
Mr. Charles Taulo   Principal Extension Officer 
     FD, Southern Province 
 
Mr. John Mulombwa   Principal Extension Officer 
FD, Copperbelt Province 
 
Mr. Fanwell Sikasamba  Principal Extension Officer 
FD, North-Western Province 
 
Mr. M.S. Mutemwa   Principal Extension Officer 
     FD, Luapula Province 
 
Mr. Besa Muwele   Senior Statistician, Agric. & Forestry  
Central Statistical Office, Lusaka 
 
Mr. Joseph Tembo   Senior Statistician, External Trade 
Central Statistical Office, Lusaka 
 
Dr. Patrick Phiri   Senior Lecturer, Biology Dept. 
University of Zambia, Lusaka 
(now at Copperbelt University, Kitwe) 
 
Dr. Fred Mutesa   Lecturer, Development Studies 
University of Zambia, Lusaka 
 
Mr. Victor K. Kazembe  Country Representative 
     Plant Resources of Tropical Africa (PROTA) 
(also Chairman, Commonwealth Forest Association 
– Zambia Branch) 
 
Dr. Erick Chisanga   General Manager, ZAFFICO 
(on sabbatical from Copperbelt University) 
 
Mr. Felix Njovu   Lecturer 
Copperbelt University, Kitwe 
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Externally-Funded Forest Sector Investments by Project. 
 
A. Multilateral Projects 
      
PROJECT FINANCIER US$ YEAR 
Industrial Forestry World Bank      34,600,000  1969-1993 
Fuelwood Plantations IDRC           156,000   (1982- ?) 
Food Assistance to Forestry WFP        1,830,000  1984-1990 
Forestry Training Programme IDA        1,500,000  1985-1989 
Wood Energy Consumption Resource Survey UNDP           392,000  1985-1986 
Intra Regional Co-operation in Development of 
Plantation Forest Industry UNDP        3,248,000  1988-1991 
Action Programme to Combat Deforestation UNDP           316,000  1989-1991 
Forestry Industry Investment Promotion FAO           160,000  1994-1995 
Forest Resource Conservation Study EU           336,000  1994-1995 
Zambia Forestry Action Programme  UNDP/Netherlands 893,860 1995-1997 
Forest Support Programme (support to the 
Establishment of ZFC) EU  2002-2004 
Forest Resource Management Project 
DED (German 
Development Services 1,690,000 2002-2008 
Forest Resource Management Project IFAD 12,633,000 2002-2008 
Forest Resource Management Project IRISH AID 123,366 2002-2008 
  Total     57,878,226    
      
      
B. Bilateral Projects 
      
PROJECT FINANCIER US$ YEAR 
Dry Forestry CIDA           130,000  ? (1980-81) 
Chinyunyu Forestry Project NORAD             48,000  ? 1982-  
Forestry Education and Training FINNIDA  1983-1992 
Forestry Education and Training FINNIDA           810,000  1985-1990 
Forest and Forest Products Research FINNIDA           714,000  1985-1989 
Kafubu Sawmill I & II FINNIDA        8,570,000  1985-1992 
Formulation of a Community Forestry Strategy SIDA           500,142  1986-1989 
Soil Conservation and Agroforestry SIDA           508,000  ? 1986- 
Forestry and Sawmill NORAD           788,000  1988-1992 
Improvement and Strengthening of Forestry 
Colleges in the SADC Region FINNIDA      23,051,000  1989-1992 
Kafubu Frame Sawmill FINNIDA        5,692,000  1989-1993 
Forestry Department Training ODA           675,000  1989-1995 
Special Fund for Forestry Sector FINNIDA        5,716,000  1990-1994 
Kafubu Sawmill: Reservation for Harvesting and 
Transport Import FINNIDA        2,860,000  1990-1992 
Production of Agroforestry Manuals (Eastern, 
Southern & Northern Zambia) SIDA              8,000  ? (1991-92) 
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Zambia Forestry College  CIDA           127,000  1993 
Acacia Trials CIDA             80,000  1993 
Forest Resource Management Study JICA        4,098,119  1993-1995 
Forest Research Training ODA           149,000  1993-1994 
SADC Tree Seed Centre CIDA  1993-1998 
Support to the Forestry Extension Services in 
Solwezi GDS (German Devt Svc)              2,808  1994-1996 
Chinyunyu Forestry Project, Chongwe. NORAD        4,091,090  1995 
Forest Extension in Northern Province.  NVS (Norway)      16,000,000  1995 
Provincial Forestry Action Programme, Phase I FINNIDA        4,400,000  1995-2005 
Forest Extension in Northern Province.  NVS (Norway)      38,000,000  1996 
Zambia Teak Forests. GTZ      49,000,000  1996 
Beekeeping Training & Extension Services, NW 
Province. GDS        6,329,912  1997 
Conservation of the Zambia Teak Forests GTZ        3,000,000  1997-2003 
Finnish Grant to the Provincial Forestry Programme, 
bridging phase. FINNIDA     230,520,000  1997-2005 
Provincial Forestry Action Programme, Phase II FINNIDA (Euro 6,389,056)        8,303,167  2000-2005 
  Total     405,690,071    
      
      
C.  Non-Governmental Funded Projects 
      
PROJECT FINANCIER US$ YEAR 
Promotion of Beekeeping AFRICARE           990,000  1983 
Forestry Extension and Saw-milling Finnish Volunteer Services             53,200  1987-1996 
Promotion of Agroforestry AFRICARE             92,000  1988 
Support to Beekeepers Association North-Western 
Province OXFAM  1992-1996 
Nursery Establishment and Tree Planting in Petauke Lutheran World Federation              1,158  1994-1996 
Support to Crafts Association in North-Western 
Province OXFAM             23,000  ?  1996-(1999) 
Tree Planting in Petauke MS-ZAMBIA              2,000  1996 
Beekeeping Training & Extension Services, NW 
Province. ADP/IFAD      29,176,691  1997 
  Total      30,338,049    
      
  Grand Total     493,906,346    
 
Notes:   
 
?  means not too sure about the dates. 
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GRZ Funding to Forestry Capital Projects, 1994=100 (ZMK '000). 
 
Year National Level Provincial Level  Total Allocation 
1980-1984 984830769 2975438462 3960269231 
1985-1989 1283492644 512536552 1796029195 
1990-1993 290819669 113464695 404284365 
1994-1997 0 0 0 
1998-2001 0 0 0 
2002-2005 0 0 0 
 
Source:  MENR, Zambia Forestry Action Programme, Vol. II 
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Change in PFAs, Annual Allocations and Forestry Personnel, 1962-2005. 
 
Year 
PFAs (million ha.) Operational 
Funds 
(ZMK, 
million) 
Capital 
Funds 
(ZMK, 
million) 
Forestry Department Personnel
1
 
Total 
Staff 
Revenue 
(ZMK, 
million) 
Currently 
Reported 
Projection
2
 Professional Technical 
Field 
Staff 
Admin 
1962   5,000,000  5.00 4071.5 499.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1071.1 
1963   5,041,525  5.04 4278.3 622.5 " " " " " 1271.5 
1964   5,229,167  5.23 4919.9 1349.7 " " " " " 1395.0 
1965   5,236,267  5.24 5416.3 1720.5 " " " " " 1520.9 
1966   5,346,067  5.35 5825.6 1967.5 " " " " " 1784.2 
1967   5,590,192  5.59 7363.6 4502.1 " " " " " 1788.3 
1968   5,618,342  5.62 24011.7 3983.8 " " " " " 2333.9 
1969   5,710,484  5.71 34707.3 2446.9 " " " " " 3840.0 
1970   5,805,609  5.81 3048.1 5474.7 33 66 350 145 594 1244.7 
1971    6,889,000  6.89 5951.7 2722.9 36 179 287 109 522 2123.3 
1972   6,419,100  6.42 3911.7 222.3 33 166 280 119 598 2364.6 
1973   7,054,600  7.05 2393.5 813.2 33 103 284 132 552 2368.9 
1974   7,130,600  7.13 3000.1 842.7 26 84 284 132 552 2789.7 
1975    7,189,480  7.16 1080.0 893.9 36 53 214 145 448 4375.1 
1976    7,423,902  7.33 1000.0 706.7 28 82 267 145 522 4112.3 
1977    7,496,343  7.42 1071.4 432.8 26 114 374 144 658 4285.1 
1978   7,496,343  7.50 1412.5 1249.9 37 118 367 135 657 3670.8 
1979    7,841,425  7.67 1277.8 6797.9 37 150 326 142 655 3358.3 
1980   7,601,400  7.60 830.0 764.0 41 190 222 132 585 3181.3 
1981   7,635,000  7.64 863.6 1394.5 50 213 333 92 688 4192.7 
1982   7,635,000  7.64 175.0 1253.3 47 244 353 161 805 4958.9 
1983   7,605,500  7.61 453.3 2010.0 40 82 372 82 576 717.7 
1984   7,462,149  7.46 105.6 480.6 40 81 365 80 566 576.8 
1985   7,378,305  7.38 77.8 3.0 38 97 365 80 580 478.3 
1986   7,405,500  7.41 295.2 794.0 35 113 3132 63 3343 587.5 
1987   7,435,835  7.44 169.4 409.8 29 117 1410 58 1614 254.3 
1988   7,425,454  7.43 272.3 0.0 21 108 1303 55 1487 561.2 
1989   7,375,533  7.38 426.2 1404.3 21 128 1303 55 1507 492.9 
1990   7,375,533  7.38 145.3 0.0 19 152 1288 55 1514 250.9 
1991   7,375,533  7.38 83.6 351.4 23 142 1273 62 1500 364.6 
1992   7,361,406  7.36 6.4 154.9 23 130 1249 62 1464 97.4 
1993   7,233,884  7.23 6.0 0.1 28 130 1247 54 1459 93.3 
1994   7,233,884  7.10 7.1 0.0 28 128 1188 50 1394 95.3 
1995   7,233,884  6.49 5.7 0.0 17 112 1120 64 1313 436.1 
1996   7,199,802  6.49 4.4 10.4 21 124 1064 63 1272 327.8 
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Appendix 5 (cont’d) 
 
Year 
PFAs (million ha.) Operational 
Funds 
(ZMK, 
million) 
Capital 
Funds 
(ZMK, 
million) 
Forestry Department Personnel
1
 
Total 
Staff 
Revenue 
(ZMK, 
million) 
Currently 
Reported 
Projection
2 Professional Technical 
Field 
Staff 
Admin 
1997   7,176,273  6.46 5.0 30.5 26 115 695 47 883 265.1 
1998   7,107,256  6.43 4.0 0.0 26 115 695 47 883 284.4 
1999   7,103,099  6.37 6.0 362.3 26 115 695 47 883 416.1 
2000   7,103,099  6.36 4.4 57.0 41 539 478 60 883 399.8 
2001   7,103,099  5.62 83.3 327.6 44 434 273 135 886 342.5 
2002   7,103,099  5.16 231.4 305.6 22 439 384 82 927 202.3 
2003   7,103,099  5.16 135.5 0.0 23 417 374 76 890 221.0 
2004   7,103,099  5.16 1136.9 0.0 23 418 374 76 891 111.2 
2005   7,103,099  5.16 950.5 0.0 23 418 374 76 891 102.0 
1
 No data available for 1962 to 1969. 
2
 Projected status, adjustment based on reports from the Provinces. This figure may be possibly lower. 
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